Evaluating Scientific Evidence: An Interdisciplinary Framework for Intellectual Due Process by Erica Beecher‐Monas
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2230.2008.00728_3.x |
| Published date | 01 November 2008 |
| Date | 01 November 2008 |
Erica Beecher-Monas, Evaluating Scienti¢c Evidence: An Interdisciplinary
Framework for Intellectual Due Process
,Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2007, 254 pp, pb d24.99.
Questionsabouttheadmissibilityofscienti¢cevidenceposedi⁄cultproblemsfor
the courts, for theyconfront judges with technical issues which they may ¢nd dif-
¢cult to understa nd.Yet, es pecially in jury trials, it i sc ommonly thought that judges
need to grapple seriously with these questions, for otherwise verdicts risk being
based on science of dubious validity. Drawing on the US Supreme Court’s decision
in Daubert (509 US 579 (1993)), Beecher Monas’ aim is to help judges (as well as
lawyers and scholars) to make better informed analyses of these tricky issues.
Beecher-Monas tends to the view that there is a scienti¢c method; once this is
identi¢ed, judges and others can use it to assess scienti¢c evidence to see whether
it is the real thing or just pseudo-science. This idea ^ the existence of a scienti¢c
method which can be used to distinguish science from non-science ^ is one that
no sensible philosopher now subscribes to. Thus the opening chapters are heavy
going as we are treated to sweeping statements ^ manyof them loosely based on
the work of Karl Popper ^ about what proper scientists do.Worse, some of the
writing displays the pathologies of the style of scholarship that seems to be
encouraged by US law reviews: disconnected sentencesthat exist mainly as hooks
for long footnotes. That a 300 word footnote at p.11 is repeated word for word at
p.17 indicates the lack of proper editing of the text.
Thankfully, things get better. Once the evaluative frameworkhas been set out,
the following chapters focus on speci¢c topics: toxic torts, criminal identi¢cation
evidence, testimony on future dangerousness, social psychology and battered
woman syndrome. At this level, there are useful things to be said about the valid-
ity of particu lar methodologies and the common problems in their application.
The text is still sometimes fairly indigestible: the overview of epidemiological
methodology in the toxic torts chapter often lacks clear explanation, and it is only
when weget to a speci¢c example at p. 85 that the analysis comes tolife. But these
chapters generally o¡er a useful primer on the relevant topics, with the lengthy
footnotes giving plenty of links to more detailed material.While there is little
here that is terribly new, Beecher-Monas does a good job synthesising the large
and often complex literature on her topics.
Even in these later chapters, though, there are things to qu ibble with when
Beecher-Monas’s prejudices aboutscience come to thefore.The critique ofvarious
types of identi¢cation evidence ^ handwriting, ¢ngerprints, bitemarks ^ is gen-
erally well done, and illu minates one of th e more depressing corners of evide nce
law.While there are manycriticisms to be made of ¢ngerprint evidence, though,
it is not clear that holding it up to somePopperian paradigm of science to see if it
should be admitted is a sensible exercise. Beecher-Monas is critical of the fact that
there is no proof that ¢ngerprints are unique, and that there are no statistics to
facilitate th e comparison of i ndividual ¢ngerprint features. It may be, though,
that ¢ngerprint features and their con¢gurations are so variable that this sort of
research agenda is, if not impossible, at least very hard to undertake. Still, the sort
of view put forward by David Stoney, that ¢ngerprint features ‘have an extreme
variability that is readily appreciated intuitively and which becomes objectively
Reviews
10 43
r2008 The Author.Journal Compilation r2008 The Modern Law Review Limited.
(2008) 71(6) 1032^1049
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