Expert Witnesses and Battered Women—The Lighthouse Flashes!
| Author | Frank Bates |
| DOI | 10.1177/002201839405800106 |
| Published date | 01 February 1994 |
| Date | 01 February 1994 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
EXPERT
WITNESSES
AND
BATTERED
WOMEN-THE
LIGHTHOUSE
FLASHESP
Frank Bates'
The
recent decision of the South Australian
Court
of Criminal Appeal in
R v Runjanjic and Kontinnen' deals with a variety of matters which
deserve to be canvassed beyond its jurisdiction of origin and, indeed, its
country of origin at large.
Quite
apart
from its immediate subject-matter,
which is of intrinsic interest itself, the case illustrates the need for a
generally
broader
awareness of developments in the law of evidence
across common law boundaries.
It
is clear, for example,
that
the decision
of the House of Lords in Rvp3 has demonstrated a wholly different
attitude towards the reception of similar fact evidence from
that
to be
found in decisions of the High Court of Australia." Runjanjic and
Kontinnen is also notable for its reliance on authorities from elsewhere
than Australia.
The
far from edifying facts in the case at hand were that both of the
women accused had had sexual relationships with
one
H. Both of these
relationships were characterised by a domineering attitude towards them
and
continual violence.
The
facts which eventually gave rise to the
present prosecution and subsequent appeals were that all three
protagonists lured the woman victim to a particular house so
that
H
might violently interrogate her regarding some allegedly stolen property.
The
victim was detained and severely beaten. Both appellants were
convicted of false imprisonment and causing grievous bodily harm with
intent." In defence, it was argued
that
the two women were not party to
any plan involving violence or imprisonment and that
H's
violence was
not anticipated by them. Alternatively, they claimed
that
they had been
subjected to duress. Their specific grounds of appeal were, first,
that
the
verdicts were unsafe and unsatisfactory; secondly, and more particularly,
that
the judge had wrongly refused to admit certain specific expert
evidence.
JThe lighthouse metaphor has proved popular with various writers in various contexts:
see, W L Prosser, 'Lighthouse No
Good'
(1948) I JLegal Ed 257; C Wells, 'The Mental
Element in Crime 1974-83: Lighthouse Some
Good'
[l984J Crim LR 652; F Bates,
'Property Disputes and Unformalised Relationships: Looking for a Lighthouse' (1986) 60
Aust LJ 31.
• LLM, Professor of Law, University of Newcastle (NSW).
2(1991) 53 A Crim R 362.
3[l991J 3 All
ER
337.
4See Markby v R (1978) 140
CLR
198; Perry v R (1982) 150
CLR
580; Sutton v R (1984)
152
CLR
528; Hoch v R (1989) 165
CLR
292; Harriman v R (1989) 167 CLR 590. These
cases, very broadly, represent an adherence to the principles enunciated by the House of
Lords in Broadman v
DPP
[1975J AC 421, whereas R v P does not.
SSee, P Gillies, Criminal Law (2nd ed, 1990) at pp 524ff.
85
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