Forever wars: Divided government and the termination of interventions in support of civil war governments
| Author | Christopher Linebarger,Andrew J Enterline |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/13691481211070172 |
| Published date | 01 May 2023 |
| Date | 01 May 2023 |
| Subject Matter | Original Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/13691481211070172
The British Journal of Politics and
International Relations
2023, Vol. 25(2) 328 –347
© The Author(s) 2022
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DOI: 10.1177/13691481211070172
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Forever wars: Divided
government and the
termination of interventions
in support of civil war
governments
Christopher Linebarger1
and Andrew J Enterline2
Abstract
Why do third-party states continue interventions in support of governments fighting civil wars even
when continuing to do so appears futile from a military standpoint? To answer this question, we
focus on third-party state domestic politics, theorising that institutional characteristics condition
the likelihood that the third party will terminate support to a civil war government before a
conflict ends. When a third-party state’s legislature and executive branches are controlled by
opposing political parties, the third party’s executive is more likely to remain committed to an
intervention in order to deny political opponents the opportunity to seize on the withdrawal as
a basis for political advantage. To test this expectation, we assemble a data sample of third-party
interventions in support of civil war governments during the period 1975–2009. The analysis
suggests that the third-party divided government reduces the likelihood of an early termination of
its support for a civil war government. Our analysis underscores the role of third-party domestic
politics in understanding the dynamics of internationalised civil conflicts.
Keywords
civil war, competing risk models, divided government, domestic politics, latent variables, third-
party intervention
Introduction
When US forces were withdrawn from Afghanistan in 2021, the intervention had endured
for 20 years, persisting across three presidential administrations, the death of Osama bin
Laden, and the eviction of al-Qaeda from Afghanistan (Sanger and Shear, 2021). One
1School of Criminology & Justice Studies, University of Massachusetts, Lowell, MA, USA
2Department of Political Science, University of North Texas, Denton, TX, USA
Corresponding author:
Christopher Linebarger, School of Criminology & Justice Studies, University of Massachusetts, 113 Wilder
Street, HSSB 435, Lowell, MA 01854, USA.
Email: Christopher_Linebarger@uml.edu
1070172BPI0010.1177/13691481211070172The British Journal of Politics and International RelationsLinebarger and Enterline
research-article2022
Original Article
Linebarger and Enterline 329
might expect that American presidents would terminate the intervention into Afghanistan
earlier, either as a consequence of shifting domestic politics, the apparent completion of
the original objective, or the continuing cost of defending the government in Kabul. Yet,
the United States did not effect a rapid withdrawal from the conflict despite a stated desire
to do so. Indeed, despite a stated desire to withdraw, President Donald Trump previously
deployed 4000 new troops to the Afghan theatre merely 6 months after his 2017 inaugura-
tion and remained committed deep into his presidency (The Guardian, 2017). The inabil-
ity of the United States to terminate the armed intervention in Afghanistan is not unique.
For example, France began counterinsurgency intervention into Mali in 2013. Upon entry
to office, French President Emmanuel Macron expressed a desire to withdraw his nation’s
military forces after a few weeks, but later doubled-down by deploying additional forces
that remain engaged in counterinsurgency operations as of fall 2021 (BBC, 2020). As
such:
France now finds itself stuck in the Sahel, much like the United States found itself in Afghanistan
and Iraq – spending years and billions of dollars on fighting highly mobile Islamist groups in
difficult, unfamiliar terrain, with no end in sight (Maclean, 2020).
Why do third-party state interveners continue to support central governments engaged
in civil war, even when continuing such support appears futile? We approach this ques-
tion by focussing on the domestic politics of third-party interveners.1 Specifically, we
examine how institutional accountability mechanisms in third-party states constrain the
ability of their political leaders to terminate ongoing interventions. Accountability exists
any time that one social actor is obliged to inform another about their ‘actions and deci-
sions, to justify them, and to suffer punishment in the case of eventual misconduct’
(Schedler et al., 1999). We focus on the form of accountability that obtains when deci-
sions by national leaders are subject to review and approval by rival institutions within
government, particularly legislatures controlled by the political opposition. This logic
pertains primarily, but not exclusively, to democratic third-party interveners.
We theorise that when control of the government in a third-party state is divided and
the legislature is controlled by the executive’s political opposition, national leaders are
less likely to terminate an intervention. Our logic is based on two basic assumptions.
First, although third-party citizens are generally unaware of foreign affairs (e.g. Zaller,
1992), they are deeply concerned that involvement in foreign conflict is worth the atten-
dant costs (Downs and Rocke, 1994). Leaders that fail to achieve victory are punished
and removed from office (Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson, 1995; Caverley, 2010;
Chiozza and Goemans, 2004; Chiozza and Goemans, 2011; Colaresi, 2004; Croco, 2011;
Croco and Weeks, 2016; Debs and Goemans, 2010; Downs and Rocke, 1994; Goemans,
2000; Stanley, 2009; Wells, 2016). Third-party interventions in support of civil war gov-
ernments represent a special class within this phenomenon because a third party’s national
survival is rarely threatened and citizens may not understand the original policy justifica-
tions (Haass, 2009).
Second, when the national legislature is controlled by the opposition, elites within the
opposition party may use the termination of a conflict as evidence of foreign policy fail-
ure and incompetence, thereby creating an issue that can be exploited to undermine the
incumbent leader’s standing (Arena, 2008, 2015; Koch and Nicholson, 2016; Sullivan,
2008). Put differently, citizens may not be educated about international relations, but they
are concerned about their leader’s reputation for competence. National leaders seek to
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