Framing the Japan Problem: The Bush Administration and the Structural Impediments Initiative
| Published date | 01 June 1992 |
| Date | 01 June 1992 |
| Author | Michael Mastanduno |
| DOI | 10.1177/002070209204700203 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
MICHAEL
MASTANDUNO
Framing
the
Japan
problem:
the
Bush
administration
and
the
Structural
Impediments
Initiative
Imagine
two
families,
living on
opposite
sides
of
a
wide
boule-
vard.
They
agree
to
visit
each
other's
homes
and
make
a
critical
assessment
of
the
wallpaper,
the
furniture,
the
family
budget,
and the
eating
habits
of
the
children.
Each
recommends changes
for
the
other:
rearranging
the
furniture,
eating
less
meat
(and
more
rice),
visiting
the
grandparents
more often.
Each
agrees
to
adopt
its
neighbour's recommendations,
to
implement them
on
a
specified
timetable,
and
to
monitor
the
results.
The
neighbours
expect
to
become
better
friends
as
a
result.
The
Structural
Impediments
Initiative
(siI)
was
a
novel
and
ambitious
attempt
to
rectify the
trade
and
payments
imbalance
between
the United
States
and
Japan.
It
was
launched
as
a
joint
initiative
by
President
Bush
and
Prime
Minister
Uno in
June
1989,
and,
following
a
year
of
concentrated
formal
negotiations
and
informal
meetings,
a
final
agreement
was
signed
in
June
199
o.
The
sii required
each
side
to
scrutinize
and
seek
to
alter
policies
and
practices
in
the
other
which
are
normally
considered
the
preserve
of
domestic
politics.
For
example,
the
United
States
emphasized
the
manner
in
which
Japan
utilized
its
land,
the
Associate
Professor
of
Government,
Dartmouth
College,
Hanover,
New
Hampshire;
author
of
Economic
Containment:
Cocom
and
the
Politics
of
East-
West
Trade
(1992).
I
am
grateful
to
the
other
contributors
to
this
volume,
and
to
Joseph
Massey,
Michael
Donnelly,
and
Nelson Kasfir for
thoughtful
comments
and
suggestions.
I
also
thank
the Council
on
Foreign
Relations
for
the
International
Affairs
Fellowship
that
enabled
me
to work
at
the
Office
of
the United
States
Trade
Representative
and
participate
in
the sit
negotiations
as
a
member
of
the
United
States
delegation.
International
Journal
XLVll
spring
1992
236
INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL
work
and
leisure
habits
of Japanese
citizens,
and
the exclusionary
purchasing
habits
of
and
long-term
relationships
among
Japa-
nese
firms.
Among
the
issues
stressed
by
Japan
were
the
lack
of
patience
and
planning
by
American
firms,
the
inadequate
efforts
of
the
United
States
government
in
the
fields
of
education
and
labour
training,
and
the
excessive
reliance
of
individuals,
firms,
and
the
government
on
instruments
of
debt.
In
the
agreement,
each
side
pledged
to
eliminate
or
modify
many of
the
structural
barriers identified
by
the
other. The
Japanese
government
agreed
to
bolster
the
administration
and
enforcement of
its
anti-
monopoly
laws,
to
increase
spending
by
specified
amounts
on
public
infrastructure,
to
improve the
efficiency
of
its
distribution
system,
and
to
relax
restrictions
on
the
operation
of large
retail
stores.
The
Bush
administration
promised
to
promote
saving
by
the
public
and
the private
sector,
to
encourage
firms
to
adopt
long-term
strategies,
to
reduce the federal
budget
deficit,
and
to
improve
the
quality
of
education.
The
two
governments
agreed
to
meet
periodically
over
the
following
three
years
to
assess
the
implementation
of
the
agreement
and
to
resolve
problem
areas.
That
the
United
States
and
Japan
agreed
to
engage
in
the
sii,
much
less
to
reach
detailed
agreements,
might
be
considered
puzzling.
The
two
sides
had
co-operated
in
the
past
on
specific
compartmentalized
issues
such
as
the
adjustment
of
exchange
rates, the
removal
of
sectoral
trade
barriers,
or
the
co-ordination
of
macro-economic
policies.
Yet
they
had
never
before
attempted
any
negotiations
as
comprehensive,
and
as
intrusive
domestically,
as
the
six.
The
general
tendency
of
governments
is
to
guard
their
domestic
political and
economic
autonomy.
For
one
government
to
allow
another,
in
the context
of
a
trade
negotiation,
to
criticize
and
expect
changes
in
long-standing
practices
and
institutions
unambiguously
considered
the
preserve
of
domestic
politics
is
highly
unusual.
For
governments
to
make
a
formal
commitment
to
alter
such
structures
and
practices
is
all
the more
extraordi-
nary.
Thus,
it
is
not
surprising
that
the
sii
was
greeted
with
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