From concept to conceptions: Can the Broad View overcome the debate between orthodox and political theories of human rights?
| Date | 01 July 2020 |
| Published date | 01 July 2020 |
| DOI | 10.1177/1474885119890057 |
| Author | Daniel P Corrigan |
| Subject Matter | Symposium on Andrea Sangiovanni's Humanity without Dignity |
Symposium on Andrea Sangiovanni’s Humanity without Dignity
European Journal of Political Theory
From concept to
2020, Vol. 19(3) 417–425
! The Author(s) 2019
conceptions: Can the
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DOI: 10.1177/1474885119890057
Broad View overcome
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the debate between
orthodox and political
theories of human rights?
Daniel P Corrigan
Marymount University, USA
Abstract
In Humanity without Dignity, Sangiovanni offers an interesting new approach to human
rights theory called the “Broad View” (BV) of human rights. The BV involves an inno-
vative attempt to overcome the debate between orthodox and political theories of
human rights. While orthodox and political theories each capture certain roles or
functions that human rights have in practice, it remains unclear how to reconcile
some of their differences. The BV seeks to resolve this debate by drawing a distinction
between the concept and particular conceptions of human rights. It offers a general
concept of human rights, and then allows for both orthodox and political conceptions
of this concept. The aim is to show that neither orthodox nor political theories make a
conceptual mistake about human rights, while also accommodating their recognition of
the various roles or functions human rights have in practice. This article assesses the
success of the BV in resolving the debate, suggesting that several types of indeterminacy
bring into question whether it has accomplished this aim.
Keywords
Human rights, justification of human rights, orthodox theories, political theories, rights
Corresponding author:
Daniel P Corrigan, Marymount University, 2807 N Glebe Road, Arlington, VA Virginia 22207-4224, USA.
Email: daniel.corrigan@marymount.edu
418
European Journal of Political Theory 19(3)
Sangiovanni offers an interesting new approach to human rights theory called the
“Broad View” (BV) of human rights. The BV involves an innovative attempt to
overcome the debate between orthodox and political theories of human rights.
While orthodox and political theories each capture certain roles or functions
that human rights have in practice, it remains unclear how to reconcile some of
their differences. The BV seeks to resolve the debate by drawing a distinction
between the concept and particular conceptions of human rights. It offers a general
concept of human rights, and then allows for both orthodox and political concep-
tions of this concept. The aim is to show that neither orthodox nor political theories
make a conceptual mistake about human rights, while also accommodating their
recognition of the various roles or functions human rights have in practice. This
article assesses the success of the BV in resolving the debate, suggesting that several
types of indeterminacy bring into question whether it has accomplished this aim.
The Broad View of human rights
The BV defines the concept of “human rights” as those “moral rights whose system-
atic violation ought to be a matter of universal moral, legal, and political concern”
(p. 191). In other words, if the violation of a moral right ought to be a matter of one
or more of these kinds of concern, then it is a human right.1 Distinguishing the BV
from orthodox and political theories requires the rejection of two ideas: the Single
Practice Assumption (SPA) and the Extended List Approach (ELA).
The SPA holds that there is a single overarching practice of human rights, from
which we can reconstruct a moral core and derive a master list of human rights.
This master list can then be used to critique, reform, and improve the practice.
While orthodox and political theories hold the SPA in common, Sangiovanni
argues this assumption is false. (pp. 177–178). We should recognize the great
diversity of activities involving human rights, and see there is no single overarching
practice. The BV therefore rejects the SPA, and attempts to account for the diver-
sity of activities found in the practice (p. 191).
Rejection of the SPA should, in turn, lead us to reject the ELA, a particular
approach to developing the BV. This approach uses the general concept of human
rights offered by the BV to produce a list of the rights (and correlated duties) that
satisfy the definition. In other words, the ELA aims to list all the moral rights (and
correlated duties) whose systematic violation should merit universal moral, legal,
or political concern (p. 194).
Sangiovanni finds at least three problems with the ELA. First, the ELA
attempts to specify a list of human rights that underlies and justifies human
rights practice as a single, coherent whole. In other words, the ELA relies on the
SPA, which the BV rejects. Second, the ELA renders the BV merely a competitor
with orthodox and political theories, because it aims to list all moral rights whose
violation should merit universal moral, legal, or political concern. Orthodox and
political theories take the same approach: an orthodox theory may aim to list all
moral rights we possess simply in virtue of being human, while a political theory
Corrigan
419
may aim to list all moral rights whose violation will justify foreign intervention in a
sovereign state. Construed in this way, the BV presents just another competitor
with orthodox and political theories, rather than an approach that...
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