From Quality Control to Labor Protection: ISO 9001 and Workplace Safety, 1993–2012
| Published date | 01 May 2017 |
| Date | 01 May 2017 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12408 |
| Author | Sijeong Lim,Aseem Prakash |
From Quality Control to Labor Protection: ISO
9001 and Workplace Safety, 1993–2012
Sijeong Lim
University of Amsterdam
Aseem Prakash
University of Washington
Abstract
Workplace safety is an important issue in global public policy. Given the failure of many governments to enforce their work-
place safety laws, might voluntary programs help in this regard? Most studies on the effectiveness of voluntary programs
focus on their first-order effects reflecting program goals. Yet, well-designed programs that focus on firms’internal practices
and policies can have significant spillover effects beyond the program objectives. This insight motivates our study of the sec-
ond-order effect on occupational safety of ISO 9001, the most widely adopted voluntary standard in the world. While ISO
9001 is a quality management standard, the internal systems that ISO certified firms establish can improve workplace safety.
This is because some workplace practices that lead to poor product quality also contribute to an unsafe working environment.
Our empirical analysis covering 92 countries for the period 1993–2012 supports our argument. We find that 1 per cent
increase in country-level ISO 9001 certification count is associated with 0.04 per cent decline in occupational injury rate (injury
per 10,000 working population). Importantly, our finding is more pronounced where public law regarding workers’rights is
weak, suggesting that voluntary programs can fill in the governance gaps.
Voluntary programs and labor rights
Labor rights and the provision of safe working conditions
are important issues in global policy debates. Developing
country governments can show considerable laxity in
enforcing their workplace safety laws. Take the case of the
2013 Rana Plaza factory collapse in Bangladesh which killed
at least 1,100 garment workers and injured many more. This
tragedy is a grim reminder of systematic and pervasive gov-
ernment failure in this regard. Industrial accidents in Bangla-
desh’s garment exporting sector due to workplace safety
violations had occurred before because the government did
not take corrective actions. In 2010 a fire at the garment
factory, That’s It Sportswear Ltd, led to the death of 30 peo-
ple. In 2012, another fire in the Tazreen Fashion factory led
to the death of over 100 workers. The Rana Plaza tragedy
was a continuation of the horrific record of garment facto-
ries of violating basic safety standards and the failure of the
Bangladesh government to enforce its own workplace safety
laws. The Rana Plaza complex violated multiple building
codes, with the four upper floors having been constructed
illegally without permits.
1
Further, the building was
designed to house shops and offices. Its foundation and
support structures were not supposed to bear the weight
and vibrations of the heavy garment machines that were
eventually housed in its factories. The Bangladesh govern-
ment was heavily criticized for failing to enforce the codes,
especially against politically well-connected landlords.
2
For
reference, the owner of Rana Plaza was a functionary of the
youth wing of the ruling party, the Awami League.
In response to such institutional failure, there is increased
attention to voluntary regulatory programs or standards
(henceforth, voluntary programs), often formulated and
enforced by overseas stakeholders. Examples include, the
Ethical Trading Initiative’s Base Code, Fair Trade, SA8000,
and AA1000 (Fransen and Burgoon, 2012; Marx, 2008). The
global diffusion of these voluntary programs has motivated
scholars and practitioners to investigate their effectiveness:
whether these programs can influence government policies
and, more importantly, the performance of participating
firms in desired ways and correct for government failure
(G€
obbels and Jonker, 2003; Hiscox et al., 2008; Stigzelius
and Mark-Herbert, 2009).
3
Yet, as recent studies acknowledge, voluntary programs in
the areas of labor safety have often not performed as pro-
mised (Egels-Zand
en and Merk, 2013; Locke, 2013). A
ghastly fire in the Ali Enterprises’facility in Karachi that
killed over 250 workers is just one example. This facility had
subscribed to a prominent voluntary program, SA 8000,
which is sponsored by Social Accountability International.
4
Third party auditors who visited the Karachi facility prior to
the 2012 tragic accident had declared it to be in compliance
with SA8000 program obligations.
5
This leads to an obvious
question: why do voluntary programs fail to perform? It is
plausible that voluntary programs have not been adequately
institutionalized and their obligations not internalized by
©2017 University of Durham and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Global Policy (2017) 8:Suppl.3 doi: 10.1111/1758-5899.12408
Global Policy Volume 8 . Supplement 3 . May 2017
66
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