Going on record: Revisiting the logic of roll-call vote requests in the European Parliament
| Author | Stefan Thierse |
| DOI | 10.1177/1465116515622692 |
| Date | 01 June 2016 |
| Published date | 01 June 2016 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
European Union Politics
2016, Vol. 17(2) 219–241
!The Author(s) 2016
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DOI: 10.1177/1465116515622692
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Article
Going on record: Revisiting
the logic of roll-call vote
requests in the European
Parliament
Stefan Thierse
Department of Political Science, University of Duisburg-Essen,
Germany
Abstract
While many contributions on legislative politics in the European Parliament rely on
recorded votes, the motivations behind the decision to record a vote remain somewhat
arcane. This article frames roll-call vote requests as a minority right which offers party
groups an opportunity to shape the voting agenda and signal commitment to a policy
proposal. The analysis adds to our understanding of legislative behavior by linking the
committee stage to the plenary stage. Party groups which do not support a floor
proposal drafted by the lead committee are found to be more likely to request a
roll-call vote in plenary. The quantitative evidence is supplemented by interview data
which shed light both on the actors’ motivations and the internal decision-making
processes preceding the decision to go on record.
Keywords
Committee, European Parliament, roll-call votes, minority rights
Introduction
Published voting records are key to our knowledge about individual voting behav-
ior (Faas, 2003; Hix, 2002; Lindsta
¨dt et al., 2012), group cohesion (Hix et al., 2007;
Hix and Noury, 2009), and coalition formation (Kreppel, 2002; Kreppel and Hix,
2003) in the European Parliament (EP). However, with few exceptions, the stand-
ard voting procedure in the EP is not by roll-call, but by show of hands (Rule 178,
EP Rules of Procedure 2014). In the long-run, only between one-fifth and one-third
Corresponding author:
Stefan Thierse, Department of Political Science, University of Duisburg-Essen, Lotharstraße 65,
47057 Duisburg, Germany.
Email: stefan.thierse@uni-due.de
of all plenary votes have occured by roll-call (Carrubba et al., 2006: 692; Finke,
2015: 754; Hix et al., 2007: 114). Where visible voting is not the standard voting
procedure, recorded votes constitute a non-random sample of all votes scheduled in
plenary (Hug, 2009). Hence, it is all but impossible to ignore the strategic consid-
erations driving the selection mechanism.
Following a rule change in the seventh EP (2009–2014), roll-call votes (RCVs)
are now the mandatory voting procedure for single votes or votes on the final text
of legislative acts (Rule 179, EP Rules of Procedure 2014). Indeed, there have been
some notable interventions to the debate which have capitalized on this procedural
reform to trace the selection mechanism (Hug, 2016; Yordanova and Mu
¨hlbo
¨ck,
2014). Therefore, one might argue that part of the theoretical puzzle of what is
driving RCV requests is solved. Still, further investigating RCV requests may have
its merits for two reasons: First, existing studies make claims about what motivates
RCV requests by relying on quantitative data alone, usually focusing on revealed
voting cohesion (Finke, 2015; Yordanova and Mu
¨hlbo
¨ck, 2014). Second, previous
research has not taken into account the decision-making process at the committee
stage. This is a shortcoming given that committees are the sites where the bulk of
the legislative work takes place and where European party groups (EPGs) develop
a common party line (Ringe, 2010). Furthermore, the likelihood of success for
particular amendments which may become subject to a RCV is to a large extent
determined at the committee stage.
What explains the demand for recorded votes? And how can we account for the
variation between EPGs in terms of their activity to demand disclosing the exact
voting behavior? The major claim of this article is that RCV requests in the EP are
best understood as instruments of position-taking rather than a device to enforce
party discipline. While this argument has been advanced before (Finke, 2015;
Thiem, 2009), the study presented here will take issue with the existing findings
and make a twofold contribution: First, it marshals evidence from qualitative data
derived from a total of 23 interviews with Members of the European Parliament
(MEPs), group advisors, and parliamentary assistants from five EPGs. The inter-
view data provide insight not only into the motivations behind RCV requests but
also allow for probing into the group-internal decision-making processes which
precede the decision to go on record. Second, by incorparating the agenda-setting
stage in an explanation of RCV requests, this article analyzes previously unex-
plored antecedent factors that may help to better adjudicate between the competing
theoretical logics of RCV requests. By linking the decision-making dynamics at the
proposal stage with the interaction patterns at the plenary stage, I address a
remaining research desideratum in the by now abundant literature on European
Union (EU) legislative politics (Hurka, 2013).
Evidence from expert interviews suggests that RCVs are primarily motivated by
revealing a distinct position to outside audiences and to force competitors to go on
record in votes on specific policy proposals. This finding is substantiated by a
quantitative analysis of approximately 6000 legislative votes scheduled in the EP
6 (2004–2009). EPGs which cohesively reject the draft report voted on in the lead
220 European Union Politics 17(2)
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