A Global Trend EU‐style: Democracy Promotion in ‘Fragile’ and Conflict‐Affected South Caucasus
| Published date | 01 May 2016 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12305 |
| Date | 01 May 2016 |
| Author | Nelli Babayan |
A Global Trend EU-style: Democracy Promotion
in ‘Fragile’and Conflict-Affected South
Caucasus
Nelli Babayan
Transatlantic Academy and Freie Universit€
at Berlin
Abstract
This article examines the EU’s democracy promotion in ‘fragile’and conflict-affected states. The article discusses the EU’s per-
ception of state fragility, contrasts it to the evolving understanding of the concept in the literature, and discusses its actions
in the conflict-affected states of the South Caucasus: Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. The analysis demonstrates that while
the EU has adjusted its democracy promotion policies following critical international junctures, it has not specifically addressed
the perceived fragility or conflicts of states where it promotes democracy. While the EU’s democracy promotion profile in the
South Caucasus countries has become more visible, its involvement in the resolution of regional conflicts has remained mar-
ginal. Yet, by not following the trend of accentuating fragility, the EU may have proven itself as a more nuanced democracy
promoter, attempting to take into consideration local perceptions and realities.
Policy Implications
•In an effort to address democratization challenges, democracy promoters need to participate in the resolution of other
salient domestic issues, e.g. protracted conflicts.
•Democracy promotion in ‘fragile’states needs to focus on the least favourable factors to avoid further deterioration.
•Democracy promoters need to closely cooperate with local democracy-oriented stakeholders.
•Instead of ideal-typical democracy, the policy should concentrate on achieving further democratization of weak or back-
sliding domestic institutions.
Democracy promotion has become a global policy led by
the US and the EU, and complemented by recent efforts of
rising democracies (Carothers and Youngs, 2011; Stuenkel,
2013; Petrova, 2014). Yet, despite extensive democracy pro-
motion, especially postconflict democratization has always
been regarded as an ordeal (Z€
urcher et al., 2013). In addi-
tion to autocratic legacies, weak institutions, illiberal elites or
underdeveloped economies, (protracted) armed conflicts
and perceived fragility of some states further complicates
democratization (Zeeuw and Kumar, 2006; Diamond, 2005;
Ottaway, 2003). As Diamond (2005) notes, in postconflict
states democracy promoters face not only the challenge of
democratization, but also of legitimization of the authorities
and facilitating proper functioning of state institutions,
which may be under risk of both external and internal
threats. Thus, logic would dictate that to be effective
democracy promotion policy in such states should be
adapted to domestic conditions and address conflicts. How-
ever, the literature on democracy promotion has extensively
discussed how the strategies of democracy promoters often
forego domestic requirements of target countries (Burnell,
2007; B€
orzel and Risse, 2004; Bossuyt and Kubicek, 2011).
Both the EU and the US have tended to follow ‘one size fits
all’approaches with hastily developed policies (B€
orzel and
Risse, 2004; Pishchikova, 2010), while the EU has not
employed a single process in choosing and developing its
policies (Kotzian, Knodt, and Urdze, 2011). Yet, after much
criticism and the introduction of the principle of joint own-
ership, the EU has attempted to move to a differentiated
approach when promoting democracy. It is against these
observations that this article asks: How have state fragility
and the presence of conflicts influenced the EU’s democracy
promotion in its neighbourhood?
The article argues that neither state fragility nor presence
of protracted conflicts has influenced the EU’s democracy
promotion policy. Yet, the reasons are likely to have been
more nuanced than mere negligence of domestic condi-
tions. First, after the criticism of its unequivocal enlargement
conditionality, the EU is likely to have preferred not to
invoke terminology of state fragility, which may seem con-
descending to its partners. Second, in the case of protracted
conflicts the EU has preferred to rely on the efforts of its
individual member states due to its own strategic interests
and complicated relations with parties to conflicts. As shown
below, this is specifically the case of the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict, which is co-mediated by EU-member France, or the
Global Policy (2016) 7:2 doi: 10.1111/1758-5899.12305 ©2016 University of Durham and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Global Policy Volume 7 . Issue 2 . May 2016 217
Research Article
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