Germany, Russia, Europe: Multilevel politics and the divergent resonance of “history”
| Date | 01 September 2017 |
| Author | Steve Wood |
| DOI | 10.1177/0020702017723668 |
| Published date | 01 September 2017 |
| Subject Matter | Scholarly Essays |
Scholarly Essay
Germany, Russia,
Europe: Multilevel
politics and the
divergent resonance
of ‘‘history’’
Steve Wood
Politics and International Relations, Macquarie University, Sydney,
New South Wales, Australia
Abstract
The German and Russian nations share a long relationship. They fought the largest part
of the world’s largest ever war. Resonances of that conflict and the Cold War that
followed it still permeate their contemporary relationship. Under very different political
systems, however, ‘‘history’’ is interpreted and responded to very differently. Concern
for status and image, as well as geostrategic factors, motivate Russian officialdom’s
disputing of the ‘‘post-Cold War order.’’ Germany is viewed as the pivotal state and
nation in Europe. Russia seeks to influence Germany’s civil society and political elite in
the attempt to obtain favourable policy outcomes. Sympathy for the Russian position
within Germany is outweighed by disquiet regarding Russian foreign policy adventurism
and its authoritarian regime more generally.
Keywords
Germany, Russia, Europe, international relations, history
Russia–Western estrangement and its most serious reverberation, the Ukraine
crisis, have prompted some instructive and varied scholarly appraisals. Roy
Allison placed principal responsibility with Russia, which had transgressed inter-
national rules and concocted a ‘‘plausible deniability.’’ Richard Sakwa apportioned
most blame to the EU and the USA qua NATO, arguing that their myopic wishful
thinking and arrogant geopolitical imperialism was fatal to an ambiguous
International Journal
2017, Vol. 72(3) 338–355
!The Author(s) 2017
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DOI: 10.1177/0020702017723668
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Corresponding author:
Steve Wood, Politics and International Relations, Macquarie University, Herring Road, Sydney, New South
Wales 2109, Australia.
Email: steve.wood@mq.edu.au
‘‘Europe’’ while Russia emerged relatively untarnished. Alexander Lukin thought
similarly: the West had missed a chance to integrate Russia, and instead sought to
impose an ideology of ‘‘democratism’’ that ‘‘strongly resembled colonialism.’’
Bock, Henneberg, and Plank argue that the West has failed to understand
Moscow’s perception of threats. Arbatova and Dynkin claim that major initiatives
undertaken ‘‘‘without Russia’ will always be interpreted by Moscow as ‘against
Russia’’’—if Russia had been ‘‘invited’’ to join NATO and the EU’s Eastern
Partnership, neither the Ukraine crisis nor the ‘‘Caucasian crisis’’ that preceded
it would have occurred. In contrast, Franc¸ ois Heisbourg interpreted the annexation
of Crimea as terminating a naı
¨ve view of Russia as a status quo power that required
no ‘‘comprehensive strategy.’’ F. S. Larrabee and colleagues announced the end
of two ‘‘basic assumptions’’ underpinning US policy, and contended that a new
strategic posture was needed.
1
For Sten Rynning, neither Russia, the USA, NATO,
nor the EU was the most critical influence on Eurasian affairs; that was attributed
to Germany. Implicitly, Germany has assumed this role—involuntarily—for a
generation. Michael Stu
¨rmer predicted as much in 1994.
2
This article contributes to the literature on Russia and the ‘‘West,’’ and
German–Russian relations in particular. It draws on interviews, media, and
other sources. It argues that apprehensions about the Federal Republic of
Germany (FRG) privileging Russia over the ‘‘transatlantic community’’ are mis-
taken. As Germany is a large pluralist polity, diverse views will emerge, and stake-
holders will disagree. Some want to prioritize Russia. To an extent, the FRG has
been compromised by energy resource needs and a profound aversion to armed
conflict. Yet Russia’s capacity to entice or intimidate the FRG is more limited than
those in the Kremlin hope. Germany is a post-heroic but not a post-values society,
much as it yearns for liberation from crises.
3
Though hardly impeccable, the FRG’s
international behaviour has been closer to that unlikely standard than most other
entities, shaped by internal checks and balances as much as by the regional or
global environments. Consequently, German diplomacy sometimes appears
timid. It can also be measured and constructive. Russia and the USA,
1. Roy Allison, ‘‘Russian ‘deniable’ intervention in Ukraine: How and why Russia broke the rules,’’
International Affairs 90, no. 6 (November 2014): 1255–1297; Richard Sakwa, ‘‘The death of Europe?
Continental fates after Ukraine,’’ International Affairs 91, no. 3 (May 2015): 553–579; Alexander
Lukin, ‘‘Russia in a post-bipolar world,’’ Survival 58, no. 1 (2016): 91–112; Andreas Bock, Ingo
Henneberg and Friedrich Plank, ‘‘‘If you compress the spring it will snap back hard’: The Ukrainian
crisis and the balance of threat theory,’’ International Journal 70, no. 1 (March 2015: 101–109;
Nadezhda Arbatova and Alexander Dynkin, ‘‘World order after Ukraine,’’ Survival 58, no. 1
(2016): 71–90; Franc¸ ois Heisbourg, ‘‘Preserving post-Cold War Europe,’’ Survival 57, no. 1
(2015): 31–48; F. S. Larrabee, Peter Wilson and John Gordon, The Ukrainian Crisis and
European Security: Implications for the United States and U.S. Army (Santa Monica: RAND
Corporation, 2015).
2. Sten Rynning, ‘‘The false promise of continental concert: Russia, the West and the necessary bal-
ance of power,’’ International Affairs 91, no. 3 (May 2015): 539–552; Michael Stu
¨rmer, ‘‘Deutsche
Interessen,’’ in Karl Kaiser and Hanns Maull, eds., Deutschlands neue Aussenpolitik, vol. 1,
Grundlagen (Mu
¨nchen: Oldenbourg, 1994), 39–61.
3. Herfried Mu
¨nkler, ‘‘Heroische und postheroische Gesellschaften,’’ Merkur 61, no. 8/9 (August/
September 2007): 742–752.
Wood 339
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