European populist radical right leaders’ foreign policy beliefs: An operational code analysis
| Author | Özgür Özdamar,Erdem Ceydilek |
| DOI | 10.1177/1354066119850254 |
| Published date | 01 March 2020 |
| Date | 01 March 2020 |
https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066119850254
European Journal of
International Relations
2020, Vol. 26(1) 137 –162
© The Author(s) 2019
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/1354066119850254
journals.sagepub.com/home/ejt
E
JR
I
European populist radical right
leaders’ foreign policy beliefs:
An operational code analysis
Özgür Özdamar
Bilkent University, Turkey
Erdem Ceydilek
Bilkent University, Turkey
Abstract
Despite the significance of the subject, studies on the foreign policy preferences of
European populist radical right leaders are scarce except for a handful of examples.
Are European populist radical right leaders more hostile than other world leaders or
comparatively friendly? Do they use cooperative or conflictual strategies to achieve
their political goals? What are the leadership types associated with their strategic
orientations in international relations? Using the operational code construct in this
empirical study, we answer these questions and depict the foreign policy belief systems
of seven European populist radical right leaders. We test whether they share a common
pattern in their foreign policy beliefs and whether their foreign policy belief systems
are significantly different from the norming group of average world leaders. The results
indicate that European populist radical right leaders lack a common pattern in terms of
their foreign policy belief systems. While the average scores of the analysed European
populist radical right leaders suggest that they are more conflictual in their world
views, results also show that they employ instrumental approaches relatively similar
to the average group of world leaders. This article illuminates the microfoundations
of strategic behaviour in international relations and arrives at conclusions about the
role of European populist radical right leaders in mainstream International Relations
discussions, such as idealism versus realism. In this sense, the cognitivist research school
complements and advances structural accounts of international relations by analysing
leadership in world affairs.
Corresponding author:
Erdem Ceydilek, Bilkent University, 06800, Bilkent, Ankara, Turkey.
Email: ceydilek@bilkent.edu.tr
850254EJT0010.1177/1354066119850254European Journal of International RelationsÖzdamar and Ceydilek
research-article2019
Article
138 European Journal of International Relations 26(1)
Keywords
European populist radical right, foreign policy analysis, foreign policy beliefs,
leadership, operational code analysis
Introduction
European international affairs have been relatively cooperative since the end of the
Second World War. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)/European Union
(EU) expansions to the east further strengthened the calm on the continent. Recent politi-
cal developments, however, have caused concerns. A major culprit is the populist radical
right, which paves the way for illiberal democracies in Europe, challenging the legiti-
macy of the EU. The success of the UK’s populists in the Brexit campaign stunned the
continent in 2016. The rise of populist authoritarian governments in Hungary and Poland,
and Marine Le Pen’s, Geert Wilders’s and Norbert Hofer’s significant electoral cam-
paigns, reveal important insights into the current landscape of European politics. As
Chryssogelos (2017) notes, populism is no longer considered a phenomenon isolated
within domestic politics; world affairs are also largely influenced by it. Populist radical
right leaders influence their countries’ foreign policies even when they are not in power.
Research conducted on the foreign policy positions of populist radical right parties in
Europe has found a number of common agendas and concerns, such as Euroscepticism,
migration (especially by Muslim populations), terrorism, Turkey’s EU membership aspi-
rations and anti-Americanism (Chryssogelos, 2017; Liang, 2007). Despite these com-
monalities, inconsistent and changing views on most foreign policy issues are distinctive
characteristics of European populists. The National Rally’s (formerly known as the Front
National (FN)) radically different attitudes towards Russia during and in the aftermath of
the Cold War (Shields, 2007), the Freedom Party of Austria’s (FPÖ’s) contradictory posi-
tions on relations with the US and Russia (Meyer, 2007), or European populist radical
right (EPRR) leaders’ more positive attitudes vis-a-vis the US after the election of
President Donald Trump in 2016 present some examples in this regard.
Despite its utmost importance, scholarship has largely ignored populist radical right
leaders’ international agendas, with only a few exceptions. Liang’s (2007) edited volume
deals with various populist radical right parties in Europe, with a focus on foreign policy.
Verbeek and Zaslove’s (2015, 2017) studies analyse the relationship between populism
and foreign policy in general. The ‘Europe’s troublemakers: The populist challenge to
foreign policy’ report by a pan-European network of experts on radical right populism in
Europe describes EPRR parties as the ‘troublemakers’ of Europe in terms of their atti-
tudes towards foreign policymaking (Balfour et al., 2016). Cas Mudde (2016: 14) has
argued that ‘recent developments, like Brexit and the refugee crisis, have made it clear
that’ this lack of academic interest cannot continue ‘as radical right parties are increas-
ingly affecting foreign policy, and not just the process of European integration’.
This study aims to fill this gap by analysing the foreign policy belief systems of seven
influential EPRR leaders: Marine Le Pen (France), Viktor Orban (Hungary), Geert Wilders
(Netherlands), Nigel Farage (Britain), Jimmie Åkesson (Sweden), Frauke Petry (Germany)
and Norbert Hofer (Austria).1 We answer the following questions: are the foreign policy
To continue reading
Request your trial