Explaining interest group access to the European Commission’s expert groups
| Date | 01 June 2020 |
| DOI | 10.1177/1465116519886365 |
| Author | Carl Vikberg |
| Published date | 01 June 2020 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Article
Explaining interest
group access to the
European Commission’s
expert groups
Carl Vikberg
Department of Political Science, Stockholm University,
Stockholm, Sweden
Abstract
Conventional wisdom holds that interest group access to the European Commission is
biased in favor of specific interests and against diffuse interests. Yet, patterns of access
vary between policy areas. In this article, I map and explain the relative access of specific
and diffuse interests to the European Commission’s expert groups. I find that specific
interests gainmore access in general, but there are considerable variations across issues. I
argue that variations in access acrossexpert groups are explained bythe relative ability of
specific and diffuse interests to contest policies in different policy areas. This argument
gains support by statistical analyses using a novel dataset comprising all expert groups
with interest group participants. The findings suggest that a political logic helps explain
variations in specific and diffuse interest access to the Commission.
Keywords
Access, European Commission, expert groups, interest groups
Introduction
In the last few decades, the European Union (EU) has gone through what is
sometimes described as a participatory turn, centered on an increasing involvement
Corresponding author:
Carl Vikberg, Department of Political Science, Stockholm University, Universitetsv€
agen 10F, 106 91
Stockholm, Sweden.
Email: carl.vikberg@statsvet.su.se
European Union Politics
2020, Vol. 21(2) 312–332
!The Author(s) 2019
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DOI: 10.1177/1465116519886365
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of interest groups in the decision-making processes of its institutions (Kohler-Koch
and Quittkat, 2013; Saurugger, 2010). The European Commission, in particular, is
viewed as having adopted a civil society discourse (Saurugger, 2010: 471; Smismans,
2003), expressed in a multitude of advisory committees, high level groups, and other
consultative arrangements where interest groups
1
like business associations, labor
unions, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) participate.
While such interactions between decision makers and civil society are generally
seen as an important feature of democratic polities, scholars and NGOs frequently
highlight that interest group access to the European Commission is biased in favor
of specific interests (see e.g. ALTER-EU, 2013, 2014; Beyers, 2004; Rasmussen and
Gross, 2015), i.e. groups with a limited and well-defined constituency, such as
producers in a particular economic sector. So-called diffuse interests, on the
other hand, are seen as being disadvantaged. Diffuse interests are represented by
groups whose constituencies are larger and less well defined, with weaker socio-
economic ties among the constituents—a classic example being environmental
groups. The theoretical rationale behind this specific interest dominance is distinct-
ly functional. The Commission demands technical information to initiate effective
policy, and specific interests are comparatively well endowed with technical infor-
mation. They gain this information as part of their everyday activities, and face less
severe collective action problems than their diffuse interest counterparts, which
makes their collection and provision of information comparatively efficient (e.g.
Bouwen, 2002; Du
¨r and Mateo, 2016; Rasmussen and Gross, 2015).
2
As a result,
the Commission grants privileged access to specific interests.
However, while specific interests gain more access to the European Commission
on average, there are numerous indications that the representation of interests may
vary considerably between different types of issues (Beyers and Kerremans, 2004;
Rasmussen and Gross, 2015: 361). Given expectations about specific interests
being more effective than diffuse interests in collecting and providing technical
information, what accounts for these differences in access?
This article seeks to gain traction on this question by mapping and explaining
the relative access of specific and diffuse interests to the European Commission.
I conceive of relative access as the balance of interest groups representing specific
and diffuse interests in a venue with interest group access. Understanding when
and why different types of interest groups gain differential access to the
Commission is central to the theory and practice of EU politics in three respects.
First, it speaks to the question of interest group influence on EU political out-
comes. While access does not necessarily imply influence, it is generally conceived
of as a superior interest group strategy to exercise influence, compared to the use of
outside strategies like public campaigns (Dellmuth and Tallberg, 2017). If patterns
of access consistently privilege some interests over others, this may be reflected in
political outcomes. This should be particularly true for interest group access to the
Commission, since the shape of policy is more fluid at earlier stages of the policy
process (Eising, 2007: 333; Mazey and Richardson, 2006: 249). Second, it speaks to
questions of interest representation in the EU. Skewed access patterns could be
Vikberg 313
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