Freedom, Interference and Domination
| DOI | 10.1111/1467-9248.00310 |
| Published date | 01 June 2001 |
| Author | Steven Wall |
| Date | 01 June 2001 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
Freedom, Interference and Domination
Steven Wall
Kansas State University
Interference and domination make persons less free. This paper discusses how they do so. It
considers and rejects two influential recent accounts of freedom, one that holds that freedom is
best understood in terms of non-interference and one that holds that freedom is best understood
in terms of non-domination. Against these accounts, the paper argues that both interference and
domination play an important role in reducing freedom and that neither concept can be reduced to
the other. To bolster this argument, the paper presents and defends an account of freedom that
relates both concepts back to a common source. This account shows that while interference and
domination have independent significance for judgments of freedom both reduce freedom by
obstructing the ability of persons to plan their lives.
This paper analyzes the role that interference and domination play (and can play)
in reducing personal freedom. It argues that both of these concepts are important
to understanding freedom, and that both are necessary to explain the different
ways in which people can become less free. More precisely, the paper advances both
a negative and a constructive claim. The negative claim holds that it is a mistake to
think, as some political theorists now insist, that we must choose between freedom
as non-interference and freedom as non-domination. A plausible account of free-
dom, the paper contends, will need to recognize the independent significance of
both of these concepts. Picking up where this claim leaves off, the constructive
claim holds that interference and domination are related to a common root idea
that explains why both are plausibly understood to be freedom-reducing factors,
despite their independence from each other. This common root idea refers to the
capacity of persons to plan their lives.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the first section, I clarify the concepts
‘interference’ and ‘domination’. These remarks are somewhat stipulative, but I
attempt to characterize these concepts in a way that is consistent with how they
have been used in recent theoretical discussions of freedom. After doing this, in the
second, third and fourth sections, I substantiate the negative claim. Here I present
arguments for rejecting the view that freedom can be understood solely in terms of
either non-interference or non-domination. These arguments prepare the ground
for the fifth section, where I present and defend the constructive claim. I conclude
that both interference and domination are freedom-reducing factors because both
are important means by which other agents can and do obstruct the ability of
persons to plan their lives.
Interference and Domination
Before proceeding, I need to register a preliminary qualification. This paper does
not attempt a full analysis of the concept of freedom. I shall be concerned with the
ways in which people – and the relations between them – can reduce freedom. I
POLITICAL STUDIES: 2001 VOL 49, 216–230
© Political Studies Association, 2001.
Published by Blackwell Publishers, 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA
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