From ‘Rogue’ to ‘Failed’ States? The Fallacy of Short-termism*
| Published date | 01 September 2004 |
| Author | Pinar Bilgin,Adam David Morton |
| Date | 01 September 2004 |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9256.2004.00217.x |
| Subject Matter | Article |
© Political Studies Association, 2004.
Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA
From ‘Rogue’ to ‘Failed’ States?
The Fallacy of Short-termism*
Pinar Bilgin
Bilkent University
Adam David Morton
Lancaster University
This article deals with the growing policymaking interest in the condition of ‘failed states’ and the
calls for increased intervention as a means of coping with international terrorism. It starts by high-
lighting the inordinate attention initially granted to the threat posed by ‘rogue states’ to the neglect
of ‘failed states’. Generally, it is argued that the prevalence of such notions has to be related to a
persistence of Cold War discourse on statehood that revolves around binary oppositions of ‘failed’
versus ‘successful’ states. Specifically, the purveyors of this discourse are practitioners who focus
on the supposed symptoms of state failure (international terrorism) rather than the conditions that
permit such failure to occur. Here, an alternative approach to ‘state failure’ is advocated that
is more cognisant of the realms of political economy and security constraining and enabling
developing states and appreciative of different processes of state formation and modes of social
organisation.
Following the 11 September 2001 attacks against New York and Washington, DC
and the war in Afghanistan, ‘failed states’ have once again come to the fore of US
policy planning. Previously, within a brief ‘universal moment’ (Holm, 2001, p. 361)
in the immediate aftermath of the end of the Cold War, the issue of ‘state failure’
was considered a responsibility of the international community. During this period,
intervention to establish state structures was considered not only do-able but also
morally responsible. Yet, beginning with the failure of US intervention in Somalia,
this consensus disappeared and policymaking towards failed states became more
ad hoc. Hence, as the significance of former anti-communist allies declined, a selec-
tive policy was adopted whereby those developing states that retained their strate-
gic significance were still supported whilst the rest were left to their own devices.
Additionally, states that refused to take cues from the US – such as North Korea,
Iran and Iraq – became labelled as ‘rogue’ states and were engaged with accord-
ingly. The stress was therefore put on the threat posed by ‘rogue states’ to the
neglect of ‘failed states’, especially during the initial months of the George W. Bush
administration (see Bleiker 2003; Caprioli and Trumbore 2003).
This article seeks to address the recent shift in US policymaking interest from ‘rogue
states’ back to ‘failed’ states. It is argued that the prevalence of notions of ‘state
failure’ in US policy lexicon can be understood with reference to the persistence
of Cold War discourse on statehood that revolves around the binary opposition of
POLITICS: 2004 VOL 24(3), 169–180
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