Gillespie v Macmillan
| Jurisdiction | Scotland |
| Judgment Date | 06 February 1957 |
| Docket Number | No. 5. |
| Date | 06 February 1957 |
| Court | High Court of Justiciary |
HIGH COURT Full Bench.
Lord Justice-General. Lord Justice-Clerk. Lord Russell. Lord Sorn. Lord Blades.
Evidence in Criminal Cases—Sufficiency—Corroboration—Evidence of single witnesses to facts in chain of evidence—Statutory offence—Exceeding speed limit—Road Traffic Act, 1930 (20 and 21 Geo. V, cap. 43), sec. 10—Road Traffic Act, 1934 (24 and 25 Geo. V, cap. 50), sec. 1 (1) and (2).
The driver of a motor car was convicted of driving his car over a measured distance in a built-up area at a speed in excess of the speed limit. Proof of the speed of the car depended on the evidence of two police constables who had been stationed one at either end of the measured distance. Each was provided with a stop-watch the second hand of which stood at zero. The constable at the entrance started his watch as the car entered the measured distance and the constable at the exit started his watch as the car emerged. The accused was stopped further along the road by a third constable. The watches were stopped simultaneously in the presence of the accused and the difference in time was noted. From this it was calculated that the speed limit had been exceeded.
Held that the evidence of the individual constables constituted links in a single consecutive chain, and that, although two witnesses were required to identify and incriminate the accused, the evidence of a single credible witness to each fact in such a chain of circumstantial evidence was sufficient in law to establish the offence; and convictionsustained.
Scott v. Jameson, (1914) 7 Adam, 529, 1914 S. C. (J.) 187, followed. Morton v. H. M. Advocate, 1938 J. C. 50, and Bisset v. Anderson, 1949 J. C. 106,commented on.
Charles Mavor Machray Gillespie was charged in the Sheriff Court at Dunblane on a complaint at the instance of William Robert Duncan Macmillan, Procurator-fiscal, which set forth that "on 2nd September 1956, about 4.40 p.m., on the public road between Perth and Stirling, and at a part thereof in the Parish of Dunblane and Lecropt, Perthshire, from a point opposite the west gable of the bus shelter near the junction of said road with Beech Road, Dunblane, to a point opposite the south gatepost of the entrance gate to Abbey House, Dunblane, and extending to four hundred and forty yards, being a road in a built-up area, you did drive a motor vehicle, namely, motor car No. NWS 4, at a speed exceeding thirty miles per hour, namely, at a speed of about fifty-two miles per hour; Contrary to the Road Traffic Act, 1934, section 1 (1) and (2), whereby you shall be deemed to be guilty of an offence under section 10 of the Road Traffic Act, 1930."
On 24th October 1956, after evidence had been led, the Sheriff-substitute (Prain) found the accused guilty as libelled. At the request of the accused he stated a case for appeal to the High Court of Justiciary.
The case, after referring to the fact that no evidence had been led for the appellant, set forth that the Sheriff-substitute found the following facts admitted or proved:—"(1) On 2nd September 1956 about 4.40 p.m. the appellant was driving motor car NWS 4 on the main public road through Dunblane in the Parish of Dunblane and Lecropt, Perthshire. This road runs approximately north and south, and the appellant was driving southwards. (2) The part of the road on which the appellant was driving is in a "built-up" area and the speed on the said road at that part is controlled to 30 miles per hour under the provisions of the Road Traffic Act, 1934, section 1 (1). Signs properly conforming to the regulations are erected at the side of the roadway at the beginning and end of the controlled area. (3) Three police officers in uniform were stationed on the said road to observe and check the speed of traffic. Constable Irvine was stationed at a point opposite the west gable of a bus shelter near the junction of the main road with Beech Road, Dunblane. Constable Morrison was stationed exactly 440 yards further south at a point opposite the south gatepost of the entrance gate to Abbey House, Dunblane, and Constable Simpson was stationed some distance further south. Constables Irvine and Morrison were in sight of each other and were each provided with a stop watch. Their function was to operate their respective stop watches as undernoted to time the speeds of observed cars. Neither could observe the actual operation of the stop watch by the other. Constable Simpson was in sight of Constable Morrison, and his duty was to stop a car on a pre-arranged signal from Constable Morrison. (4) As the car driven by the appellant passed Constable Irvine, the constable started the stop watch in his possession. He then mounted a cycle and proceeded southwards down the road. By doing so he indicated to Constable Morrison that the appellant's car was under observation. (5) As the said car passed Constable Morrison, he started the stop watch in his possession. He also signalled to Constable Simpson to stop the appellant's car. There was no traffic on the roadway at the time which impeded the operations of the constables. (6) The appellant's car was stopped by Constable Simpson. The other constables joined Constable Simpson, and the purpose of his being stopped was explained to the appellant. The two stop watches were then stopped simultaneously in the appellant's presence. (7) The difference between the readings on the stop watches was 16.9 seconds, showing the time taken for the appellant to cover a distance of 440 yards. For the purposes of calculation this was taken as 17 seconds, and on this basis the speed of the appellant's car over the distance was slightly over 52 miles per hour. (8) The appellant was cautioned and charged with the present offence and elected to make no reply. (9) The two stop watches were in good working order and accurate, and I accepted the evidence of Constables Irvine and Morrison that the watches were operated as set out in the foregoing findings."
The question of law for the opinion of the Court was:—"On the above facts was I entitled to convict ?"
The case was heard before a Full Bench (consisting of the Lord Justice-General, the Lord Justice-Clerk, Lord Russell, Lord Sorn and Lord Blades) on 1st February 1957.
At advising on 6th February 1957,—
LORD JUSTICE-GENERAL (Clyde).—This is a stated case which arises
out of a complaint against the appellant charging him with driving a motor car between two points on a public road in a built-up area at a speed exceeding 30 miles per hour, namely at a speed of 52 miles per hour, contrary to section 10 of the Road Traffic Act, 1930.1The Sheriff-substitute convicted him, and the question put to us is whether on the facts found proved by the Sheriff-substitute he was entitled to convict.The Sheriff-substitute found that on the occasion in question the appellant drove the motor car along the public road between the two points referred to in the complaint and that the road was in a built-up area where the speed of motor vehicles is controlled to 30 miles per hour under the provisions of the Road Traffic Act, 1934.2 The distance between the two points was 440 yards. One constable at the first of these two points started his stop-watch when the appellant...
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