Falling crime rates: What happened last time
| Published date | 01 February 2015 |
| Date | 01 February 2015 |
| DOI | 10.1177/1362480614541290 |
| Author | Paul Knepper |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
541290TCR0010.1177/1362480614541290Theoretical CriminologyKnepper
research-article2014
Article
Theoretical Criminology
2015, Vol. 19(1) 59 –76
Falling crime rates:
© The Author(s) 2014
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DOI: 10.1177/1362480614541290
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Paul Knepper
University of Sheffield, UK
Abstract
Although the falling crime rates in the 1990s surprised criminologists, it was not the
first time crime had declined. There was a ‘crime drop’ in England in the 1920s. When
crime did not rise as expected following the Great War, the government closed half the
prisons, and Edwin Sutherland came to investigate ‘England’s empty prisons’. To conduct
his analysis, Sutherland relied on work by SK Ruck, and between them, they came up
with most of the leading explanations now used by criminologists. They considered
the police and prisons, the economy and household security. They also discussed the
psychological conditions of low-crime societies, the ‘sense of security’. Drawing on
their unpublished material from archives in New York and London, the discussion here
examines what can be learned about contemporary analyses of the crime drop of the
1990s. Overall, this article argues for the importance of theory in analysing the statistics
of falling crime and how historical studies of crime trends can be useful in developing
this theory.
Keywords
Crime trends, historical perspectives, history of crime, penal policy, security
The unanticipated fall in crime rates in the United Kingdom, the United States and other
countries in the 1990s presents theoretical criminology with uncomfortable questions.
Classic theories—strain, social learning, control and labelling—do not furnish satisfy-
ing explanations of the ‘crime drop’ (Aebi and Linde, 2010: 265–266; Van Dijk and
Tseloni, 2012a: 3). To explain what has taken place, criminologists have focused on
Corresponding author:
Paul Knepper, School of Law, University of Sheffield, Bartolome House, Winter St, Sheffield S3 7ND, UK.
Email: p.knepper@sheffield.ac.uk
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Theoretical Criminology 19(1)
prisons, police, economy and demography (Barker, 2010; Blumstein and Wallman,
2006a), although there have been some curious theories as well. According to one recent
inventory, 21 hypotheses have been offered, including abortion and lead poisoning
(Farrell et al., 2010).
This essay examines the ‘crime drop’ that occurred in England during the 1920s.
There have been other episodes of falling crime rates in history, but the interwar situation
is particularly worthy of historical study. The war had been expected to leave a massive
crime wave in its wake, and when this did not occur, the government responded by
reducing the prison population by one half. Looking back offers an opportunity to exam-
ine explanations for crime trends then and their implications for recent trends. Specifically,
we can examine the explanation offered by Edwin Sutherland who came to England in
1930 to study the extraordinary sequence of events. To do this, it will be necessary to
consider the work of a little known English criminologist, SK Ruck. Sutherland’s con-
clusions about England, which appear in his article of 1935, are taken from Ruck
(Sutherland, 1935).
Ruck’s original work on crime trends in England after the Great War, not to mention
the Ruck–Sutherland correspondence, has never been published. It has been preserved at
the Rockefeller archives in New York. The discussion here is based on these documents,
and additional material from the National Archives in London and special collections at
the London School of Economics. We begin with the history of crime trends after the
Great War and end with the theory of falling crime rates then and now. Recovering the
historical context, as Rosenfeld et al. (2014: 3) have recently emphasized, is important
for understanding the ‘crime drop’. The first part explains the English ‘crime drop’ of the
1920s and the background to Ruck’s analysis. The second part reviews Ruck’s account-
ing of the causes: education; penal methods; police efficiency; and above all, economic
conditions. The third part discusses the Ruck–Sutherland theory of the psychology of
low-crime societies, the ‘sense of security’. The final part discusses the Ruck–Sutherland
approach to crime trends; specifically, framing the problem, the scale of analysis and
unmeasurable factors.
