‘Forced to Friendship’? Russian (Mis-)Understandings of Soft Power and the Implications for Audience Attraction in Ukraine
| Published date | 01 November 2015 |
| DOI | 10.1111/1467-9256.12106 |
| Author | Victoria Hudson |
| Date | 01 November 2015 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
‘Forced to Friendship’? Russian
(Mis-)Understandings of Soft Power
and the Implications for Audience
Attraction in Ukraine
Victoria Hudson
Aston University
This article argues that for all its efforts to implement soft power techniques, the Kremlin still fails to grasp the
subtle, voluntaristic essence of soft power. This is reflected in a style of public interaction that has practical
implications for how Russian soft power overtures are received by the audience. This is demonstrated through
the findings of mixed-method empirical research from four Ukrainian regions. Thus, while surveys show that
the worldview promoted by Russian public diplomacy resonates to some extent, insights from focus groups
indicate that potential attraction is nevertheless limited by Russia’s ‘hard’ and obtrusive approach to cultural
influence.
Keywords: Russia; Ukraine; soft power; audience reception; focus groups
Introduction
The crisis that has escalated in Ukraine since November 2013 has sharply foregrounded
the continued significance of military power in European security affairs. However, the
conflict between the Kyiv government and the pro-Russian rebels in the Donbas region of
Eastern Ukraine has a strong informational element, with the opposing sides striving to
advance their own narrative of the unfolding crisis to legitimise their actions and garner
international and domestic support. While currently reflected in the stoking of passionate and
polarising responses to events on the ground, the crisis is rooted in a more general cleavage
in the worldview of Ukrainians, who over the past two-and-a-half decades have found
themselves on the geopolitical frontline in a soft power struggle waged between Russia and
the West. Playing on local commercial and industrial interests as well as historically rooted
identity and language issues, each side has sought to secure Ukraine in its orbit on its own
terms through a network of financial-economic, interpersonal and cultural ties. The West’s
promotion of an attractive culture and lifestyle to support this process has become known as
‘soft power’, which Russia has also striven latterly to integrate into policy.
This article argues that while Russia recognises the importance of regenerating its cultural
appeal and public diplomacy capacity, research suggests that the specific, voluntaristic and
non-coercive nature of this ‘soft’ form of influence has thus far not been fully grasped by the
relevant sections of the Russian elite. This was reflected in the findings of an original empirical
study undertaken to explore how one section of the Ukrainian audience – namely the highly
educated youth – received Russian soft power overtures, with the aim of evaluating the
success of the Kremlin’s ‘charm offensives’ to date. The findings of the unique, in-depth
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POLITICS: 2015 VOL 35(3-4), 330–346
doi: 10.1111/1467-9256.12106
© 2015 The Author.Politics © 2015 Political Studies Association
fieldwork in four diverse regions of Ukraine are presented to show how, in spite of the
significant, albeit regionally differentiated wells of affinity with Russian cultural, value-
oriented and political perspectives, the appeal of Moscow’s leadership is limited by the rather
widespread impression that even Russia’s efforts at soft power engagement are but a prop-
agandist’s velvet glove around the iron fist of Moscow’s neo-imperial machinations. Such
perceptions, which were found to transcend the East–West cleavage, condition how individ-
uals and groups respond to the current conflict.
When Nye’s main conceptual elaboration of ‘attraction’ as a foreign policy tool appeared in
2004, likely responses to the suggestion that Russia might be nurturing soft power would
probably have included incredulity, scepticism and possibly mirth. Recent events in Ukraine
would seem to bear out the views of such sceptics. But soft and hard power are inextricably
bound together, both in theory and practice, and consideration of the Kremlin’s attempts to
rekindle cultural attraction is vital since attempts to integrate Ukrainians into the cultural-
ideational space of the russkiy mir [‘Russian world’] are unlikely to cease even with the
resolution of the crisis. Indeed, it was Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution which, in exposing
the insufficiency of Russia’s political and cultural engagement with its closest neighbour,
forced sections of the Moscow elite to recognise the need to enhance Russia’s attraction
abroad. In the three to four years following the events on Kyiv’s Maidan Nezaleznosti, percep-
tions of Russia in the world and its ability to renew ties with citizens of the former Soviet
republics were a matter for discussion on the pages of the nation’s newspapers and periodi-
cals, and among policy and intellectual circles. Since 2007, soft power has been increasingly
embodied in policy documents (President of Russia, 2008; 2009; 2013) and found expression
in the establishment of a number of organisations and bodies charged with increasing the
profile of the Russian language, culture and worldview abroad (Feklyunina, 2008). However,
even today it would be overstating the case to argue that Russia has a coherent strategy to
restore its cultural attraction. Rather, activity in this sphere is often fragmented and unsys-
tematic. Indeed, Moscow acknowledges (Burlinova, 2013; Dolinskiy, 2013; Kosachev, 2014)
that Russia’s representatives are struggling to implement measures designed to foster soft
power with optimal efficiency. For his part, Joseph Nye (2013) argues simply that Russia does
not ‘get’ soft power. This article will explore this contention in more depth and investigate the
implications for Russia’s attraction among a key section of the Ukrainian audience.
Ukraine is a particularly interesting case study as it straddles a strategic intersection of the
European continent with implications for energy, food and identity security. Furthermore,
the high degree of cultural proximity and the relatively extensive integration characteristic of
the Russian and Ukrainian media-informational spheres suggest that to investigate the Ukrain-
ian case study could be to explore the high water mark of Russian soft power. Rather than
examining elite outlooks, this study focuses on reception among the general population, which
President Medvedev declared should be targeted by Russian soft power efforts (Medvedev,
2009). Taking a future-oriented approach, the focus will be on the highly educated youth who
represent the next generation of Ukrainian leaders and opinion-multipliers.
Conceptual framework
Joseph Nye (2004) frames soft power as getting what you want in international politics
through attraction, not coercion. More specifically, soft power is understood here as the ability
of a polity to exercise international cultural leadership in terms of ‘setting the agenda’ for
global norms and being perceived as attractive within the framework of those values and
RUSSIAN SOFT POWER IN UKRAINE 331
© 2015 The Author.Politics © 2015 Political Studies Association
POLITICS: 2015 VOL 35(3-4)
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