Examining informal defence and security arrangements’ legalization: Canada–US agreements, 1955–2005
| Author | Anessa L. Kimball |
| Published date | 01 September 2017 |
| Date | 01 September 2017 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/0020702017723931 |
| Subject Matter | Scholarly Essays |
Scholarly Essay
Examining informal
defence and security
arrangements’
legalization: Canada–US
agreements, 1955–2005
Anessa L. Kimball
Political Science, Universite
´Laval, Que
´bec, Canada
Abstract
This article presents and examines a model of legalization on an original dataset of
informal Canadian–US defence and security arrangements (DSA) formed between 1955
and 2005. Non-treaty arrangements permit US presidents to bypass Senate ratification,
resulting in expediency and secrecy, both assets in defence and security relations. That
withstanding, informal arrangements contain provisions responding to certain strategic
problems. They detail aspects of legalization: delegation; obligations; and precision.
Leaders select informal arrangements to incur fewer public commitments, but design
them to ensure credibility. In that context, what factors shape informal DSA legaliza-
tion? Propositions developed from delegation and rational institutionalist arguments
identify the factors influencing informal DSA legalization. The Canada–US case is ger-
mane due to its ‘‘rules-based’’ nature and heterogeneity. An original dataset of the legal
design of eighty-two bilateral DSA is introduced and analyzed. Results confirm cabinet
shuffles and unified governments decrease DSA legalization while Democrat presidents
and rising military threats increase it.
Keywords
US–Canada, defence and security cooperation, delegation theory, rational institutional
design, legalization, Poisson model
International Journal
2017, Vol. 72(3) 380–400
!The Author(s) 2017
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DOI: 10.1177/0020702017723931
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Corresponding author:
Anessa L. Kimball, Political Science, Universite
´Laval, 1030, Avenue des Sciences-Humaines, local 4431,
Quebec, G1V 0A6, Canada.
Email: anessa.kimball@pol.ulaval.ca
Notwithstanding the prominence of treaties as a public form of cooperation,
empirically they are one of several forms that states choose among when contract-
ing internationally. Agreements range in public nature and legalization, creating a
vast understudied heterogeneity of arrangements,
1
notably in the realm of defence
and security where incentives to control public access to the arrangement and
knowledge about the partner’s responsibilities are substantial. Scholars argue
that publicizing a commitment (e.g., through legislative ratification) increases cred-
ibility
2
because costs for non-compliance increase. Despite governments’ needs to
credibly bind themselves to overcome the commitment problem, Lipson identifies
reasons that states prefer informal arrangements for defence and security (DS).
3
Distributional concerns, the need for DS policy secrecy, and party politics may
complicate ratification, often moving agreements closer to legislative preferences.
4
Thus, the secrecy, flexibility, and expediency of informal arrangements increases
their desirability.
Commitment publicness via ratification is one method to invoke credibility,
agreement design being the other.
5
Bypassing legislative influence forsakes public-
ness, but whether legalization is also affected in informal contracting in DS is the
puzzle under study. Koremenos argues that states design various arrangements
(in differing sectors) in response to specific strategic problems.
6
If she is correct,
then assuming informal arrangements are designed without intent is problematic,
to the extent that they outnumber formal DS treaties between many pairs of states.
Most pairs of states are linked through a mix of both formal and informal agree-
ments; democratic pairs of states are likely to use informal arrangements (over
mixed or autocratic pairs). There exists a vast substructure of informal DS arrange-
ments, contracted through memorandums of understanding, exchanges of diplo-
matic notes, agreements, etc.; they are the empirical majority of agreements,
particularly among democratic states. The US manages over 450 bilateral formal
and informal DS arrangements with its key allies in Europe, and over 700 including
key allies in Asia.
7
Given the empirical importance of those arrangements, a sys-
tematic study has potential to yield insight about how key international actors
contract informally in the DS sector. Specifically, this study examines the extent
to which informal defence and security arrangements (DSA) are legalized/binding
1. Charles Lipson argues that ‘‘the scale and the diversity of such accords indicate that they are an
important feature of world politics, not rare and peripheral’’: Lipson, ‘‘Why are some international
agreements informal?’’ International Organization 45, no. 4 (1991): 495–538, 498.
2. Helen Milner, Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).
3. Lipson, ‘‘Why are some international agreements informal?’’.
4. Milner, Interests, Institutions, and Information.
5. Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson and Duncan Snidal, ‘‘The rational design of international
institutions,’’ International Organization 55, no. 4 (2001): 761–800.
6. Barbara Koremenos, ‘‘When, what, and why do states choose to delegate?’’ Law & Contemporary
Problems 71, no. 1 (2008): 151–192; Barbara Koremenos, ‘‘Exit, no exit,’’ Duke Journal of
Comparative & International Law 21, no. 1 (2010): 81–119.
7. Jennifer Kavanagh, ‘‘US security related agreements in force since 1955: Introducing a new data-
base,’’ RAND Corporation, RR763, 2014.
Kimball 381
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