Foreign Policy and the 104Th Congress
| Author | Tim Hames |
| Date | 01 April 1996 |
| DOI | 10.1177/004711789601300102 |
| Published date | 01 April 1996 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
29
FOREIGN
POLICY
AND
THE 104TH
CONGRESS
Tim
Hames
The
landslide
Republican
triumphs
in
the
congressional
elections
of
November
1994
appeared
to
signal
a
radical
change
in
the
direction
of
public
policy
across
a
range
of
issue
arenas
in
the
United
States.
In
many
areas
of
domestic
policy,
actual
or
probable
political
shifts
do
indeed
seem
likely
to
be
significant,
espe-
cially
when
one
allows
for
the
limitations
of
the
Constitution,
the
relatively
nar-
row
margins
of
the
Republican
majorities,
and
the
continued
existence
of
a
Democratic
president
wielding
the
veto
power.
However,
this
article
will
make
the
argument
that,
despite
a
great
deal
of
pas-
sionate
rhetoric
to
the
contrary,
the
104th
Congress
has
thus
far
made
little
real
difference
to
the
conduct
of
American
foreign
policy.
Furthermore,
what
shifts
can
be
associated
with
this
Congress
do
not
reflect
especially
partisan
concerns,
but
institutional
politics
between
the
legislature
and
executive
that
existed
under
Democratic-controlled
Congresses
and
might
well
have
surfaced
in
1995
even
if
Democrats
had
maintained
majorities.
Moreover,
the
reasons
why
this
relative
restraint
existed
in
1995
are
likely
to
continue
into
1996,
and
could
well
be
true
even
if
the
United
States
was
to
enjoy
an
extended
period
of
Republican
Congresses
alongside
a
Democratic
president.
The
article
starts
by
outlining
the
reasons
why
serious
disagreements
and
pol-
icy
struggles
between
the executive
and
legislature
during
the
104th
Congress
might
have
been
expected.
These
are
mainly
based
on
the
recent
past
behaviour
of
the
Congress
and
the
statements
of
the
incoming
Republican
majority.
This
is
followed
by
a
detailed
examination
of
what
happened
during
1995.
Thls
section
focuses
on
the
four
main
means
by
which
the
legislature
can
attempt
to
shape
international
relations
and
national
security.
These
are:
through
new
insti-
tutional
legislation
that
constrains
the
executive
(such
as
the
Case
Act
1972
or,
more
contentiously,
the
War
Powers
Act
1973);
legislation
affecting
policy
in
a
particular
locality
(such
as
the
Clark
Amendment
on
Angola
in
1976
or
South
African
sanc-
tions
in
1986);
through
the
authorization
process
of
the
budget
(by
which
Congress
frequently
makes
policy
by
budgetary
means,
for
example
refusing
further
aid
to
South
Vietnam
in
1975);
and
finally
by
the
appropriations
element
of
the
budget
(which
makes
actual
spending
decisions
for
a
given
year
thus
deciding
everything
from
precise
weapons
systems
to
foreign
aid).
In
all
these
areas
it
will
be
demon-
strated
that
Republican
efforts
at
reform
either
failed,
were
vetoed,
were
diluted
to
render
them
acceptable
to
the
Administration
or
were
marginal.
Finally,
it
will
be
argued
that
an
identifiable
set
of
reasons
exist
for
this
under-
whelming
shift
in
foreign
priorities.
These
are
explored
in
some
detail.
‘The
anticipated
conflict
The
widely
predicted
struggle
over
the
conduct
of
foreign
policy
was
based
pre-
dominantly
on
the
recent
prior
conduct
of
Congress
even
where
both
branches
30
were
controlled
by
Democrats,
but
especially
under
divided
government,
and
the
statements
of
the
incoming
Republican
leadership.
First,
there
had
been
a
persistent
pattern
of
conflict
between
the
executive
and
legislature
for
nearly
25
years
from
the
Vietnam
War
onwards.
