GJ v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (PIP)
| Jurisdiction | UK Non-devolved |
| Judge | Judge Wikeley |
| Neutral Citation | [2022] UKUT 334 (AAC) |
| Subject Matter | Tribunal procedure,practice - tribunal jurisdiction,Wikeley,N |
| Court | Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber) |
| Published date | 10 January 2023 |
GJ v SSWP (PIP) [2022] UKUT 340 (AAC)
UA-2021-001099-CPIP
1
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL Appeal No. UA-2021-001099-CPIP
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS CHAMBER
On appeal from the First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber)
Between: G.J. Appellant
- v -
Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (SSWP) Respondent
Before: Upper Tribunal Judge Wikeley
Decision date: 15 December 2022
Decided on consideration of the papers
Representation:
Appellant: In person
Respondent: Ms Anna Woods, DMA, Department for Work and Pensions
DECISION
The decision of the Upper Tribunal is to dismiss the appeal.
This decision is made under section 11 of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act
2007.
GJ v SSWP (PIP) [2022] UKUT 340 (AAC)
UA-2021-001099-CPIP
2
REASONS FOR DECISION
Introduction
1. This is another appeal arising out of a decision taken in a LEAP exercise. ‘LEAP’
is shorthand for Legal Entitlements and Administrative Practices. The
Department for Work and Pensions (the DWP) from time to time undertakes
LEAP exercises where claimants may have been underpaid social security
benefits based on their true entitlements, e.g. because of departmental error.
1
2. One such LEAP exercise, and the context for the present appeal, has been
undertaken in recent years in relation to claimants’ entitlement to Personal
Independence Payment (PIP). This LEAP exercise was prompted by two
decisions by three-judge panels of the Upper Tribunal, followed by an
unsuccessful attempt by the DWP to change the law in respect of one of those
decisions via secondary legislation (for a convenient summary of the background,
see YA v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2022] UKUT 143 (AAC)).
3. My decision, in brief, is that the First-tier Tribunal was correct in this case to find
it had no jurisdiction to hear the claimant’s appeal. There were two reasons for
the Tribunal’s conclusion. The first was that the LEAP decision in 2020 had
involved looking again at an original decision in 2017, which had refused the
Appellant’s PIP claim, with a view to seeing whether that earlier decision could
be revised for official error. As no official error in the original decision could be
identified, the LEAP decision was a refusal to revise and as such carried no direct
right of appeal. It followed that the Appellant could only succeed if he could
challenge the original 2017 decision. However, the second reason was that he
was out of time to do so and there were no exceptional circumstances justifying
an extension of the usual 13-month time limit for bringing an appeal against the
original decision as not revised. I conclude for the following reasons that the First-
tier Tribunal did not misdirect itself in law on either issue. It follows that the
claimant’s appeal to the Upper Tribunal must be dismissed.
4. I appreciate that this decision will be a considerable disappointment to the
Appellant, who has now been involved in this saga for more than five years. He
may well feel that he has been let down by both the DWP and the tribunal system.
However, for the reasons that follow his challenge to the First-tier Tribunal’s
decision cannot succeed. Making a successful claim for PIP is not just a question
of showing that one has difficulties with the requisite daily living and/or mobility
activities. It also depends on making a claim for benefit and may depend
thereafter on pursuing appeal rights against specific decisions in a timely fashion.
An outline sketch of the Appellant’s PIP claims
5. In summary, and very much in the barest outline, the claimant made an
unsuccessful claim for Personal Independence Payment (PIP) in 2017. He did
not appeal that adverse decision at the time. However, his claim was later
reviewed as part of the LEAP exercise in 2020, but the 2017 disallowance
decision was not changed. The claimant sought to appeal the LEAP decision.
Around the same time as lodging that appeal, he made a fresh claim for PIP,
which resulted in an award of benefit. His argument, in short, is that his
1
For a detailed analysis see R . Thomas, ‘Legal Entitlements and Administrative Practices: LEAP
Exercises and Benefits Administration’ (2022) 29 Journal of Social Security Law 49-73.
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DB v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions(PIP)
...A.A.C.R. 14, CM v. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2020] UKUT 221 and GJ v. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (PIP) [2022] UKUT 334 (AAC), to all of which I refer below. Before embarking on an attempt to analyse the relevant law, however, I turn to the facts of the present ......