Explaining Interest Group Density Across Economic Sectors: Evidence from Germany
| Date | 01 May 2019 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0032321718774685 |
| Published date | 01 May 2019 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/0032321718774685
Political Studies
2019, Vol. 67(2) 459 –478
© The Author(s) 2018
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DOI: 10.1177/0032321718774685
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Explaining Interest Group
Density Across Economic
Sectors: Evidence from
Germany
Heike Klüver and Elisabeth Zeidler
Abstract
Why does the number of interest groups vary across economic sectors? Interest groups are an
important channel through which companies can transmit their policy preferences to decision-
makers. However, empirical research shows that the number of interest groups varies considerably
across sectors. We argue that the size and the wealth of the potential constituency as well as
government activity positively affect interest group density. We test our theoretical expectations
based on an unprecedented longitudinal analysis of interest groups that registered at the German
Bundestag from 1978 until 2013 and show that the number of firms, the wealth of an economic
sector, and government activity positively influence interest group density. However, we also find
that the relationship between interest groups and legislative activity is reciprocal as legislative
activity positively impacts the number of interest groups in an economic sector, but at the same
time interest group density also positively affects legislative activity.
Keywords
economic interest representation, interest groups, lobbying, Germany
Accepted: 11 April 2018
Introduction
Why does the number of interest groups vary across economic sectors? While this ques-
tion is interesting from an empirical point of view, it also renders a theoretical puzzle for
interest group scholars until today. Interest groups are an important channel through
which individual companies can transmit their policy preferences to decision-makers.
Interest groups establish formal and informal networks with policy-makers to express the
concerns of their member firms and influence legislation in line with their preferences. In
Department of Social Sciences, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Berlin, Germany
Corresponding author:
Heike Klüver, Department of Social Sciences, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Unter den Linden 6, 10099
Berlin, Germany.
Email: heike.kluever@hu-berlin.de
774685PCX0010.1177/0032321718774685Political StudiesKlüver and Zeidler
research-article2018
Article
460 Political Studies 67(2)
order to make their voice heard, firms belonging to the same economic sector get mobi-
lized by establishing and maintaining interest groups that lobby decision-makers in favor
of their common policy objectives. Accordingly, the vast majority of interest groups lob-
bying decision-makers in Western democracies are economic interest groups representing
the interests of companies (e.g. Baumgartner and Leech, 2001; Wonka et al., 2010).
However, empirical research shows that the number of interest groups varies consid-
erably across economic sectors (e.g. Berkhout et al., 2015; Gray and Lowery, 1996;
Messer et al., 2011). In some policy sectors, such as manufacturing, finance or health-
care, a large number of interest groups represent the interests of companies. In other
domains, such as defense or accommodation and food service activities, there are only
a small number of organizations representing a relatively narrow range of interests. The
density of the economic interest group system is therefore heavily biased toward a few
economic interests, while others are hardly represented (e.g. Baumgartner and Leech,
2001; Berkhout et al., 2015; Lowery et al., 2005; Messer et al., 2011). Economic inter-
est groups represent a crucial part of the interest group system in Western democracies.
Yet, while a bias in favor of economic groups compared with other groups has widely
been studied (e.g. Lowery et al., 2015), the bias within the economic interest group
population has received only little attention (e.g. Berkhout et al., 2015). In an effort to
solve this empirical puzzle, this article seeks to explain why the number of interest
groups varies across economic sectors.
Early scholars of interest group mobilization have either considered group-related fac-
tors like the potential constituency of organizations (Truman, 1951) or contextual charac-
teristics like the size of the government (Coughlin et al., 1990; Mitchell and Munger,
1991; Mueller and Murrell, 1986) as isolated factors explaining interest group density. By
contrast, Gray and Lowery (1996) have suggested a population ecology model for why
the number of interest groups varies across policy domains that constitute a coherent
theoretical framework combining a bottom-up and top-down explanation to account for
variation in interest group density (Lowery and Gray, 1995). They introduced the so-
called Energy-Stability-Area (ESA) model initially developed in population biology to
study the density of interest group systems. According to the ESA model, the potential
constituency and government activity simultaneously account for variation in interest
group density across sectors. More specifically, it is expected that the size of the potential
constituency and government activity positively affect the number of interest groups lob-
bying decision-makers in a policy domain. The ESA model has been successfully applied
in numerous empirical studies to explain variation in the number of interest groups that
lobby decision-makers in different sectors (e.g. Berkhout et al., 2015; Gray and Lowery,
1996; Lowery et al., 2005; Lowery and Gray, 1995, 1998; Messer et al., 2011; Nownes,
2004; Nownes and Lipinski, 2005).
Whereas the ESA model predicts that government activity explains interest group den-
sity, other scholars have suggested a competing hypothesis. More specifically, these
scholars have posited a reversed relationship between government activity and interest
group mobilization by arguing that interest groups actually shape the legislative agenda
and policy-making more generally (e.g. Baumgartner et al., 2009; Bernhagen, 2012; Dür
et al., 2015; Klüver, 2013; Mahoney, 2008; Toshkov et al., 2013). Interest groups draw on
a variety of different lobbying tactics to influence policy-making in line with their prefer-
ences. By providing goods, such as information, campaign donations, and electoral sup-
port, interest groups can exert a considerable influence on what policy issues make it on
the agenda and by shaping the design of final policy outcomes. To capture the effect of
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