Global justice and global realities
| Date | 01 June 2016 |
| Published date | 01 June 2016 |
| DOI | 10.1177/1755088216629173 |
Journal of International Political Theory
2016, Vol. 12(2) 200 –216
© The Author(s) 2016
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DOI: 10.1177/1755088216629173
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Global justice and global
realities
Shmuel Nili
Yale University, USA
Abstract
Should global political theory “get real,” focusing on real-world moral failures? I argue
that, insofar as we think it important to reflect on global morality in a world of separate
states, the answer is yes. In the article’s first stage, I set up the argument by suggesting
that our only convincing reasons to reject the idea of a world state are non-ideal—
these reasons concern failures to comply with moral duties, rather than ideal visions
of a perfectly just world of full compliance. Therefore, any theory assuming a world of
separate states must itself be a non-ideal theory focusing on compliance failures. In the
article’s second stage, I contend that this necessary focus should lead global political
theorists to make more use of social-scientific knowledge than they typically do, while
recognizing the structural obstacles confronting global social science. In the article’s
third stage, I indicate some under-studied normative implications of these obstacles,
tying the debate on ideal and non-ideal global theory to other methodological questions
in global political philosophy.
Keywords
Global justice, global reform, ideal and non-ideal theory, natural resources, political
economy, political philosophy and social science
Introduction
The leading question of this symposium—should global political theory “get real”—can be
interpreted in several ways. The question I will explore here is whether global political
theory should be “non-ideal theory”: should global political theory focus on real-world
failures to comply with moral duties, instead of articulating ideal visions of perfect justice
that fictionally assume full compliance? My answer to this question will essentially be
Corresponding author:
Shmuel Nili, Department of Political Science, Yale University, 115 Prospect Street, New Haven, CT 06520,
USA.
Email: shmuel.nili@yale.edu
629173IPT0010.1177/1755088216629173Journal of International Political TheoryNili
research-article2016
Article
Nili 201
“yes.” I believe that at least the vast majority of global political theory has to be non-ideal
theory in the sense just indicated. But I also believe that non-ideal global theory has to
confront questions and obstacles that many non-ideal accounts often ignore, or at least
underestimate.
I advance these claims in three stages. In the first stage, I argue for the significance of
non-ideal global theory from a heterodox direction. Rather than appealing to familiar
considerations regarding the urgency of real-world moral failures, and the ability to iden-
tify these failures independently of ideal visions of perfect justice, I pursue another strat-
egy: I highlight the methodological significance of arguably the most idealistic global
vision—namely, that of a world state. I suggest that our only convincing reasons to reject
a world state are non-ideal—these reasons clearly concern failures to comply with moral
duties and would not exist given assumptions of full compliance. Therefore, any theory
assuming a world of separate states must be one that already takes compliance failures
seriously and should accordingly focus on compliance failures as we witness them in the
real world.
In the article’s second stage, I contend that a philosophical focus on real-world com-
pliance failures requires nuanced engagement with the social-scientific study of flawed
institutions. I argue that philosophers reflecting on global affairs should make more use
of social-scientific knowledge than they currently do. Yet at the same time, philosophers
should also recognize—to a greater extent than non-ideal accounts often do—the deep
structural limitations of social science in a global context, especially with regard to the
assessment of how global reforms might affect domestic institutions.
In the article’s third stage, I indicate some under-studied normative implications of
these social-scientific limitations. One key implication, I suggest, is the need to explore
liberal democracies’ non-consequentialist reasons to disentangle themselves from certain
foreign practices—reasons that are more independent of social-scientific uncertainty
than familiar reasons for global reform. I suggest that the force of such reasons, in turn,
depends on the degree to which one accepts analogies between individual conduct at the
domestic level and state conduct at the global level. I therefore end by emphasizing the
need to give more philosophical attention to questions surrounding the use of domestic
analogies for normative reflection on global affairs.
Why a world of separate states requires non-ideal theory
Let us start with the methodological implications of the idea of a world state. Following
Rawls (1999), I will define a world state as “a unified political regime with the legal
powers normally exercised by central governments” (1999: 36). I am going to assume
that its global monopoly on the legitimate use of organized violence would distinguish a
world government so defined from other forms of what has become known as “global
governance.” Notwithstanding the dense web of international legal and economic institu-
tions, as long as anarchy persists in the international state system—as long as there is no
single global authority able to decisively coerce all actors under its jurisdiction—global
integration is at best incomplete. It is not my intention to try to provide an exhaustive
case here for why a political vision centered on a world state is morally compelling.
Rather, I only wish to point out that a world state has some obvious advantages over a
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