Formal rules, informal norms and the everyday practice of coalition governance
| Date | 01 February 2019 |
| Author | Felicity Matthews |
| DOI | 10.1177/1369148118808457 |
| Published date | 01 February 2019 |
| Subject Matter | Original Articles |
808457BPI0010.1177/1369148118808457The British Journal of Politics and International Relations X(X)Matthews
research-article2018
Original Article
The British Journal of Politics and
International Relations
Formal rules, informal norms
2019, Vol. 21(1) 148 –168
© The Author(s) 2018
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https://doi.org/10.1177/1369148118808457
DOI: 10.1177/1369148118808457
coalition governance
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Felicity Matthews
Abstract
Despite the significant attention devoted to their birth and death, the day-to-day operation of
coalition government remains understudied. This article addresses this lacuna and sheds light on
the dynamics of coalition governance by examining the interplay between macro-level institutions,
meso-level values and micro-level practices. Focusing on the Conservative – Liberal Democrat
Coalition that governed the United Kingdom between 2010 and 2015, this analysis reveals the
extent to which the everyday practice of coalition governance is flexible, contingent, and proceeds
through informal negotiation and accommodation. It also draws attention to the dilemmas faced
by coalition actors in terms of reconciling competing loyalties and appeasing a wide range of
audiences. Through this analysis, the article makes an important distinction between the ‘rules-
in-form’ and ‘rules-in-use’ of coalition governance and between the different ways that coalition
governance is enacted on the ‘frontstage’ and ‘backstage’. Together, these findings point to an
important new avenue of research for coalition scholars.
Keywords
coalition governance, coalition government, Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition, informal
governance, majoritarianism, United Kingdom
The formation of coalition government has been a major concern of comparative scholar-
ship, with significant attention devoted to who gets in and who gets what in terms of par-
ties, portfolios and policies (see for example Laver and Schofield, 1990; Martin and
Stevenson, 2001). Similarly, the termination of coalition government has been subject to
much analysis, as scholars have sought to explain when and why coalitions fall (see Laver,
2003; Warwick, 1994, 2001). However, it has been argued that ‘[w] happens between
coalition formation and termination is still poorly understood’ and that ‘the territory
remains largely uncharted’ (Müller et al., 2008: 35). This lacuna is a significant one, and
one that matters for two reasons. First, across parliamentary democracies worldwide, and
Department of Politics, The University of Sheffield, Sheffield, UK
Corresponding author:
Felicity Matthews, Department of Politics, The University of Sheffield, Elmfield, Northumberland Road,
Sheffield S10 2TU, UK.
Email: f.m.matthews@sheffield.ac.uk
Matthews
149
within western Europe in particular, coalitions are the predominant government type (see
Andeweg et al., 2011; Müller et al., 2008; Müller and Strøm, 2003c). Yet despite their
prevalence, we know relatively little about the everyday practice of coalition governance.
Second, and relatedly, some have regarded coalition as an outward manifestation of a pol-
ity’s capacity for inclusive and consensual decision-making (notably Lijphart, 2012, but
compare Matthews and Flinders, 2017). However, for such normative claims to substanti-
ated, a clear understanding of the contextual conditions under which coalition govern-
ments operate are imperative.
This article addresses this gap, and focuses on the everyday practices of the
Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition that held office in the United Kingdom between
2010 and 2015. Compared to the parliamentary democracies of western Europe, the
United Kingdom has limited experience of national-level coalition, as the structures of
Westminster are purposefully calibrated to ‘manufacture’ (Rae, 1967) a legislative major-
ity for the plurality winning party. Yet, it is precisely because of this seeming disconnect
between the principles of majoritarianism and the practice of power-sharing that this case
should be regarded as ‘critical’ (Flyvbjerg, 2006: 230). It provides a unique opportunity
to isolate the effects (and effectiveness) of formal and informal mechanisms of coalition
governance within a polity hitherto dominated by single-party majority executives. As
such, this article will make a number of broad contributions to the study of coalition gov-
ernance and specific contributions to the study of British government.