England’s empty prisons
The end of the Great War brought gloomy forecasts of a fearful rise in crime. Cecil
Chapman, magistrate at Westminster police court, warned of a violent aftershock. He
thought of a dozen reasons for an increase in youth crime, including working mothers,
school closings and darkened streets (Chapman, 1916–1917: 80). Sir Neville Macready,
commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, predicted a surge in criminal violence.
‘Freedom in battle from the restraint of ordinary law’, he said, ‘lowered man’s respect for
fear of that institution, with the result that an increase in crime invariably followed war’
(The Times, 1919: 7). The chair of the prison commissioners, Evelyn Ruggles-Brise,
seconded Macready’s dreary outlook. His reports, also made available to newspapers,
speculated about a rise in levels of crime due to wartime experiences. Four years of fight-
ing would leave its mark on returning soldiers. Men accustomed to killing, foraging and
drug taking would be unable to adjust to peaceful conditions, and the post-war frame of
mind would send rates of robbery, assault and murder to shocking levels (Commissioners
of Prisons, 1919: 7–8).
Knepper
61
As Emsley (2013) explains, anxiety about the brutalized veteran who would persist in
violent behaviour after the return home has a long provenance. After the Great War,
newspapers joined with criminal justice officials to speculate about a surge in criminal-
ity. The press told the public about criminal acts by former soldiers and offered ways of
understanding them. Readers learned about men who lashed out against unfaithful wives
or tried to reclaim their manhood through violent acts; about shell-shock and the possi-
bility that men might be as vulnerable to mental breakdown as women (Emsley, 2008).
However, the overwhelming majority of men who volunteered or were conscripted, and
who had been involved in killing at close range during the conflict, did not become
involved in such violence after returning to civilian life. The notion of the brutalized
veteran turning to criminality was largely a fantasy based on imaginings about the bat-
tlefield experience (Emsley, 2013: 169).
Even before the end of 1919, it had become clear to Macready, Ruggles-Brise and
anyone else with access to the statistics that there would be no post-war crime wave. In
December, Macready revised his forecast. He advised the public not to worry about
crime and dismissed any reference to a crime wave as journalistic sensationalism
(Manchester Guardian, 1919: 6). His report, completed in 1920, showed a modest
amount of criminal activity. Although it was too early to state with confidence, Macready
suggested, the figures pointed to ‘the moral stability of the nation’ (Commissioner of
Police, 1920: 11–12). Ruggles-Brise also decided there would be no crime wave. It was
‘idealistic and brash’ to predict future crime rates, and he suggested ‘there is every reason
to hope that the supply of the Convict population is falling’ (Commissioners of Prisons,
1921: 10–11).
As the Home Office saw it, the figures signalled the start of a downward trend. The
number of persons who came before criminal courts for trial in 1922 compared favour-
ably to the average figure for the war years. ‘In spite of the prevalence of unemployment
and of other conditions conducive to such crimes’, the editors of the annual Criminal
Statistics report observed, ‘crimes against property have shown no tendency to increase,
but are actually fewer than formerly’ (Home Office, 1924: 6). More good news appeared
the following year. After a comparison of police statistics and judicial statistics for 1923
to 1914–1919, the report concluded:
The remarkable increase of two or three classes of crimes against property has brought them
into great prominence, but putting aside these cases, the opinion may be hazarded that crime in
general has steadily diminished over a considerable term of years, and in addition the reduction
is greatest in the more serious forms of law breaking.
(Home Office, 1925: 10)
Reports throughout the 1920s generally adopt this optimistic view, explaining that if
crime was not decreasing, at least it was not increasing. The report for 1928 maintained
that ‘taking all kinds of offences, major and minor, into consideration there is no clear
evidence of a general increase in criminality’ (Home Office, 1930: lxi, emphasis in
original).
Taylor (1998, 1999) has proposed that there was no falling off in the level of crime
after the war; rather, the government orchestrated the production of the statistics to make
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Theoretical Criminology 19(1)
it appear so. Falling crime rates justified the government’s interest in saving money on
criminal justice and promoted the idea that its reform programme was working. It is
implausible that assaults, truancy, drunkenness, vandalism and other offences declined.
These offences must have continued to be committed but were dealt with by agencies
other than the police or not at all (Taylor, 1998, 1999). Taylor’s...
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