From Situations of Weakness: Foreign Policy of the New Russia
| DOI | 10.1177/002070209404900401 |
| Date | 01 December 1994 |
| Author | Franklyn Griffiths |
| Published date | 01 December 1994 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
FRANKLYN
GRIFFITHS
From
situations
of
weakness:
foreign
policy
of
the
new
Russia
Within
Russia
as
of
mid-1
994,
it's an
open
question whether
the
country
has
a
foreign
policy.
One
commentator
says
it
will
be
years
before
the
internal
situation
permits
a
consistent approach
to
foreign
relations.'
Another
in
effect
asks
what
country
has
a
foreign
policy
anyway.
2
A
third
reports
survey
data
from
a
sam-
ple
of
the
Russian
foreign
policy
41ite
which
shows
a
fundamen-
tal cleavage
along
Westernizer-Slavophile
lines.3
Over
here,
in
the
West,
there
is
widening
support
for
another
view
of
Russian
foreign
policy
which in
part
I share.4
It
sees
Moscow's
interna-
Professor
of
International
Politics,
University
of
Toronto,
at
present
on
sab-
batical
at
the
University
of
Cambridge.
1
Vitalyi
Tretyakov,
in
'Russia's
foreign
policy
should
be
multidimensional,'
International
Affairs
(Moscow),
no 5(1994),
8o.
2
Viktor
Komplektov,
in
ibid.
3 N.
Popov,
'Vneshnyaya
politika
Rossii'
[Russia's
foreign
policy],
Mirovaya
eko-
nomika
i
mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya,
no
3(1994),
53, 57,
and
no
4(1994),
10.
The
method, tone,
and
quality
of
knowledge
in
this
piece
of
survey
research
offer
a
striking
contrast
to
William
Zimmerman,
in
'Markets,
democracy
and
Russian
foreign
policy,'
Post-Soviet
Affairs
io(April-June
1994),
103-26,
who
identifies
intriguing correlations
in
Russian
opinion
on
internal
change
and
the
use
of
force
abroad,
for
example
that
liberal-democratic
61ite
and
mass
opinion
is
more
likely
than
that of
socialist
authoritarians
to
favour
foreign
military
operations.
4
See
Suzanne
Crow,
'Russia
asserts
its
strategic
agenda,'
RFE/RL
Research
Report
2(17
December
1993),
1-8,
and
'Why
has
Russian
foreign
policy
changed?'
RFE/RL
Research
Report
3(6
May
1994),
i-io;
Neil
Malcolm,
'The
new
Russian
foreign
policy,'
World
Today
5o(February
1994),
31.
On the
future
of
the
Rus-
sian
Federation
see:
Jessica
Eve
Stern,
'Moscow
meltdown:
can
Russia
sur-
vive?'
International
Security
18(spring
1994),
4o-65;
Elizabeth
Teague,
'Yeltsin's
difficult
road
toward
election,'
RFE/RL
Research
Report
2
(15
October
1993),
1-
4;
and
Suzanne
Crow, 'Russia
promotes
the
cis
as
an
international
organiza-
tion,'
RFE/RL
Research
Report
3
(18
March
1994),
37-8.
InternationalJournalXLIX
AUTUMNI
1994
700
INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL
tional behaviour
as
increasingly
deft,
assertive,
and
based
on
an
61ite
consensus despite
internal
disarray
which
could
threaten
the
survival
of
the
Russian
Federation
itself.
But
surely
we
can't
all
be
right. Or
might
we?
It
depends
on
the
truth
tests
we
apply.
Here
and
in
Russia,
evaluations
of
Russian
foreign
conduct
are
shaped
by
more
than
the
effort
to
get
the
analysis
straight.
Equally
and
perhaps
more
important
is
the
sense
of
what
is
required
for
policy. In
Russia
and
also
in
the
West,
detachment
is
accompanied
by
politicized
thinking
which
is
quite
capable
of
taking
over
the
perception
of
Russia's
international
perform-
ance
to
justify pre-existing
preferences for
one
line
of
policy
at
the expense
of
others.5
The
truth
test
here
-
success
in
political
combat
-
opens
the
way
to
a
considerably
wider
array
of
inter-
pretations
than
would
likely
be
met
if
the
endeavour
were
some-
how
strictly
academic.
Nor
are
politicized
Russian
and
Western
debates
about
Russian
behaviour
conducted
wholly
in
isolation.
Russian
actions
and
the
uncertainty
that
surrounds
them
may
play
into
Western
discourse,
confirming
certain
perceptions
and
policy
alternatives,
working
against
others.
The
same
applies
to
5
For
example,
those
in
the
61ite
who
say
they believe
there
is
a
foreign
policy
or doctrine
correlate
heavily
with
those
who
favour
President
Yeltsin,
whereas
those
seeing
foreign
policy
formed
issue
by
issue
only
are
likely
to
be
his
opponents:
Popov,
'Vneshnyaya
politika,'
no
4,
6o. Similarly,
Westernizers
on
foreign
relations are
inclined
to
be
supporters
of
the
president
whereas
Slav-
ophiles
tend
to
oppose: Popov,
'Vneshnyaya
politika,'
no
3,
57.
For
current
Western examples,
see:
William
C.
Bodie,
'The
threat
to
America
from
the
former
USSR,'
Orbis
37(fall
1993),
509-23,
which
speaks
of
Foreign
Minister
Andrei
Kozyrev's
'alleged pro-Western
orientation'
(p
514)
in
arguing
against
Russocentrism
in
United
States policy
towards
the
former
Soviet
republics;
and
Gerhard
Simon,
'La
Russie:
une
higbmonie
eurasienne,'
Politique
itran-
g&re
59(printemps
1994),
41.
Or
consider
Walter
Slocombe
('The
continued
need
for
extended deterrence,'
Washington
Quarterly
14[autumn
1991],
159)
on
the
uncertainty
surrounding
Russia's
future:
'A
reactionary
regime,
com-
mitted
to
restoring
internal
order,
cultural
orthodoxy,
and
Russian
national
pride,
would be
tempted
to
make military,
and
particularly
nuclear,
threats
part
of
its
diplomacy
and
to
exploit
its
military
advantage
in
its
international
relationships
if it
saw
opportunities
to
do
so.'
On politicized
perception
as
such,
see
the
piercing
comments
in
William
Pfaff,
'Reflections:
the
Soviet
myth,'
New
Yorker,
6
November
1978,
172-8;
also
David
Campbell,
Writing
Security:
United
States
Foreign
Policy
and
the
Politics
of
Identity
(Minneapolis:
Uni-
versity
of
Minnesota
Press
1992).
To continue reading
Request your trial