First, it responds to the demand for situated analyses of coalition governance (Martin
and Stephenson, 2001; Müller et al., 2008; Müller and Strøm, 2003a), and by providing
critical insights from the United Kingdom, makes an important empirical contribution to
extant comparative scholarship, which has largely focused on the ‘consensual’ (Lijphart,
2012) democracies of western Europe (see Andeweg et al., 2011; Müller et al., 2008;
Müller and Strøm, 2003c). Second, it dovetails with a burgeoning body of literature that
examines how political actors have mediated the ‘dilemmas’ arising from clashes between
constitutional traditions, institutional rules and governing reality (see Bevir and Rhodes,
2003; Marsh and Hall, 2016; Matthews, 2015; Turnbull, 2016). Third, its findings provide
further impetus for the emerging scholarly turn towards ‘informal governance’, and the
focus on the interplay between formal ‘frontstage’ posturing and informal ‘backstage’
accommodation in governance transactions (see for example Ayres et al., 2017; Friedman,
1995; Klijn, 2014). Fourth, the article offers a counterpoint to existing studies of British
government, which have (understandably) largely focused on the dynamics of intra-exec-
utive relations (Bevir and Rhodes, 2003; Marsh, 2008; Smith, 1999) and political leader-
ship (Dowding, 2013; Foley, 1993, 2000; Heffernan, 2003) in the context of single-party
majority government. Finally, recognising that ‘no act of coalition politics can be under-
stood in isolation from others that may occur earlier or later’ (Müller and Strøm, 2003a:
5), it provides a timely contribution to the study of British politics in a period when such
governments are increasingly exceptional.
To develop these strands, the article proceeds as follows. The next section brings
together several hitherto separate strands of literature to demonstrate the necessity of
locating the operation of coalition government within its wider institutional context, and
develops a critical distinction between the ‘rules-in-form’ and ‘rules-in-use’ (Ostrom,
2005) of coalition governance. Following on from this exercise, the case of the
Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition is analysed. Drawing on a range of primary
materials, including previously embargoed interviews with actors at the heart of the gov-
ernment, this section examines the relevance of formal mechanisms and informal
150
The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 21(1)
relationships for the everyday practices of the Coalition, and in doing so explores the
ways in which its members sought to navigate the demands of multiparty politics within
a highly adversarial majoritarian polity. The article concludes by locating these findings
within a series of theoretical debates regarding the relationship between ‘frontstage’ and
‘backstage’ governance practices, and identifies a number of areas through which this
research can be developed.
The rules-in-form and rules-in-use of coalition governance
Designing the rules-in-form
While significant scholarly attention has been devoted to coalition formation and termi-
nation, the day-to-day operation of coalition government has been relatively understud-
ied. Indeed, this ‘stages approach’ has been criticised for neglecting the dynamic, cyclical
and anticipatory character of coalition governance, which requires its participants to
‘anticipate and influence what will happen from the time they form their government until
the time of their next election’ (Müller et al., 2008: 10–11; see also Warwick and
Druckman, 2006). As suggested, coalition governments are required to remain alert to the
potential for preference divergence, political opportunism and (unforeseen) external
shocks in order to avoid their untimely demise. Recognising this reality, several studies
have drawn attention to the variety of formal arrangements that coalitions adopt to man-
age the dispersal of office and policy payoffs, the resolution of disputes, and the timing of
future elections.
Perhaps the most widely utilised tool is the formal coalition agreement, typically pub-
lished immediately after the conclusion of coalition negotiations (see Indridason and
Kristinsson, 2013; Müller and Strøm, 2008). Coalition agreements have been variously
described as a ‘register of policies that coalition parties wish ministers to implement’
(Moury, 2011: 386), a ‘pre-commitment device by which the negotiating parties bind
themselves to the mast’ (Müller and Strøm, 2008: 165), or quite simply the ‘bible’ (De
Winter et al., 2000: 322). Coalition agreements have been regarded as playing an impor-
tant role in reconciling ‘the fundamental tension between standing apart and sitting
together’ (Timmermans, 2006: 264), constituting ‘a basic method for containing ministe-
rial, or party, drift in cabinets’ (Indridason and Kristinsson, 2013: 825), and nearly all
agreements lay down (some of) the intra-coalition rules of the game...
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