From Veto Players to Agenda-Setters?
| Author | Cristina Fasone,Diane Fromage |
| DOI | 10.1177/1023263X1602300205 |
| Date | 01 April 2016 |
| Published date | 01 April 2016 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
294 23 MJ 2 (2016)
FROM VETO PLAYERS TO AGENDA-SETTERS?
National Parliaments and their ‘Green Card’
to the European Commission
C F* and D F**
ABSTRACT
National parliaments (NPs) had long been excluded from the European integration process
and wer e in m any Memb er S tat es a t be st k ept info rme d an d rar ely invo lve d in d ail y EU a airs.
With the Lisbon Treaty and its introduction of the Early Warning System (EWS), as well as
the Political Dialogue initiated by former Commission President Barroso, NPs have now
become full actors in the EU. rough the Political Dialogue, they can express their opinion
on the Commission Annual Work Programme and in uence the Commission’s agenda.
Now, through control of the respect of the principle of subsidiarity, and provided that their
reasoned opinions attain the de ne d thresholds, they can potentially strike down an ex isting
proposal.However the EWS leads to NPs still being constrained to a limited, reactive role:
as ‘quasi veto-players’ and not one of ‘agenda-setter’. Recent developments in favour of the
introduction of a ‘green card’ would change thi s situation profoundly as NPs would eventually
be able to prompt the Commission to make legislative proposals on their behalf. is article
sheds light on the evolving role of NPs in EU policymaking f rom the Lisbon Treaty onwards,
from veto players to proactive instit utions committed to the good functioning of the EU.
Keywords: Early Warning System; EU agenda-setti ng; ‘Green card’; National Parli aments;
political dia logue
* Assistant Profes sor of Comparative Public Law, Depart ment of Political Science, LUISS Guido C arli
University Rome, cfa sone@luiss.it.
** Assistant Pr ofessor in EU Law at the Universit y of Utrecht, d.b.fromage@ uu.nl.
e authors wou ld like to than k Alfredo De Feo, C ostanza Gaet a, Gérard Laprat, Ev a-Maria Poptcheva
and the two anony mous reviewers for their insig htful comments on an earl ier version of this article.
ey a re also tha nkfu l to the part icipants of the sem inar organi zed at the Inst itute for Advanced
Studies in Vien na on 9April 2015. Although the a rticle is the result of a joi nt work of the authors and
the introduct ion and conclusions have been dra ed joi ntly, Section 2 was written by Cr istina Fasone
and Section 3 by Di ane Fromage.
From Veto Players to Agenda-Setter s?
23 MJ 2 (2016) 295
§1. IN T RODUCT ION
National Parliaments (NPs) had long been excluded from ‘European business’,
especially a er the rst direct elections of the Europ ean Parliament (EP) in 1979.
1
Not
only did most NPs not have any in uenc e on the position defended by their executives
in the Community and later European Union (EU) institutions but they long lacked
information regarding the supranational negotiation and decision-mak ing process.
As a consequence, they were far from being able to be ‘agenda-setters’ in this eld,
contrary to the role they may assume at national level. Arg uably, not all NPs were
equally weak: some like the British, the Danish or the German leg islatures were
guaranteed rights of information and participation but these were either poorly or
only partia lly used.
With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in Dec ember 2009, NPs were ( na lly)
guaranteed d irect involvement in the European decision-making process by the L isbon
Treaty itself. ey ‘contribute actively to the good functioning of the Union’ and have
been granted a series of rig hts and prerogatives to this end (Article12 of the Treaty of the
European Union (TEU)). Furthermore, together w ith national governments and the EP,
they ought to ensure the functioning of the representative democracy on which the EU
is founded (Article10 TEU).
However, it appears that the powers NPs now have are strictly negative or reactive.
Some of their functions include a veto over the use of passerelle clauses (Article48(6)
TEU and Article 81(3) Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)); or
the issuing of reasoned opinions to contest t he respect of the principle of subsidiarity by
a legislative proposal (the Early Warning System, (EWS)). As a result they are basica lly
designed by the treaties as i nstitutional ‘veto’ or ‘quasi-veto players’ in the EU. Indeed,
they are considered to be ‘indiv idual actors who have to agree to the proposed change’,2
for example in the simpli ed treaty revision procedures, or as a collect ive actor that can
delay or impose further c onditions to EU legislative procedures, as seen with the EWS.3
Indeed their reasoned opinions that amount to at least one third of the votes cast (18
1 A. Maurer, ‘National Parl iaments in the Eu ropean Architec ture: From Latecomers ’ Adaptation
Towards Permanent Instit utional Change?’, in A. Maure r and W. Wessels (eds.), National Parli aments
on their Ways to Europe: Loser s or Latecomers? (Nomos Verlag, 20 01), p.27–75; P.L. Lindse th, Power and
Legitimacy. Rec onciling Europe and the Nation- State (OUP, 2010), p.81–188.
2 See G. Tsebelis, Veto Player s. How Political Institut ions Work (Princeton University P ress, 2002), p.2.
3 Whether, under the E WS, NPs act as a col lective actor or whe ther the indiv idual dimen sion of
participat ion prevails is su bject to discus sion. For example, I. C ooper, ‘A “Virtual ird Chamber”
for the European Union? Nationa l Parliaments a er the Treaty of Lisbon’, 35 We st Euro pean P oliti cs
(2012), p.441–465, sees NPs as a c ollective actor in a ‘Virt ual ird Cha mber’; by contrast N. Lupo,
‘Parlamento europeo e p arlamenti nazionali nell a costituzione ‘composita’ nell’UE : le diverse letture
possibili ’, 3 Rivista AIC (2014), p.3 et seq., consider s that, particula rly in the framework of the EWS,
NPs play the ‘game’ as i ndividual a ctors by interpret ing the principle of s ubsidiarit y in the light of
constitutiona l identity and national interest s, although t hey can informally coord inate their ac tion.
On this point, see D. Jančić, ‘ e G ame of Cards: National Parlia ments in the EU and the Future of
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