Freedom of expression, deliberation, autonomy and respect
| DOI | 10.1177/1474885110386003 |
| Date | 01 January 2011 |
| Published date | 01 January 2011 |
| Author | Christian F. Rostbøll |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
European Journal of Political Theory
10(1) 5–21
!The Author(s) 2011
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DOI: 10.1177/1474885110386003
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Article
Freedom of expression,
deliberation, autonomy
and respect
Christian F. Rostbøll
University of Copenhagen
Abstract
This paper elaborates on the deliberative democracy argument for freedom of expres-
sion in terms of its relationship to different dimensions of autonomy. It engages the
objection that Enlightenment theories pose a threat to cultures that reject autonomy
and argues that autonomy-based democracy is not only compatible with but necessary
for respect for cultural diversity. On the basis of an intersubjective epistemology, it
argues that people cannot know how to live on mutually respectful terms without
engaging in public deliberation and developing some degree of personal autonomy.
While freedom of expression is indispensable for deliberation and autonomy, this
does not mean that people have no obligations regarding how they speak to each
other. The moral insights provided by deliberation depend on the participants in the
process treating one another with respect. The argument is related to the Danish
cartoon controversy.
Keywords
autonomy, Danish cartoon controversy, deliberative democracy, freedomof expression,
liberalism, respect
Freedom of expression has become a central battlefield in multicultural societies, as
seen most dramatically in the recent Danish cartoon controversy. A core argument
for freedom of expression is its indispensability for democracy. The cartoons of the
Prophet Muhammad published by a Danish newspaper in 2005, and attracting
enormous international attention and protests in 2006 and again in 2008, were
also defended, inter alia, with reference to the idea that vigorous public debate is
a prerequisite for democracy. The principle of near absolute freedom of expression
might be perceived as being in conflict with an equally important principle of
Corresponding author:
Christian F.Rostbøll. Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, Øster Farimagsgade 5, Øster
Farimagsgade 5, Denmark
Email: cr@ifs.ku.dk
respect for difference. This conflict corresponds to arguments in liberal political
theory concerning the relationship between autonomy and respect, enlightenment
and tolerance. During the cartoon controversy, a number of Danish Muslims
pitted a demand for respect for their religious feelings against Jyllands-Posten’s
right to publish the cartoons,
1
while some defenders of the cartoons insisted that
respect for religion is incompatible with freedom of expression.
This paper considers the role of free expression in deliberative democracy. The
deliberative model of democracy is of particular interest in connection to the
alleged conflict between freedom of expression and autonomy on the one hand
and respect and religious feelings on the other hand for two reasons. First, the link
between free expression and democracy is stronger in the deliberative model than in
other models of democracy. Second, autonomy is a key principle in deliberative
democracy in a way that it is not in other models of democracy. Is deliberative
democracy a form of autonomy-based theory and practice that does not show
sufficient concern for the principle of respect for diversity? Is the idea that political
decisions should be justified in common deliberation hostile to cultural diversity?
To what extent does public deliberation require autonomous preference formation
and to what extent, if at all, is that incompatible with respect for cultures that do
not value autonomy?
Freedom of expression and deliberative democracy
Freedom of expression is often justified with reference to its connection to democ-
racy. In order to show an internal relationship between democracy and freedom of
expression, however, not just any conception of democracy will do.
2
I shall argue
that the relationship between free expression and democracy is particularly robust
in the deliberative conception of democracy. The reason why the latter presupposes
freedom of expression is that it is a conception of democracy that embodies ideals
of autonomy. Deliberative democracy not only presupposes an ideal of political
autonomy, it also prescribes a procedure for individuals to develop autonomous
understandings of their own political preferences.
In order for ‘democracy’ to provide a secure foundation for freedom of expres-
sion, it cannot be defined merely as a form of government in which the present
majority has its desires implemented. Critics of the democracy argument argue
that, as a right, freedom of expression restrains the ability of the majority to do
as it likes, and therefore a conflict exists between freedom of expression and democ-
racy as majority rule.
3
Even if democracy requires that decisions must ultimately be
made by the majority, however, this is no reason to identify democracy with imple-
menting whatever desires the present majority has, for this might make it difficult
for new majorities to form in the future.
4
For example, if the majority decides to
prohibit criticism of its own policies, democratic elections will no longer be possible
because the people will lack the basis for deciding who to vote for in the future.
If democracy is the fundamental ideal we wish to protect and promote, it can
hardly be used to justify laws that undermine its own future possibility.
6European Journal of Political Theory 10(1)
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