Evans v Evans
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judgment Date | 02 July 1790 |
| Date | 02 July 1790 |
| Court | Consistory Court |
English Reports Citation: 161 E.R. 466
IN THE CONSISTORY COURT
[35] evans evans. 2nd July, 1790,-Divorce by reason of cruelty. What circumstances constitute cruelty in construction of law. Dismissed. [Discussed, Curtis v. Curtis, 1858, 1 Sw. & Tr 192. Followed, Kelly v. Kelly, 1870, L. R. 2 P. & D. 61. Approved, Russell v. Russell, [1897] A. C. 395 ] 3 This was a case of divorce, by reason of cruelty, instituted by Mrs. Evans against 0- her husband. vp Judgment-Sir William Scott. This cause has been carefully instructed * with j evidence by the practisers, who have had the conduct of it, and has been very ^ elaborately argued by the counsel on both sides. It now devolves upon me to pronounce the legal result of the evidence which has been thus collected, arid of the arug-ments raised upon that evidence-a duty heavy in itself, from the quantity and the weight of the matter, and extremely painful, from the nature and tendency of a great part of it, and from the inefficacy of this Court to give relief adequate to the wishes of both parties. Heavy and painful as it is, it is a duty which must be discharged : and which can only be discharged with satisfaction under a consciousness that it is discharged with attention and impartiality, and under the reflection that if, after the endeavours which I have used in cleansing and in instructing my own conscience upon the subject, I should have taken what may be deemed an undue impression of the case, the laws of this country have not been deficient in providing a mode by which the parties may be relieved against the infirmities of my judgment. The humanity of the Court has been loudly arid repeatedly invoked. Humanity ia the second [36] virtue of courts, but undoubtedly the first is justice. If it were a question of humanity simply, and of humanity which confined its views merely to the happiness of the present parties, it would be a, question easily decided upon first impressions. Every body must feel a wish to sever those who wish to live separate from each other, who cannot live together with any degree of harmony, and consequently with any degree of happiness ; but my situation does not allow me to indulge the feelings, much less the fiist feelings of an individual. The law has said that married persons shall mot be legally separated upon the mere disinclination of one or both. to cohabit together. The disinclination must be founded upon reasons which the law approves, and it is my duty to see whether those reasons exist in the present case. To vindicate the policy of the law is no necessary part of the office of a judge ; * There were several pleadings, and one iu exception to witnesses, on which the observations of the Court will be introduced, as a note, in the latter part of this case. 1HAG.CON.S7. EVANS V. EVANS 467 but if it were;, it would not be difficult to shew that the law in this respect has acted with its usual wisdom and humanity, with that true wisdom, and that real humanity, that regards the general interests of mankind For though in particular cases the repugnance of the law to dissolve the obligations of matrimonial cohabitation may operate with great seventy upon individuals, yet it must be carefully remembered that the geBeial happiness of the married life is secured by its indissolubility. When people understand that they must live together, except for a very few reasons known to the law, they learn to soften by mutual accommodation that yoke which they know they cannot shake off; they become good husbands and good wives from the necessity of remaining husbands and wives; for necessity is a powerful master in teaching the du-[$7]-ties which it imposes. If it were once understood that upon mutual disgust married persons might be legally separated, many couples who now pass through the woild with mutual comfort, with attention to their common offspring and to the moral order of civil society, might have been at this moment living in a state of mutual uukindness, in a state of estrangement from their common offspring, and in a sttte of the most licentious and unreserved immorality. In this case, as in many others, the happiness of some individuals must be sacrificed to the greater and more general goad. That the duty of cohabitation is released by the cruelty of one of the parties is admitted, but the question occurs, What is cruelty ? In the present case it is hardly necessary for me to define it; because the facts here complained of are such as fall within the most restricted definition of cruelty; they affect not only the comfort, but they affect the health, and even the life of the party. I shall therefore decline the task of laying down a direct definition This, however, must be understood, that it is the duty of Courts, and consequently the inclination of Courts, to keep the rule extremely strict. The causes must be grave and weighty, and such as shew an absolute impossibility that