Fixed Content of Political Obligations
| Date | 01 March 1998 |
| DOI | 10.1111/1467-9248.00129 |
| Published date | 01 March 1998 |
| Author | George Klosko |
| Subject Matter | Article |
Fixed Content of Political Obligations
GEORGE KLOSKO
University of Virginia
An aspect of political obligations that has received little attention is the means
through which their content, i.e., exactly what is required of their bearers, is deter-
mined. An adequate moral basis for political obligations must account for this
requirement, which is closely linked to the concept of authority, the state's right to
substitute its judgement in various areas for the subjects' own. The problems faced by
theories of obligation based on gratitude and tacit consent in ®xing the content of
obligations are examined, while I show how a theory based on the principle of
fairness is able to overcome them. As long as a cooperative enterprise supplies public
goods that are indispensable to minimally acceptable lives and require `regulated
cooperation' for their supply, it is able to ground obligations with ®xed content under
the principle of fairness.
In this paper I discuss the nature of obligations, as a particular kind of moral
requirement, and the implications particular aspects of obligations have for
theories of political obligation. I am especially interested in the dierence
between having an obligation, i.e., a strong moral requirement to do something,
and having an obligation with a determinate content, i.e., being required to do
something particular. In regard to political obligations, this second sense is
being required to do particular things for one's state. A workable theory of
political obligation must have obligations of the second sort rather than the
®rst, though it seems to me that this distinction is often lost in the literature.
Throughout this paper, I will construe political obligations in the usual sense,
as moral requirements to obey the laws of the state or to submit to political
authority (on which, more below). I will follow common practice and not
require that political obligations be `obligations' in the strict sense. Establishing
strong moral requirements to obey the law would counter widespread current
scepticism about the possibility of a workable theory of political obligation
founded on liberal premises, and so answer basic questions of political obliga-
tion, whether or not these requirements are `obligations' strictly speaking.1
Because the moral requirements I discuss have the particular content I have
noted, the nature of authority is an important concern, and I will discuss the
relationship between political obligation and political authority in detail.
1 Scholars who question the traditional arguments in defence of political obligation include
A. J. Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations (Princeton, Princeton University Press,
1979); L. Green, The Authority of the State (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1988); J. Raz, The
Authority of Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1979), ch. 12; C. Pateman, The Problem of
Political Obligation (New York, University of California Press, 1979). For the broader sense of
obligation, see Simmons, Moral Principles, ch. 2; and G. Klosko, The Principle of Fairness and
Political Obligation (Savage MD, Rowman and Little®eld, 1992), ch. 1.
# Political Studies Association 1998. Published by Blackwell Publishers, 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK and 350 Main
Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
54
Fixed Content of Political Obligations
After general discussion of political obligations, their content, and authority,
in Part I, I brie¯y examine diculties problems determining the content of
obligations raise for theories of political obligation based on gratitude and tacit
consent, in Parts II and III. In Part IV, I explore how a theory of political
obligation based on the principle of fairness (or fair play), is able to overcome
these problems. Showing how fairness theory negotiates these hurdles will
provide additional support for its claim to be a workable theory of political
obligation, while also shedding new light on exactly how it works.
The Content of Obligations
Though it is not necessary that a theory of political obligation establish
`obligations' in the strict sense, the issues we explore are best approached by
brie¯y considering obligations properly speaking. As generally understood, an
`obligation' has three central features. Construed on the model of a promise, an
obligation is viewed as: (a) grounded on a speci®c voluntary action or perform-
ance; (b) owed to a particular person; (c) having a determinate content.2 Thus if
Smith promises Jones to give her $10.00, the obligation is (a) established by the
promise Smith makes, (b) owed to Jones and not to other people, (c) a require-
ment to pay Jones the money. Though a case of this sort illustrates the concept
clearly, other obligations are more complex, as we will see below.
Regardless of whether political obligations are obligations in the strict sense,
it is clear that their determinate content entails submitting to the authority of
the state. As analysed by Raz, whom I follow here, political authority centres on
the subject's surrender of judgment to the state. In place of his own reasons for
actions, the subject will substitute reasons mandated by political authorities.
Raz refers to the reasons presented by authorities as `preemptive' reasons, and
argues that the essence of political authority is the subject's substitution of the
preemptive reasons thus promulgated for reasons of his own. In Raz's words:
The fact that an authority requires performance of an action is a reason for
its performance, which is not to be added to all other relevant reasons when
assessing what to do, but should exclude and take the place of some of
them.3
Thus according to Raz, political authority has an important epistemic dimen-
sion. Rather than acting on what she thinks, the subject must act on what the
authorities think. This construal of authority is closely bound up with the law
(the vehicle through which authorities generally present their preemptive
reasons), and so requirements to obey the law.
Raz's view can be illustrated by an example. Assume that Jones believes it is
most ecient to drive on the left-hand side of the road. Regardless of what she
thinks on the matter, when the government mandates driving on the right, she
must act on this opinion rather than her own and will be penalized if she does
not. It is notable that in a case of this sort Jones's interests are best served by
2 For the concept of obligation, see R. B. Brandt, `The concepts of obligation and duty', Mind,
73 (1964), 374±93; H. L. A. Hart, `Legal and Moral Obligation,' in A. I. Melden, ed., Essays in
Moral Philosophy (Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1958); Simmons, Moral Principles,
ch. 1; J. Mish'Alanai, ` ``Duty,'' ``Obligation,'' and ``Ought'' ', Analysis, 30 (1969), 33±41.
3 Raz, `Authority and justi®cation,' Philosophy and Public Aairs, 14 (1985), 3±29, p. 13; italics
removed.
# Political Studies Association, 1998
GEORGE KLOSKO
55
accepting the state's reasons, as to drive on the left would have undesirable
consequences. Accordingly, Raz holds that political authority is defended most
eectively by showing that it is necessary if people are to accomplish their
goals.4
If we combine our brief discussions of obligation and authority, we can see
that the distinctive thrust of political obligations requires substituting the state's
judgments, its reasons for acting, for reasons of one's own. But in spite of this
clear conceptual relationship, it remains to be seen how the moral requirements
that constitute actual political obligations come to have this speci®c content.
The problem can be illustrated by a particular feature of obligations, what Hart
refers to as `independence of content'.5 Hart's meaning is seen most clearly in
promises. In the case of an obligation grounded on a voluntary performance,
such as that which generates a promise, the content of the obligation becomes
mandatory through the performance and is not otherwise binding. If Smith
promises Jones to pay her $10.00, the requirement in question is generated by
the promise and does not otherwise exist. Even if paying Jones $10.00 is a
morally desirable thing to do, Smith's requirement to do this stems from the
promise. There are numerous other desirable actions that Smith could perform
but is not required to because he has not promised to do them. Contrariwise, if
he had promised Jones to give her $20.00, he would be required to do this. Thus
the content of a given obligation is distinguishable ± or independent ± from the
performance through which it becomes morally required.
Applying Hart's analysis to political obligations raises the question of how
their content is determined, or ®xed, as mandatory acceptance of the preemp-
tive reasons of the state. It seems that this problem has received little attention
until now because of the hold consent theory has maintained on the liberal
imagination. Ever since the time of Locke, the dominant view within Western
(including American) society is that people are required to obey the state
because they have consented to do so. In theories of obligation based on
consent, it is not ordinarily dicult to explain how political obligations attain
the necessary content, as the proponent of such a theory will typically designate
this as the content of the acts of consent through which political obligations are
incurred. Thus for Locke, the best known consent theorist, a...
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