European Union Conditionality and the Acquis Communautaire
| Date | 01 July 2002 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0192512102023003003 |
| Published date | 01 July 2002 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
European Union Conditionality and the
Acquis Communautaire
HEATHER GRABBE
ABSTRACT. The EU’s conditions for the central and east European
applicants look deceptively straightforward: they comprise stable
democracy, a competitive market economy, and the capacity to
implement EU laws and policies (the so called acquis communautaire).
However, they are very general and not amenable to quantitative
assessment, leaving ambiguity about exactly when they have been met.
This ambiguity increases the EU’s power in accession negotiations, but
the accompanying uncertainty diffuses its influence in shaping
institutional and policy choices. This article examines the EU’s accession
conditionality levers and the constraints on their use. It concludes that
readiness for membership depends not only on technical progress in
negotiations, but also on when the current member-states are politically
ready for enlargement.
Keywords:• Central Europe • Conditionality • Eastern Europe •
European Union
Introduction
The conditions for joining the European Union (EU) look deceptively straight-
forward: an aspirant member has to be a stable democracy and competitive market
economy, and demonstrate that it is willing and able to take on all EU policies,
both present and future. These conditions seem self-evident, a set of “motherhood
and apple pie” criteria to which no self-respecting European could object. They
are also essential to reassure EU states that the Central and Eastern European
countries (CEE)1will—if they become members—look like familiar, west European
countries, not bringing instability, authoritarianism, or economic collapse into the
Union.
On closer inspection, however, the membership conditions are more confusing,
International Political Science Review (2002), Vol 23, No. 3, 249–268
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and “readiness to join” lies in the eye of the beholder. The conditions are very
general: they do not, for example, define what constitutes a market economy or a
stable democracy. Do new member states need a German economy, British civil
service, Swedish welfare state, and French electoral system? Or how about a Greek
economy, Belgian civil service, Austrian industrial relations, and Italian electoral
system? The European Union does not present a uniform model of democracy or
capitalism, and neither has it tried to define one. Diversity is a key feature of the
Union, and the principle of integration while respecting difference remains
important.
But how far does the principle of respecting diversity apply to applicant
countries? What exactly are the minimum standards of political institutions, public
administration, implementation of legislation, and economic performance that
are essential to join the Union, and what are merely desirable? It is not self-evident
what kind of economies and political systems would meet the Copenhagen
criteria. It is even hard to say whether all the current member states are “ready to
join,” as they have never been judged on the Copenhagen conditions. For example,
Belgium’s public administration, France’s industrial policy, and Germany’s state
aids might be unacceptable if they were applicants. Some Commission officials
claim that no current member state fully implements more than 80 percent of EU
regulations: so is it fair to demand 95 percent adherence from the East
Europeans? The question of double standards remains open.
This article is about the complexity of EU conditionality and the puzzles it
contains for political scientists. Although the conditions seem straightforward,
analyzing them is problematic because their interpretation is complex and what
would count as meeting them is opaque. The first section of this article sets out
the main elements of EU conditionality and some of the central questions
surrounding them. The next section sets out the course of negotiations so far,
followed by a section discussing the conditionality levers available to the Union to
effect institutional and policy change in CEE, while the following section points to
some of the constraints on their effectiveness. The final section considers when
the candidates will be ready to join.
How European Union Conditionality Works
EU conditionality is not limited to enlargement. The Union applies both positive
and negative forms of conditionality to third countries for benefits such as trade
concessions, aid, cooperation agreements, and political contacts. Since the late
1980s, political conditions have increasingly been applied, as well as economic
ones. Both practical and ideological motivations lie behind the development of
political conditionality, and protectionist politics have had an influence (Weber,
1995). In its dealings with third countries, the Union has shown a preference for
using “carrots” rather than “sticks,” and its conditionality is not always applied
consistently.
The conditions for accession set for the CEE countries were the most detailed
and comprehensive ever formulated. The European Union attached conditions to
aid, trade, and political relations from 1988 onwards (Smith, 1997). Formal
democratic and market economy conditions were then imposed in 1993 to
overcome opposition from several member states to eastward enlargement. For
the neutral EFTA countries which joined in 1995, the Commission had stated that
the entire acquis communautaire had to be accepted, including the common foreign
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