Explaining Capitalism: The Method of Marx's Political Economy
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9248.1989.tb00292.x |
| Author | William James Booth |
| Date | 01 December 1989 |
| Published date | 01 December 1989 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
Political
Studies
(1989),
XXXVII,
612-625
Explaining Capitalism: The Method
of
Marx’s Political Economy
WILLIAM
JAMES
BOOTH*
McGill
University
The central thesis of this article is that Marx’s explanation of the significant
phenomena of the capitalist economy draws upon a basic theoretical syntax
of
a
determinist/latent functionalist type. This conclusion has three consequences. First, it
extends the range of functionalist explanation in Marx beyond its traditional loci,
namely the theory
of
history and the analysis of the role
of
the state and other
institutions in stabilizing capitalism, into the very heart of Marx’s project, his political
economy. Secondly,
it
has a powerful, though indirect, impact on our understanding of
what might loosely
be
called the normative component of Marx’s writings in as much
as it identifies a specific sort
of
unfreedom peculiar to capitalist society. Thirdly, it
shows just how great a challenge is mounted against Marx’s project by those who seek
to recast its method
of
explanation along methodological individualist lines.
For
if
the
first two points are accurate, rational-choice Marxists aredrawn into a critique
of
both
the explanatory and normative core of Marxism.
Let me first deal with methodological individualism, and (with few exceptions) its
ethical counterparts, which have long been the
bCtes noires
of
Marxism. In a
doctrine known for the diversity of its offspring, as well as for the ferocity of their
debates, there are few pillars of constancy. The rejection of individualism, on
both explanatory and normative levels, is one of those few pillars which serve to
distinguish Marxism (at least in its self-understanding) from non-Marxist social
science. The writings
of
Jon Elster, Adam Przeworski and John Roemer are
among the most daring attempts to refurbish Marx’s intellectual legacy. The
daring
of
their work consists, on the one side, in the fundamental
methodological
challenge that they raise against traditional Marxism and, on the other side, in
their efforts
to
place themselves within that tradition, specifically within its
normative
component. The twofold character of the novelty of rational-choice
Marxism is important to underline. Critiques
of
Marx’s (and Marxist) methods
of explanation are hardly new. What is novel in the rational-choice challenge is
the claim to preserve central features
of
Marxism while, at the same time,
supplanting its preferred mode
of
explanation with Marxism’s long-standing
b&es noires,
methodological individualism.’ In short, rational-choice Marxism’s
The author would
like
to thank
Polifical
Studies’
reviewers for their valuable criticisms
of
the
original draft of this essay.
’
For evidence that the fundamentalist hostility to methodological individualism is still alive see
S.
Meikle, ‘Making nonsense of Marx’ and
C.
Slaughter, ‘Making sense of Elster’, both in
Inquiry,
29
(1986), 29-43
and
4546
respectively.
0032-321 7/89/04/0612-14jrSO3.00
0
1989
Political Studies
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