the duties of the married life can be discharged. In a state of personal danger no duties can be discharged ; for the duty of self-preservation rnuat take place before the duties of marriage, which are secondary both in commencement and in obh'gation ; but what falls short of this is with great caution to be admitted. The rule of " per quod consortium amittitur " is but an inadequate test; for it still remains to be enquired what conduct ought to produce that effect 1 whether the consortium is [38] reasonably lost 1 and whether the party quitting has not too hastily abandoned the consortium What merely wounds the mental feelings is in few cases to be admitted where they are not accompanied with bodily injury, either actual or menaced. Mere austerity of temper, petulance of manners, rudeness of language, a want of civil attention and accommodation, even occasional sallies of passion, if they do not threaten bodily barm, do not amount to legal cruelty: they are high moral offences in the marriage-state undoubtedly, not innocent surely in any state of life, but still they are not that cruelty against which the law can relieve. Under such misconduct of either of the parties, for it may exist on the one side as well as on the other, the suffering party must bear in some degree the consequences of an injudicious connection , must subdue by decent resistance or by prudent conciliation , and if this cannot be done, both must suffer in silence. And if it be complained that by this inactivity of the Courts much injustice may be suffered, and much misery produced, the answer is that Courts of Justice do not pretend to furnish cures for all the miseries of human life. They redress or punish gross violations of duty, but they go no farther; they cannot make men virtuous; and, as the happiness of the world depends upon its virtue, there may be much unhappmess in it which human laws cannot undertake to remove. Still leas is it cruelty where it wounds not the natural feelings, but the acquired feelings arising from particular rank and situation ; for the Court has no scale of sensibilities by which it can gauge the quantum of injury done and felt; and, therefore, though the Court will not absolutely exclude considerations of that sort, where they are stated [39] merely as matter of aggravation, yet they cannot constitute cruelty where it would not otherwise have existed: of course, the denial of little indulgences and particular accommodations, which the delicacy of the world is apt to number amongst its necessaries, is not cruelty. It may, to be sure, be a harsh thing to refuse the use of a carriage or the use of a servant, it may in many cases be extremely unhandsome, extremely disgraceful to the character of the husband; but the Eeelesiastical Court does not look to such matters: the great ends of marriage 468 EVANS V. EVANS 1 HAG. CON. 40. may very well be carried on without them; and if people will quarrel about such matters, and which they certainly may do in many cases with a great deal of acrimony, acd sometimes with much reason, they yet must decide such matters as well as they can in their own domestic forum. These are negative descriptions of cruelty , they shew only what is not crueltv, and ara yet perhaps the safest definitions which can be given under the infinite variety of possible cases that may come before the Court. But if it were at a\\ necessary to lay down an affirmative rule, I take it that the rule cited by Dr. Bever from Clarke, and the other books of practice, is a good general outline of the canon law, the law of this country, upon this subject. In the older cases of this sort which I have had an opportunity of looking into, I have observed that the danger of life, limb, or health is usually inserted as the ground upon which the Court has proceeded to a separation. This doctrine has been repeatedly applied by the Court in the eases tiat hava been cited. The Court has never been driven off this ground. It [40] has been always jealous of the inconvenience of departing from it, and I have heard no one case cited in which the Court has granted a divorce without proof given of a reasonable apprehension of bodily hurt. I say an apprehension, because assuredly the Court is not to wait till the hurt is actually done; but the apprehension must be reasonable . it must not be an apprehension arising merely from an exquisite and diseased sensibility of mind. Petty vexations applied to such a constitution of mind may certainly in time wear out the animal machine, but still they are not cases of legal relief, people mast relieve themselves as well as they can by prudent resistance, by calling in the succours of religion and the consolation of friends; but the aid of Courts is not to be resorted to in such cases with any effect. The parties in this case are a Mr and Mrs. Evans, proceeding in a cause of cruelty brought by Mrs. Evans against her husband. The libel states the marriage at Calcutta, in the East Indies, in the year 1778, and it proceeds...
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