Exploitation: Bridging Social and Distributive Egalitarianism
| Author | Nicola Mulkeen |
| Date | 01 November 2020 |
| Published date | 01 November 2020 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0032321719882609 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
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Article
Political Studies
2020, Vol. 68(4) 954 –972
Exploitation: Bridging
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DOI: 10.1177/0032321719882609
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Egalitarianism
Nicola Mulkeen
Abstract
Social egalitarians have charged distributive egalitarianism with abandoning the victims of option
luck, disrespecting victims of brute luck and misunderstanding the aim of egalitarian justice.
Social egalitarians have tended to favour a conception of equality that is concerned with ending
oppression and expressing equal respect for everyone. In this article, I argue that what has so
far been missing from this debate is the fundamental connection that exists between distributive
egalitarianism and a conception of exploitation. Once this connection is understood, we can see
that social egalitarians are unfair in their criticisms. Importantly, the connection to exploitation
reveals that social egalitarianism and distributive egalitarianism are not rival positions. When it
comes to exploitation, the two positions are able to coordinate and identify two core wrong-
making features that form part of an exploitative interaction.
Keywords
social egalitarianism, distributive egalitarianism, exploitation, abandonment, opportunism
Accepted: 24 September 2019
Distributive egalitarianism has a long-established practice of classifying luck as either
‘brute luck’ or ‘option luck’, whereby ‘option luck’ is classified as the outcome of deliber-
ate and calculated gamble, and ‘brute luck’ is classified as the outcome of an event that
could not have been avoided or predicted. Thus, if we win big on a slot machine then our
option luck is good, and if we are hit by an unexpected lightning bolt then our brute luck
is bad (Dworkin, 2000: 73). Because option luck is taken to be the result of a deliberate
choice and something for which an individual can be held responsible, Dworkin (2000)
proposes that differences in outcomes arising from option luck are morally permissible
whereas differences arising from brute luck are not.1 Successive egalitarian distributive
theories have also utilised this distinction. Prominent examples include G.A. Cohen’s
‘equal access to advantage’ conception (Cohen, 1989), Richard Arneson’s ‘equal oppor-
tunity for welfare’ approach (Arneson, 1989) and John Roemer and Hillel Steiner’s ‘level
The University of Manchester, Manchester, UK
Corresponding author:
Nicola Mulkeen, The University of Manchester, Arthur Lewis Building, Manchester M13 9PL, UK.
Email: nicolamulkeen@gmail.com
Mulkeen
955
playing field’ approaches (Roemer, 1982, 1995, 1996; Steiner, 1994). The intuitive argu-
ment behind distributive egalitarianism is an appeal to distributive fairness. The thought
behind option luck is that it is only fair that we bear the costs of our own deliberate
choices and that other people should not have to bear these costs. Symmetrically, it is
unfair to impose costs on us for the choices of others.2
Social egalitarians have raised devastating criticisms against distributive egalitarianism,
namely that the theory unacceptably abandons people who end up in desperate need as a
result of their own choices (Anderson, 1999; Scheffler, 2003, 2005). They argue that if a
distribution has arisen against a just background of equal opportunity and is a result of a
deliberate and calculated choice, then the person who freely made the choice loses all claims
to assistance on a distributive framework. As a result, distributive egalitarianism is charged
with abandoning not only reckless gamblers but also many people who care for dependents
– children, the ill and infirm (Anderson, 1999). Social egalitarians also admonish distribu-
tive egalitarians for being consumed with eliminating the effects of brute luck and overlook-
ing the point of equality. In contrast, social egalitarians favour a conception of equality that
is concerned with ending oppression. They argue that the point of equality is to create a
society in which people stand in relations of equality to others. A society of equals, they
argue, is free from oppression, domination, hierarchies of power and is grounded in equal
respect whereby people treat each other as social and political equals (Anderson, 1999).
