Futile Interventions: Russia's Disengagement from the Third World
| Published date | 01 December 1994 |
| Author | Mohamed M. El-Doufani |
| DOI | 10.1177/002070209404900406 |
| Date | 01 December 1994 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
MOHAMED
M.
EL-DOUFANI
Futile
interventions:
Russia's
disengagement
from
the
Third
World
Unlike
its
erstwhile
Western
rivals,
Russia's
interest
in
the
South
is
relatively
recent.
Apart from
those
countries
with
which
it
shared
borders,
Russia
did
not
turn
its
attention
towards
what
is
loosely
termed
'the
Third
World'
in any
significant
way
until
after
the death
of
Joseph
Stalin
in
1953.
This
policy
shift
was
motivated principally
by
the
Soviet
Union's
global
competition
with
the
Western powers,
mainly
the
United
States,
and it
can
thus
be
argued
that
the
end
of
the
Cold
War
has
removed
the
raison
d'itre
for
Russia's
involvement
in
the
South.
If
this
deduction
is
true,
it
would
go
some
way
towards
explaining
the
apparent
absence
of
policy
and
the confusion
that
seems
to
characterize
Moscow's
present
attitude
towards
Third
World
states, especially
those
that
were
once
targeted
for
special
atten-
tion
by
the
Soviet
Union.
But
while
this
explanation
is
true
as
far
as
it
goes,
the
end
of
the
strategic
competition
with
the
United
States
only
partly
explains the
evolution
of
Russian
thinking and
policy
towards
the
South.
For
one
thing,
the general
disarray
evident
in
Mos-
cow's
policy
towards
that
part
of
the
world
is
symptomatic
of
post-Soviet
foreign
policy
in
general.
Furthermore,
the origins
of
the
dramatic changes
in
Russia's
foreign
policy
in
the
Third
World
predate
the
end
of
the
Cold
War
and
can be seen
as
part
Chief
Sub-Editor
with
the
British
Broadcasting
Corporation's
Summary
of
World
Broadcasts,
specializing
in
Middle
Eastern politics
and
the
affairs
of
the
former
Soviet
republics.
International
Journal
XLIX
AUTUMN
1994
DISENGAGEMENT FROM
THE
THIRD
WORLD
847
of
a
longer-term
trend that
was
shaped
by
domestic
political and
economic
factors
as
well
as
by
a
continuing
assessment
of
the
political,
economic,
and
strategic
value
of
involvement
in
the
area.
The
principles
or
motivations
of
Moscow's
foreign
policy
in
the
Third
World
during
the
Soviet
era
have
been
the
subject
of
much
controversy
among
scholars.
On the
one
hand,
it
has
been argued
that
after the
departure
of
Stalin,
Soviet
foreign
policy
was
concerned
mainly
with
the
advancement
of
the
Soviet
Union's
political,
economic,
and
military-strategic
interests.'
One
African
writer
has
stated,
for
example,
that
'Moscow's
objective
at
every
level,
whether
at
the micro
level
(that
is,
in
the individual
state
concerned)
or
in
the
macro
context
(con-
tinental
or
global
level),
has
been
the
same:
how
to
advance
the
USSR'S
national
interests.'2
On
the
other hand,
there
are
those
who have
contended that
Soviet policy
was
almost
exclusively
motivated
by
ideology.
The former
dissident,
Roy
Medvedev,
for
instance,
has
argued that
it
would
be
incorrect
to
look
upon
the
USSR'S
involvement
in
certain parts
of
the
Third
World
'as
the
actions
of
a
superpower
interested
above
all
else in
further
strengthening
its
influence
in
the
world.'
Rather,
'the
Soviet
government
continues
to
be
ideologically
motivated
and
must
give
its
support
to
all
revolutionary
and national
movements
in
the
world.'3
In
this
paper,
I
take
the
view
that
ever
since
it
began
to
look
beyond
Europe
and
its
immediate
Asiatic
neighbours
up
until
the
demise
of
the
USSR,
Moscow's
policy
in
the
Third
World,
as
in
the
rest
of
the
world,
was
motivated primarily
by
state
inter-
1
See,
for example:
R.E.
Kanet,
'The
Soviet
Union
and
the
developing coun-
tries:
policy
or
policies,'
in
Kanet
and
D.
Bahry,
eds,
Soviet
Economic
and
Politi-
cal
Relations
with
the
Developing
World
(New
York
and London:
Praeger
1975),
esp.
12;
C.
Legum,
'The
African
environment,'
Problems
of
Communism
27U(Jan-
uary-February
1978),
esp.
I-2;
and
0.
Ogunbadejo,
'Soviet
policies
in
Africa,'
African
Affairs
79(july
198o),
esp.
299.
2
Ogunbadejo,
'Soviet
policies
in
Africa,'
322.
3
R.
Medvedev,
'The
Afghan
crisis,'
New
Left
Review,
no
121
(May-June
i98o),
93-
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