Fairness Obligations and Non-Acceptance of Benefits
| DOI | 10.1111/1467-9248.12024 |
| Published date | 01 March 2014 |
| Date | 01 March 2014 |
| Subject Matter | Original Article |
Fairness Obligations and Non-acceptance
of Benefits
George Klosko
University of Virginia
It is widely held that an adequate theory of political obligation must be general; that is,it must establish requirements
to obey the law for all or virtually all members of a given population.In regard to the principle of fair ness (or fair play),
generality poses a challenge,because many people claim not to want or to accept major benefits provided by the state.
However, because the most important state benefits are public goods and so received even if they are not accepted,
the implications of not accepting these benefits differ from those of not accepting excludable goods. Because of
complex psychological aspects of rejecting non-excludable goods,rejecting such benefits frees recipients of obligations
they would otherwise haveonly if they can pass an ‘alternative test’,and so explain how they would manage if rejection
of the benefits actually prevented their receipt.
Keywords: political obligation; principle of fairness; adapted preferences
It is widely held that an adequate theory of political obligation must establish requirements
to obey the law for all or virtually all members of a given population. This condition,
commonly referred to as generality, is frequently invoked in criticisms of different theories
of political obligation.1It is directed most familiarly at theories based on consent, but a
theory based on the principle of fair ness (or fair play) is also criticized on these grounds.
The generality problem arises because the principle of fairness establishes obligations
through provision of benefits.If, as many theorists hold, benefits must be accepted if they are
to g round obligations (Dworkin, 1986, pp. 192–3; Nozick, 1974, p. 95; Rawls, 1971, pp.
113–6), if large numbers of people do not want or accept the benefits, political obligations
will not be general, and the principle of fairness will not be able to ground a satisfactory
theory.
In this article, I explore connections between acceptance or non-acceptance of benefits
and establishment of obligations under the principle of fairness. By distinguishing circum-
stances in which non-acceptance of benefits does and does not free people from political
obligations they would otherwise have, I attempt to show that a theory based on the
principle is more general than is commonly allowed. Discussion is in four sections. In the
first section, I review the problem of acceptance in regard to the principle of fairness.
Acceptance and non-acceptance of excludable benefits are discussed in the second section,
while the results of this inquiry are extended to non-excludable benefits in the third
section. Finally, complex psychological aspects of rejecting non-excludable goods are
discussed in the fourth section.
The Principle of Fairness
The principle of fairness was first clearly for mulated by H. L.A. Hart in 1955 (Hart, 1955,
p.185).2Its moral basis is mutuality of restrictions. Under specified conditions, the sacrifices
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doi: 10.1111/1467-9248.12024
POLITICAL STUDIES: 2014 VOL 62, 159–171
© 2013The Author.Political Studies © 2013 Political Studies Association
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