Foreign policy anarchy in multiparty coalitions: When junior parties take rogue decisions
| DOI | 10.1177/1354066119828196 |
| Date | 01 September 2019 |
| Author | Toby Greene |
| Published date | 01 September 2019 |
E
JR
I
https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066119828196
European Journal of
International Relations
2019, Vol. 25(3) 800 –825
© The Author(s) 2019
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/1354066119828196
journals.sagepub.com/home/ejt
Foreign policy anarchy in
multiparty coalitions: When
junior parties take rogue
decisions
Toby Greene
Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel
Abstract
How do disagreements within multiparty coalitions affect foreign policy, and how can
junior parties exert their influence? These questions are of growing importance as new
media increases domestic pressure on politicians to interject in international events, and
as foreign affairs become more salient in domestic political contestation. Whereas prior
research on foreign policy in multiparty coalitions focuses on the influence of junior
parties over cabinet decisions, this article proposes a new theoretical concept of ‘rogue
decisions’ to describe a distinct outcome of partisan disagreements. Rogue decisions are
autonomous decisions by junior parties impacting foreign affairs, taken without cabinet
coordination, that undermine their senior partners’ foreign policies. This resembles the
‘anarchy model’ of foreign policy previously attributed to less institutionalized systems.
Having identified the necessary conditions that make rogue decisions possible, and the
factors that increase their likelihood, the analysis is applied to cases in Britain and
Israel. These represent polar opposite parliamentary systems, with Israel among the
most proportional, where rogue decisions may be most expected, and Britain the most
majoritarian, where they would be least expected. The identification of rogue decisions
in contrasting parliamentary democracies challenges the assumption that cabinet is
where foreign policy disagreements are managed, according to established decision-
making rules. The article therefore prompts new thinking about the potential for junior
parties to disrupt the foreign policy agendas of their senior partners, and challenges in
new ways the assumption that states act as coherent units.
Corresponding author:
Toby Greene, The Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem,
Mt. Scopus, Jerusalem 9190501, Israel.
Email: toby@tobygreene.net
828196EJT0010.1177/1354066119828196European Journal of International RelationsGreene
research-article2019
Article
Greene 801
Keywords
Britain, cabinets, foreign policy, Israel, multiparty coalitions, political parties
Introduction
How do differences of world view and political interests in multiparty coalitions affect
foreign policy in parliamentary democracies, and what tools do junior parties use to
advance their own agendas? Research has highlighted that divergent positions within a
coalition can lead to suboptimal foreign policy decisions or deadlock, and junior parties
having the potential to hijack policy (Kaarbo, 2012). The literature is nonetheless domi-
nated by the assumption that coalition cabinets are the ‘ultimate authority’ where differ-
ences play out and outcomes are determined (Kaarbo, 2012: 4). Foreign Policy Analysis
(FPA) more broadly is dominated by an assumption that policy processes ultimately lead
to a moment when members of an authoritative decision-making unit ‘select a particular
course of action, that is, make a choice’ (Hermann, 2001: 48).
Yet, in a recent study, Mintz and Wayne (2016: 33) theorize that in multiparty coali-
tions, divergences of norms or interests — which they call ‘polythink’ — may lead to
chaos as different parties make autonomous decisions in interrelated areas. Prior research
on foreign policy decision-making units has established that an ‘anarchy model’ can
develop in less institutionalized systems where ‘decision making rules are largely absent
and the overall political process is extremely fluid’, with separate actors taking uncoor-
dinated, ‘fragmented symbolic action’ (Hagan et al., 2001: 180–181). However, can this
also occur in parliamentary democracies? This seems at odds with the assumption that
the cabinet is key to foreign policy outcomes, and calls into question the notion of col-
lective government, which ‘underlies the constitutional or customary rule of collective
responsibility’ [emphasis in the original] (Andeweg, 1993: 25). If junior parties may take
autonomous decisions without cabinet coordination, under what conditions does this
occur? This article addresses this question with two contributions towards the theory of
junior-party influence on foreign policy decisions.
First, the article builds on existing theories of foreign policy decision-making units,
junior-party influence and Mintz and Wayne’s polythink framework to identify factors
that may lead a junior party to take what I term ‘rogue decisions’. These are autonomous
decisions impacting foreign affairs, taken by junior parties, contrary to the foreign policy
agendas of their senior coalition partners, using devolved ministerial powers to act with-
out cabinet coordination. Rogue decisions are distinct from the concept of hijacking
addressed by Kaarbo (2012) and others in previous work on foreign policy in multiparty
coalitions. Whereas hijacking typically refers to junior parties using the threat of defec-
tion to secure cabinet positions in line with their preferences, a rogue decision involves
a junior party using devolved ministerial authorities to take unilateral decisions without
collective cabinet agreement.
Second, the article analyses and illustrates these factors at work by examining causal
processes within two case studies of multiparty coalitions in parliamentary democracies
at polar ends of the scale with respect to proportionality. The first case is from Israel,
which has a directly proportional electoral system resulting in complex and highly
To continue reading
Request your trial