The aim of this article, in part, is to diffuse these battle lines that exist within egalitari-
anism. In what follows, I develop and defend the idea that distributive egalitarianism
connects to a conception of exploitation. What has gone wrong for distributive egalitari-
anism is not that it has a flawed understanding of equality, but that distributive egalitari-
ans have failed to show how their connection to exploitation enables them to respond to
social egalitarian criticism. This has meant that analysis of the theory has been incom-
plete. I will argue that conceiving of distributive egalitarianism as closely related to a
conception of exploitation allows a convincing response to social egalitarian criticism
regarding both the question of the point of equality and abandonment.
In support of this argument, much of the first part of the article will be spent explaining
what exploitation is and how the issue connects to distributive egalitarianism. So while
distributive injustice is considered important in its own right, it also provides an appropri-
ate springboard for understanding the problem of exploitation. Once the connection
between distributive egalitarianism and exploitation is understood, we can see that the
two theories no longer talk past each other and are united in a common concern. This
work therefore suggests the possibility of an exciting shared agenda that bridges social
egalitarianism and distributive egalitarianism.3
The second part of the article will go on to consider the abandonment objection and
recent moves within distributive egalitarianism to soften the approach. One such account
has been put forward by Kok-Chor Tan (2012) who adopts an institutional strategy that
applies to the basic structure of society as opposed to the individual decisions made within
that structure. Tan distinguishes his account from standard distributional theories and argues
that distributive egalitarianism is compatible with the Rawlsian difference principle. What
is important is that Tan’s (2012) account is unconditional in the sense that it works to the
advantage of the worst off, irrespective of how they came to be in such a disadvantaged
position. This response seems to save distributive egalitarians from the abandonment objec-
tion and brings the theory close to social egalitarians such as Anderson and Scheffler who
argue that there ought to be an unconditional threshold beyond which no-one should ever
fall – so that people can treat one another as social equals, worthy of a certain kind of respect
956
Political Studies 68(4)
and status – even if they are responsible for wasting what kept them above the threshold
(Anderson, 1999; Scheffler, 2003, 2005). Although I think that a minimum threshold or a
difference principle are attractive moral ideals, I argue that egalitarians will face a funda-
mental problem if these principles are applied unconditionally without consideration of how
a person came to be in a disadvantaged situation. Simply alleviating disadvantage without
such consideration, I argue, can undermine social and distributive egalitarian principles and
expose members of society to a type of opportunistic exploitation.4
The article has the following structure. In section ‘Marx, Distributive Egalitarianism
and Exploitation’, I will show how the distributive views of Cohen, Roemer, Steiner and
Arneson relate to exploitation: in particular, how each of these views offers a response to
the key problems found in Marx’s account of exploitation. The defence of the connection
between distributive egalitarianism and exploitation provides the tools, in section ‘The
Missing the Point Objection’, to respond to a distinct line of criticism that has been raised
by social egalitarians, namely that distributive egalitarianism misunderstands the point of
egalitarian justice. Section ‘The Abandonment Objection’ will then closely examine the
abandonment charges raised by social egalitarians. I will contend that principles endorsed
by social and distributive egalitarians – an unconditional threshold or difference principle
– that seek to tackle abandonment can work to undermine social and distributive egalitari-
anism and can make members of society vulnerable to opportunistic exploitation. Sections
‘Getting to Grips With the Abandonment Problem’ and ‘Objections’ consider how to
tackle the problem of abandonment in light of opportunistic exploitation. Section
‘Conclusion’ concludes with some general thoughts on why egalitarian conceptions of
justice are incomplete without a theory of exploitation.
Marx, Distributive Egalitarianism and Exploitation
In his account of capitalist exploitation, Marx (1887) famously attributes the exploitation
of workers by capitalists to the fact that workers (as a class) do not have access to produc-
tive resources.5 Workers therefore need to sell their labour to capitalists, who have
monopoly over productive resources (Marx, 1887: 345). In order to survive, workers
must work as capitalists direct them and are forced to yield surplus...
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