Gradual Change in International Organisations: Agency Theory and Historical Institutionalism
| DOI | 10.1111/1467-9256.12050 |
| Author | Tine Hanrieder |
| Date | 01 December 2014 |
| Published date | 01 December 2014 |
| Subject Matter | Research Article |
Research Article
Gradual Change in International
Organisations: Agency Theory and Historical
Institutionalism
Tine Hanrieder
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München (LMU)
This research note discusses limitations of principal-agent (PA) analysis in explaining gradual change in
international organisations (IOs). It suggests that historical institutionalism (HI) can fill important gaps left by
the PA approach and identifies scope conditions for both approaches. For this purpose, a distinction is made
between two sources of state power that PA usually treats as synergistic – namely the formal control of IO
decisions and material power resources. While PA analysis is best applicable where reform coalitions of
like-minded member states control both formal and material resources, in many contexts there exist frictions
between material and formal power in IOs. In these constellations recent HI-inspired works on gradual modes
of change such as ‘layering’ and ‘drift’ are of particular relevance. This research avenue is illustrated with
empirical examples from a variety of international organisations.
Keywords: international organisations; layering; drift; historical institutionalism; principal-agent theory
Introduction
In their 1998 review article, James March and Johan Olsen alerted international relations (IR)
institutionalists to pay more attention to the sources and dynamics of ‘inefficient history’ in
international institutions (March and Olsen, 1998). According to the authors, history is
‘inefficient’ where institutions do not linearly adapt to changing state preferences and power
constellations due to endogenous dynamics. In the meantime, international organisation (IO)
researchers have taken up this challenge, yet the roots of historical inefficiency have mostly
been attributed to the bureaucratic organs of IOs (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004; Weaver,
2008). This article, by contrast, draws attention to the fact that even state-driven politics is not
linear in IOs due to locked-in formal rules and endogenous sources of power. Following up on
works which suggest that historical institutionalism (HI) offers valuable concepts for explain-
ing institutional inertia and gradual rather than abrupt change in global politics (Chwieroth,
2013; Farrell and Newman, 2010; Fioretos, 2011), I delineate the conditions under which
different types of gradual change are most likely to occur. I suggest that HI is particularly
well-equipped to capture change in constellations where states can exploit their institutional
veto powers to block attempts at IO reform. These are widespread constellations in IOs, where
principles such as one state, one vote grant smaller states disproportionate votes or seats on
IO governing bodies. Pressure for change by great powers that are relatively disadvantaged by
formal decision rules therefore does not lead to linear adaptation, but often results in complex
and gradual modes of change such as ‘layering’ and ‘drift’. Linear, deliberate reform, by
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POLITICS: 2014 VOL 34(4), 324–333
doi: 10.1111/1467-9256.12050
© 2014 The Author.Politics © 2014 Political Studies Association
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