This
started
with
a
set
of
well-known
legislation
designed
to
limit
the
independent
activities
of
the
executive
and
moved
on
to
individual
policy
arenas
with
persistent
disagreements
over
arms
control
issues
and
the
appropriate
response
to
alleged
Marxist
military
insurgency
in
the
Third
World.
In
addition,
there
was
a
pronounced
tendency
for
Congress
to
use
its
power
of
the
purse,
through
both
the
authorization
and
appropriation
methods,
to
micro-manage
(as
presidents
consistently
viewed
it)
international
action
via
the
defence
or
foreign
operations
budgets.
Such
disputes
appeared
most
intense
under
conditions
of
divided
partisan
control
of
govern-
ment.
Given
this
background
there
was
little
reason
to
believe
in
an
easy
working
environment
in
the
104th
Congress.
Secondly,
this
pattern
of
public
disputes
had,
if
anything,
been
amplified
dur-
ing
the
first
two
years
of
the
Clinton
Administration
despite
the
restoration
of
so-
called
’unified’
party
government
after
the
1992
elections.
The
new
executive
appeared
committed
to
a
shift
in
foreign
policy
philosophy
that
made
democracy-
building
(in
its
broadest
sense)
the
objective
of American
action,
and
multilateral-
ism
(especially
the
United
Nations)
the
means.’
This
approach
was
greeted
with
deep
suspicion
by
congressional
Republicans
and
at
best
reluctant
tolerance
by
congressional
Democrats.
What
backing
there
was
for
it
fell
apart
in
1993-4
as
the
practical
difficulties
of
implementation
became
obvious
in
Bosnia,
China,
Haiti,
North
Korea
and
especially
Somalia.
Republicans
were
brutally
partisan
in
exploiting
the
difficulties
which
President
Clinton
faced.
Thirdly,
with
the
end
of
the
Cold
War
came
uncertainty
about
such
seeming-
ly
basic
questions
as
what
the
national
interests
of
the
United
States
were,
and
hence
what
should
be
the
goals
of
overseas
activity.
There
was
the
search
for
a
simple
alternative
to
containment
as
a
central
doctrine.
If
a
debate
existed
it
was
a
reasonable
wager
that
at
least
some
congressional
figures
would
come
forward
to
take
part
in
it
and
not
always
in
a
manner
pleasing
to
the
executive.
The
diffi-
culties
that
Defense
Secretary
Les
Aspin
had
during
his
short
tenure
in
persuad-
ing
Congress
of
the
plausibility
of
his
strategic
review -
and
allied
Win-Hold-Win
concept -
in
1993
was
testament
to
this
reality.
Fourthly,
the
intense
and
bitter
criticism
of
the
Clinton
Administration’s
record
in
foreign
policy
made
by
the
incoming
Republican
legislative
leadership
did
not
augur
well.
Senate
Republican
leader
Robert
Dole
had
been
unusually
vocal
in
his
distaste
for
White
House
actions
across
the
whole
planet.
Within
days
of
the
Republican
triumph
he
told
the
press
forthrightly
that
’...all
US
troops
should
be
withdrawn
from
Haiti
by
Thanksgiving
Day;
that
the
arms
embargo
on
Bosnia
should
be
lifted
immediately;
and
that
the
recent
agreement
on
North
Korea’s nuclear
programme
should
be
scrutinised’.2
Senator
Dole,
however,
looked
a
positive
moderate
compared
with
some
of
his
colleagues.
The
infamous
Senator
Jesse
Helms
took
over
as
Chairman
of
the
1
See
Tim
Hames,
’Foreign
Policy
and
the
American
Elections
of
1992’,
International
Relations,
vol.
XI,
no.
4,
April
1993,
and
’Searching
for
the
New
World
Order:
The
Clinton
Administration
and
Foreign
Policy
in
1993’,
International
Relations,
vol.
XII,
no.
1,
April
1994.
2
Quoted
by
Paul
F.
Horowitz,
International
Herald
Tribune,
14
November
1994.
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