A framework for analyzing public reason theories
| Author | Paul Billingham,Anthony Taylor |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/1474885120925381 |
| Published date | 01 October 2022 |
| Date | 01 October 2022 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Article EJPT
A framework for
analyzing public
reason theories
Paul Billingham
University of Oxford, UK
Anthony Taylor
University of Oxford, UK
Abstract
Proponents of public reason views hold that the exercise of political power ought to be
acceptable to all reasonable citizens. This article elucidates the common structure shared
by all public reason views, first by identifying a set of questions that all such views must
answer and, second, by showing that the answers to these questions stand in a particular
relationship to each other. In particular, we show that what we call the ‘rationale ques-
tion’ is fundamental. This fact, and the common structure more generally, are often
overlooked or distorted within the literature. As a result, we argue, several prominent
argumentative moves made by both critics and defenders of public reason are unsuc-
cessful. Our overall conclusion is that discussions of public reason views would be more
fruitful if they made consistent use of the common structure we identify.
Keywords
Idealization, legitimacy, liberalism, public reason, reasonable disagreement
A number of political philosophers are attracted to the idea that the exercise of
political power ought to be acceptable to all reasonable citizens. We will refer to
this requirement as the Reasonable Acceptability Principle (RAP), and to theories
that endorse it as public reason views.
1
Such views can differ greatly, depending on
Corresponding author:
Anthony Taylor, Nuffield College, Oxford University, Oxford, OX1 1NF, UK.
Email: anthony.taylor@nuffield.ox.ac.uk
European Journal of Political Theory
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DOI: 10.1177/1474885120925381
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2022, Vol. 21(4) 671–691
how they specify this requirement. Nonetheless, all such views share a common
structure, or so we will argue. The aim of this article is to elucidate this common
structure by identifying four questions that any public reason view must answer:
the rationale question, the idealization question, the formulation question and the
content question. The answers to these four questions stand in a particular rela-
tionship to one another, which we also aim to elucidate. Indeed, we will argue that
the rationale question is fundamental, in the sense that its answer should explain
and justify its proponent’s specification of RAP.
Part of the purpose of identifying this common structure is clarificatory. If we
are to have a productive conversation about the merits of public reason views in
general, and of any particular such view, then we need to understand the kinds of
questions that such views must answer in order to be coherent and defensible. But
our analysis also has a critical edge. Both advocates and critics of public reason
views often fail to answer the four questions clearly, and this failure can undermine
the force of their arguments. Indeed, we will argue that some of the central objec-
tions to public reason views are cast in a new, clarifying light once we properly
understand the structure of those views. This is not to suggest that no existing
public reason views have the right structure, or that no objections to them suc-
cessfully reflect that structure. If our analysis were wholly surprising or novel then
this would cast serious doubt upon our claim to be capturing what public reason
theorists are up to. Nonetheless, there is sufficient unclarity and confusion in the
burgeoning public reason literature for the clarification we offer to be urgently
required, and for it to generate criticisms of some familiar claims within that lit-
erature. For example, one upshot of our analysis is that it makes little sense to
claim that a view ‘fails to take reasonable pluralism seriously’. This is a fairly
common objection, but we will argue that it is misguided.
David Enoch (2015: 112–113) has recently expressed puzzlement with the public
reason literature. He notes that many theorists seem to believe that public reason
views are the only game in town, while others believe that such views have repeat-
edly been shown to be dead ends. Often the two sides simply seem to be talking
past one another. Part of the explanation for this, we suggest, is that some versions
of the view are susceptible to decisive objections because they do not have the
proper structure – i.e. they fail to provide a coherent set of answers to our four
questions. Critics often target these versions, and rightly point out their flaws. But
those objections often do not apply to coherent versions of the view, and some-
times the objections themselves fail to properly capture the structure of such views.
As a result, many public reason theorists see the objections as misguided.
The mutual puzzlement that Enoch identifies is the result. We hope, therefore,
that our argument in this article can be of service to both advocates and critics
of public reason views, and indeed can facilitate a more productive debate between
them. It can serve advocates by encouraging them to show how their view offers a
plausible and coherent set of answers to our questions. And it can serve critics by
helping them to identify the precise target of their criticisms, and to ensure that
they are not simply attacking incoherent or implausible versions of the view.
672 European Journal of Political Theory 21(4)
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