Foreign Policy Thinking in the Elite and the General Population
| DOI | 10.1177/002234336800500204 |
| Author | Helge Hveem |
| Date | 01 June 1968 |
| Published date | 01 June 1968 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
FOREIGN
POLICY
THINKING
IN
THE
ELITE
AND
THE
GENERAL
POPULATION
A
Norwegian
Case
Study*
By
HELGE
HVEEM
International
Peace
Research
Institute,
Oslo
1.
Introduction
This
article
has
two
different,
but
to
some
extent
overlapping
purposes.
The
one
is
to
present
the
world
picture,
or
more
specifically
the
peace
thinking,
of
the
Norwegian
foreign
policy
elite.
The
other
is
to
contribute
some
new
knowledge
to
the
general
theory
of
foreign
policy
at-
titudes
as
a
function
of
social
position,
developed
by
Galtung.1
The
data
presented
are
part
of
the
results
obtained
from
a
study
carried
out
among
two
different
population
samples
repre-
senting
higher
strata
in
Norwegian
so-
ciety.2
One
group,
the
foreign
policy
elite,
was
sampled
according
to
a
design
used
by
other
authors.3
The
other
group,
the
opinion-maker
group,
represented
a
level
between
the
elite
and
the
general
public
opinion -
educating
or
forming
the
latter,
and
to
some
extent
influencing
the
former.
The
sampling
procedure
is
explained
in
Appendix
A,
together
with
some
data
on
the
composition
of
the
two
groups.
Elite
studies
are
important
for
several
reasons.
The
cognitions
and
evaluations
of
elite
persons
are
of
consequence
to
the
formation
of
a
country’s
foreign
policy.
What
the
elite
and
the
opinion-maker
strata
see
and
believe
about
the
world
is
important;
it
even
to
some
extent
de-
termines
what
the
rest
of
the
population
shall
see
or
believe.
Internal
structures
of
communication
and
decision-making,
and
the
structure
of
and
intensity
in
the
rela-
tions
with
the
outside
world
are
factors
which
work
in
this
direction.
In
our
opinion
these
generally-accepted
considerations
are
not
paralleled
by
the
amount
of
elite
research
actually
carried
out.
There
seems
to
exist
a
certain
dis-
crepancy
between
elite
studies
and
opinion
surveys,
with
much
stronger
emphasis
on
the
latter.
This
is
not
to
say
that
this
kind
of
research
is
unimportant:
only
that
it
should
not
be
carried
out
to
the
neglect
of
elite
research,
as
appears
to be
the
case
till
now.
Rather,
one
should
concentrate
more
on
studying
the
relations
between
elite
and
public
opinion,
by
more
extensive
com-
parative
research.
This
is
our
second
start-
ing point
or
main
’hunch’,
which
will
be
further
elaborated
below.
The
data
were
collected
in
two
slightly
different
ways.
The
foreign
policy
elite
was
interviewed
by
the
author
and
three
assistants,
trained
in
this
technique,
from
February
to
April
1967
with
the
use
of
a
mostly
pre-coded
and
wholly
structured
interview
guide.
This
group
was
also
asked
to
answer
some
questions
on
a
question-
naire.
The
responses
of
the
opinion-maker
sample
were
given
on
a
questionnaire
which,
except
from
a
few
questions,
was
pre-coded.
The
opinion-maker
study
was
carried
out
in
the
period
from
April
to
medio
June
the
same
year.
The
methodol-
ogy
used
is
explained
in
more
detail
in
Appendix
B.
Before
we
proceed,
let
us
briefly
validate
the
assumption
made
above
that
the
elite
and
the
opinion-maker
samples
do
rep-
resent
different
social
strata.
This
we
do
by
presenting
data
on
three
different
variables:
the
respondents’
own
perception
of
their
position
in
the
foreign
policy
de-
147
Table
1.
Validation
of
the
position
of
the
elite
and
the
opinion-maker
samples.
%
cision-making
structure;
their
participation
in
official
delegations
to
international
or-
ganizations ;
and
their
activity
in
the
com-
munication
system
(Table
1).
Our
assumption
is
verified
on
all
three
variables:
the
elite
sample
scores
higher
on
all
of
them.
The
third
variable,
how-
ever,
needs
some
further
comments.
We
assumed
that
the
opinion-makers
to
some
extent
influenced
or
tried
to
in-
fluence
the
elite:
this
is
in fact
indicated
by
the
scores
on
the
question
of
who
con-
tacts
whom
the
most.
Taking
the
ratio
between
’contact
myself’
and
’contacted
by
others’,
we
find
that
the
ratio
of
the
elite
is
2/3:
the
elite
is
more
often
con-
tacted
by
others
than
itself
contacts
others;
the
position
of
the
opinion-makers
is
the
reverse.
Contacts,
of
course,
may
be
taken
both
vertically
and
horizontally.
The
opinion-
makers
may
contact
the
elite
-
and
it
has
been
shown
that
this
happens
more
often
than
the
elite
contacts
the
opinion-
makers ;
in
other
words:
the
structural
or
positional
difference
is
clear.
But
contact
may
also
be
taken
between
opinion-
makers.
Since
the
question,
however,
was
made
in
a
context
where
the
focus
was
on
the
top
level
making
of
foreign
policy,
vertical
or
upward
contact
was
evidently
in
the
minds
of
most
of
the
opinion-makers.
Another
problem
is
that
of
a
possible
methodological
bias
due
to
different
data
collecting
methods
for
the
two
samples
in
large
parts
of
the
study.4
As
far
as
we
can
see
from
our
data,
there
seems
to be
no
clear
tendency
or
indications
generally
of
such
a
bias.
We
may
show
this
by
com-
paring
responses
on
items
which
were
presented
in
much
the
same
context
and
formula
in
both
the
interview
guide
and
the
questionnaire,
and
comparing,
on
the
the
other
hand,
responses
the
elite
gave
on
interview
and
the
opinion-makers
on
questionnaire
stimuli.
An
attempt
to
com-
bine
these
two
approaches
is
made
in
Table
2.
Unfortunately,
we
may
present
only
two
items
which
were
used
in
both
the
guide
and
the
questionnaire:
the
intra-
and
the
inter-individual
approach
to
peace.
Table
2
supports
our
general
conclusion
about
a
possible
methodological
bias:
on
the
intra-individual
item,
the
opinion-
makers
are
more
positive
in
both
cases
(81 %
against
78%,
and
46%
against
35 %);
on
the
inter-individual
item
the
elite
is
the
most
positive
on
both
cases.
If
we
read
the
Table
vertically
and
look
at
the
relations
between
the
two
items,
the
trend
is
also
consistent
in
all
four
cases
(of’
positive
evaluation) :
the
intra-individual
approach
is
the
most
preferred.
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