Global food prices, regime type, and urban unrest in the developing world
| Author | Cullen S Hendrix,Stephan Haggard |
| Date | 01 March 2015 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022343314561599 |
| Published date | 01 March 2015 |
| Subject Matter | Research Articles |
Research Articles
Global food prices, regime type, and urban
unrest in the developing world
Cullen S Hendrix
Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver
Stephan Haggard
Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, University of California, San Diego
Abstract
The 2014 IPCC report concludes that changes in precipitation and temperature could cause global food prices to
nearly double by 2050. Anecdotal evidence of riots during the global food price spikes of 2007–08 and 2010–11
raises the more general question of whether global food prices affect patterns of contentious politics in developing
countries. Drawing on a dataset of urban unrest in 55 major cities in 49 Asian and African countries for the period
1961–2010, we find the effect of global food prices on protests and rioting is contingent on regime type: democracies
are more prone to urban unrest during periods of high food prices than autocracies. We show that this is due both to
the more permissive political opportunity structure in democratic systems and to systematic differences in food policy
across regimes of different types. Relative to autocracies, democracies pursue policies that are more favorable to the
rural sector and less favorable to the cities. The findings have longer-run implications. To the extent that climate
change will make many developing countries more dependent on food imports, and that prices could rise and be
more volatile, we suggest another vector by which climate change may affect political unrest. Our findings highlight
the importance of both political institutions and policy choices in mediating global shocks.
Keywords
contentious politics, food prices, political economy
The rapid inflation in global food prices since 2000, and
the acceleration of that increase in 2007–08 and 2010–
11, has again raised the question of whether price shocks
pose threats to political stability in the developing world.
Protests and riots related to food prices took place in over
30 countries in 2007–08 (Brinkman & Hendrix, 2011).
The import-dependent Middle East witnessed food riots
in Egypt, Jordan, Yemen, and Morocco. Demonstrations
took place in Ethiopia, Burkina Faso, Senegal, Mozambi-
que, Mauritania, Cameroon, Co
ˆte d’Ivoire, and Guinea.
In Asia, people took to the streets in Bangladesh, India,
the Philippines, Cambodia, and Thailand. In 2010–11,
food price-related protests recurred in several African
countries including Algeria, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Libya,
Mauritania, Mozambique, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan,
Togo, and Uganda (Salehyan et al., 2012), as well as Ban-
gladesh, China, and India. Across North Africa and the
Middle East, spiraling food prices were among the stated
grievances of Arab Spring protesters in 2011.
High prices are not only a function of short-run mar-
ket dynamics. Structural changes in world agricultural
production, trade, and climate are also at work. In the
1960s, Africa and Asia exported roughly as much food
as they imported. By 2011, these two regions had
become much more dependent on imports. African
nations ran food trade deficits of $30.1 billion USD;
Asia’s food trade deficit had ballooned to $96.6 billion
USD, doubling since 2006 (FAOSTAT, 2014). Over
the longer run, global warming could fundamentally
alter the distribution of world agricultural output and
Corresponding author:
cullen.hendrix@du.edu
Journal of Peace Research
2015, Vol. 52(2) 143–157
ªThe Author(s) 2015
Reprints and permission:
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DOI: 10.1177/0022343314561599
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