From a perpetrator’s perspective
| Date | 01 March 2016 |
| Published date | 01 March 2016 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022343315626240 |
| Author | Hannah Smidt |
| Subject Matter | Research Articles |
From a perpetrator’s perspective:
International election observers
and post-electoral violence
Hannah Smidt
School of Public Policy, University College London
Abstract
Do international election observers deter or spur violence after election day? This article argues that only when
conceptually and empirically distinguishing between violence by governments and opposition groups, can we assess
the impact of international election observation. Disaggregating post-electoral violence uncovers that observers can
deter governments from using force, but they have the opposite effect on opposition groups. When expecting
criticism from observers, opposition leaders can easily deny their responsibility for violence by individual party
militants, while weaponry and official insignia betray police and military involvement in violence and force the
government to bear command responsibility. Governments also anticipate higher international costs for engaging in
post-electoral violence than opposition groups, which are not usually targets of international punishment. On the
other hand, international election observers unintentionally incite opposition groups to organize violence, as oppo-
sition groups seek to benefit from international attention and support that come with the presence of observers.
Observers’ exposure of fraud reverses this differential effect: because governments expect international costs for
election rigging anyway, observers cannot deter repression after highly fraudulent elections. But their alertness to
electoral malpractice alleviates opposition groups’ incentives for post-electoral violence. Using data on 230 state-wide
elections in Africa from 1990 to 2009, the analysis supports the observable implications of this argument. The
findings of this article imply that international election observation missions make the post-electoral environment
more peaceful when it comes to government repression after non-fraudulent elections. But observers ought to
develop greater local expertise to identify opposition grievances before these groups resort to violence and be attentive
to the possibility of increased repression after exposing cheating.
Keywords
disaggregated analysis, government, international election observation, opposition, post-electoral violence
Introduction
In many unconsolidated democracies elections spark vio-
lent contests between governments and opposition
groups. Recent post-electoral violence in Kenya, Co
ˆte
d’Ivoire and Nigeria caused thousands of deaths and
hundreds of thousands of people were forced out of their
homes (Bekoe, 2012). Preventing post-electoral violence
is high on the international agenda and election moni-
toring is envisioned to be a solution (Anglin, 1998: 486;
European Commission, 2014; National Democratic
Institute, 2015). Although international election moni-
toring should deter all actors involved in elections from
using violence, the 2002 election in Congo-Brazzaville
illustrates that government and opposition react very
differently to the presence of international election
observers. Despite massive anti-government protests,
president-elect Denis Sassou Nguesso refrained from
using forceful repression, actively portrayed himself as
a peacemaker (Radio France International, 2002) and
sought credit for his peaceful organization of elections
from international election observers sent by the
Corresponding author:
hannah.smidt.13@ucl.ac.uk
Journal of Peace Research
2016, Vol. 53(2) 226–241
ªThe Author(s) 2016
Reprints and permission:
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DOI: 10.1177/0022343315626240
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European Union and the Organisation Internationale de
la Francophonie (European Parliament, 2002; Organisa-
tion Internationale de la Francophonie, 2002). In con-
trast, opposition parties denounced the election as
fraudulent and opposition-affiliated militias started
attacking government forces shortly after election results
were announced (United Kingdom Home Office, 2002;
IRIN, 2002; Kolelas, 2002).
This article investigates how the presence of interna-
tional election observers affects governments and oppo-
sition groups’ decisions to engage in post-electoral
violence.
1
It shows that observers deter governments
from using repression after non-fraudulent elections, but
unintentionally incentivize opposition groups to employ
post-electoral violence. There is a growing body of liter-
ature on how international election observers influence
government and opposition behaviour differently (Hyde,
2007; Hyde & O’Mahoney, 2010; Hyde & Marinov,
2014; Kelley, 2011; Simpser & Donno, 2012). How-
ever, this distinction has been neglected in research on
observers’ impact on violence and, especially, violence
after elections (Daxecker, 2012; Kelley, 2012). What has
gone unnoticed is an important differential effect of elec-
tion monitoring on post-electoral violence.
This article argues that governments eschew violence
in the presence of international observers, as they face a
higher risk of exposure and higher international costs for
their involvement in post-electoral violence compared to
opposition groups. Governments bear command respon-
sibility and their agents of violence – police and military
forces – wear identifying insignia and carry particular
weapons. Leadership is less clear when it comes to
opposition-sponsored violence. Thus, observers can
more easily attribute blame to governments than to
opposition leaders. Governments also expect to bear
higher international costs upon exposure. Aid cuts and
most other tools of international punishment are tar-
geted at governments, not opposition groups. In fact,
international election observers may incite opposition-
sponsored violence, because their presence reduces the
risk of repression, increases domestic media attention
and opens an opportunity to catch international observ-
ers’ attention and receive international support. Observ-
ers’ exposure of fraud reverses this differential effect:
because fraudulent governments already expect to lose
their international reputation, observers cannot deter
repression. But their alertness to electoral malpractice
can alleviate opposition groups’ incentives for post-
electoral violence. Based on a statistical analysis of the
impact of international election observation missions on
government and opposition-sponsored violence in 230
post-electoral periods in 43 African countries from 1990
to 2009, I find that when elections were not marred by
fraud, international election observers deter post-
electoral violence by governments, but have a violence-
inducing effect on opposition groups. After highly frau-
dulent elections, however, observers increase repression.
The article proceeds as follows. After reviewing what
we know about the domestic and international determi-
nants of electoral violence, I develop the theoretical argu-
ment. I then detail the research design and solutions to
endogeneity concerns, followed by the empirical analy-
sis. I conclude by discussing implications for theory and
policy.
Explaining variation in electoral violence
Existing research demonstrates that government and
opposition have different motives for using post-
electoral violence, but studies of international election
observers’ impact after elections have so far neglected
this distinction. Tests using aggregated measures of
post-electoral violence show that observers increase vio-
lent conflict after elections. This is a surprising finding, as
case studies and large-N analyses of pre-electoral violence
reveal that international election observers deter govern-
ment misbehaviour before elections.
Studies of the domestic determinants of post-electoral
conflict show that post-electoral violence by both gov-
ernments and opposition groups is more likely in auto-
cratic and transitioning regimes (Schedler, 2002, 2006;
Bhasin & Gandhi, 2013; Davenport, 1997; Anderson &
Mendes, 2006; Tucker, 2007; Kuntz & Thompson,
2009); when the opposition is fragmented (Daxecker,
2009); and when growing environmental, demographic
and economic pressures weaken government legitimacy
(Kahl, 2006: 181 ff.) and reinforce opposition groups’
mobilization efforts (Boone, 2011; Dercon & Gutie
´rrez-
Romero, 2011). But research also points out that gov-
ernments organize violence to deter and supress dissent
after election day (Hafner-Burton, Hyde & Jablonski,
2014: 8–9; Bhasin & Gandhi, 2013: 626–627), whereas
opposition groups employ violence as a form of protest
against fraud, repression, unfavourable outcomes and
socio-economic grievances (Anderson & Mendes,
2006; Kuntz & Thompson, 2009; Hafner-Burton,
1
Post-electoral violence is understood as acts of physical force used to
contest the electoral conduct an d election results or to deter and
suppress these challenge s (Daxecker, 2012; Hafner-B urton, Hyde
& Jablonski, 2014; Tucker, 2007).
Smidt 227
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