False negotiations and the fall of Afghanistan to the Taliban
| Author | S Yaqub Ibrahimi |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/00207020221135299 |
| Published date | 01 June 2022 |
| Date | 01 June 2022 |
| Subject Matter | Scholarly Essay |
Scholarly Essay
International Journal
2022, Vol. 77(2) 168–187
© The Author(s) 2022
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DOI: 10.1177/00207020221135299
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False negotiations and the fall
of Afghanistan to the Taliban
S Yaqub Ibrahimi
Carleton University, Ottawa, ON, Canada
Abstract
This paper examines the dark side of Afghanistan’s peace negotiations that started
under Donald Trump’s South Asia policy in Doha, Qatar, in September 2018 and
ended, without a meaningful success, in December 2020. The paper examines both the
United States–Taliban and the intra-Afghan negotiations and discusses the impact of the
false negotiation behaviour by the Taliban and the Afghan government on the peace
talks. It also explains how, in the absence of conditions for a political settlement, parties
to the conflict acted as false negotiators, which resulted in the failure of efforts to
launch a genuine peace process and in the Taliban’s military domination of Afghanistan.
Keywords
negotiation, false negotiation, political settlement, insurgency, Afghanistan, Taliban
The Taliban conquered Afghanistan in August 2021. The insurgent group returned to
power for two main reasons: first, the failure of efforts to settle the conflict politically,
and second, the military defeat of the Afghan government and its international allies by
the insurgency. This paper examines how the failed efforts for a political settlement led
to the insurgency’s military domination.
After the resurgence of the Taliban in 2003, the insurgent group followed a clear
strategic agenda for returning to power forcefully. Achieving the goal seemed difficult
in the early years because the Afghan government and its armed forces were part of the
United States (US)’s war on terrorism and received remarkable financial and military
support from NATO. However, the war became increasingly costly to the Afghan
Corresponding author:
S Yaqub Ibrahimi, Department of Political Science, Carleton University, Ottawa, ON K1S 5B6, Canada.
Email: yaqub.ibrahimi@gmail.com
government and its international allies. Therefore, they increasingly tried to rely on
alternative measures of conflict resolution, including negotiation and mediation.
The Taliban initially welcomed all efforts for a negotiated settlement, which helped
the group to launch a political and diplomatic front parallel to its military campaign on
the ground. As a result, different branches and segments of the Taliban participated in
any possible international platform tactically and dishonestly to pave the way for
reaching the group’s strategic goal, which was a total domination of power. In this
context, the negotiation tactic increased the international and political legitimacy of the
Taliban, when the group was simultaneously occupying territory by expanding its
insurgent operations in the countryside and its terrorist attacks in major cities. The fall
of Afghanistan to the Taliban was an outcome of the insurgent group’s tactical and
strategic manoeuvres and the Afghan government and its international allies’mis-
understanding of the insurgent group’s core plan and objective.
The Taliban’spolitical and diplomatic dominance started with the commencem ent of
the US-Taliban negotiation under the Trump administration in Doha, Qatar, in Sep-
tember 2018, and ended with the failed intra-Afghan peace talks in December 2020.
The Taliban used the two negotiations as short-term tactics to achieve a long-term
strategic goal which included a total domination and defeat of the enemy.
The US-Taliban negotiation reached a bilateral agreement with the Trump ad-
ministration in February 2020. The agreement defined a timeline for the withdrawal of
US troops from Afghanistan, counterterrorism guarantees by the Taliban, a path to a
ceasefire between the Taliban and the Afghan government, and an intra-Afghan ne-
gotiation to bring peace to the war-torn country.
1
Except for its promise to stop at-
tacking US forces in Afghanistan, the Taliban did not respect any other clauses of the
agreement. The group continued its military operations against the Afghan government,
did not cut its relations with al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations, refused a
ceasefire, and did not launch a meaningful intra-Afghan negotiation as part of its deal
with the Americans. The US government reports in 2020 showed that the Taliban never
stopped its relationship and interaction with al-Qaeda.
2
The Taliban’s violation of the
agreement is a key indicator of its engagement as a “false negotiator”in Afghanistan’s
peace process.
3
The Taliban initially agreed to negotiate with the US under significant international
pressure, particularly from Pakistan. Therefore, the Taliban agreed to negotiate with the
Trump administration firstly to avoid further external pressure and prevent a new
American agreement with the Afghan government, and secondly to enhance political
1. Department of State, Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan, 29 February 2020, https://www.state.
gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Agreement-For-Bringing-Peace-to-Afghanistan-02.29.20.pdf(accessed
28 September 2022).
2. Department of the Treasury,Memorandum for Departmentof Defense Lead Inspector General, 4 January
2021 https://oig.treasury.gov/sites/oig/files/2021-01/OIG-CA-21-012.pdf (accessed28 September 2022).
3. “False negotiations”and relevant terms are borrowed from Edy Glozman, Netta Barak-Corren, and Illan
Yaniv, “False negotiations: The arts and science of not reaching an agreement,”Journal of Conflict
Resolution 59, no. 4 (2015): 671–697.
Ibrahimi 169
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