Greed, grievance, or graduates? Why do men rebel?
| Author | Jori Breslawski,Brandon Ives |
| DOI | 10.1177/00223433211014269 |
| Published date | 01 May 2022 |
| Date | 01 May 2022 |
| Subject Matter | Regular Articles |
Greed, grievance, or graduates?
Why do men rebel?
Brandon Ives
Department of Political Science and International Relations, Seoul National University
Jori Breslawski
The Watson Institute for International & Public Affairs, Brown University
The School of Political Science, Government, and International Affairs, Tel Aviv University
Abstract
Education is widely known for its positive effect on conventional politics and nonviolent protest as well as its
suppressive effect on violence. However, recent studies have connected education to violence through its effect
on relative deprivation and frustration–aggression mechanisms. We address these divergent findings by presenting a
theory of the conditional effect that education has on violence. To do so, we build on literature addressing educa-
tion’s positive association with political participation, such as voting and protests, and question how this relationship
translates to contexts in which conventional and nonviolent channels are unlikely to be effective – specifically, in
cases of politically excluded ethnic groups. We argue that education increases ethnic group members’ resources and
desire to address grievances. Yet, because the ethnic group is politically excluded, opportunities for conventional
politics and nonviolent protest are limited. Educated ethnic group members are limited in political options, and are
thus more likely to address their grievances through the support of rebel groups, increasing the probability of
violence. Violence then occurs in localities where members of a politically excluded ethnic group are located and
where those members have higher levels of education. Using geo-spatial data and statistical analysis, we demonstrate
that education has divergent effects on violence in areas populated by politically excluded versus politically included
ethnic groups in Africa and Central America. Areas with highly educated politically excluded ethnic group members
are the most likely to experience violent events.
Keywords
education, ethnic, exclusion, grievance, violence
Introduction
For decades, scholars have been asking why people
rebel,
1
searching for explanations that shed light on the
large variation in the degree to which ethnic groups use
violence to achieve political aims. Much work on ethnic
violence focuses on the impact of material resources,
such as group size, natural resources, and external spon-
sors on violent ethnic mobilization. And while material
resources may play a large role in rebels’ success at later
stages of conflict, it takes time to develop viable rebel
groups that are capable of attaining funds and weapons at
earlier stages, rendering non-material resources like cog-
nitive skills and networks (Larson & Lewis, 2018) of
great import. While non-material resources, especially
education, have been found to play significant roles in
Corresponding author:
mtbreslawski@gmail.com
1
Our title is meant to demonstrate continuity with previous
literature (Gurr, 1970). It is not meant to imply that women do
not participate in rebellion or violence. Scholarship has highlighted
the role that women play in violent behavior (e.g. Thomas & Bond,
2015).
Journal of Peace Research
2022, Vol. 59(3) 319–336
ªThe Author(s) 2021
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/00223433211014269
journals.sagepub.com/home/jpr
nonviolent political participation and protest (Dahlum
& Wig, 2019, 2021; Zeira, 2019), their impact on eth-
nic violence remains underspecified and poorly
understood.
Education, while an important non-material resource
for mobilization, has been found to play an ambiguous
role in terms of its effect on violence. Education has been
shown to have a suppressive effect on violence (e.g.
Thyne, 2006; Alesina & Perotti, 1996; Lipset, 1959),
with scholars emphasizing its association with increased
opportunity costs of violence and its encouragement of
tolerant views. Yet, education has also been argued to
have an enabling effect on violence (Lange, 2011; Lange
& Dawson, 2010; Urdal, 2006), with scholars pointing
to relative deprivation and frustration–aggression
mechanisms, as well as identifying terrorists (Berrebi,
2007) and genocidaires (Verwimp, 2005) as more highly
educated than their nonviolent co-ethnics.
To address this ambiguity, we argue that the effect of
education on violence is conditional on the political sta-
tus of an ethnic group. We theorize that education may
actually increase the likelihood of violence in areas with a
politically excluded ethnic group, due to the fact that
education increases mobilization, but political exclusion
prevents ethnic groups from mobilizing through conven-
tional or nonviolent politics.
Education leads to an increase in what individuals feel
they deserve, contributing to a heightened sense of rela-
tive deprivation (Gurr, 1970). This often leads to edu-
cated individuals being more likely to advocate for
themselves and consequently seek to advance their status
through conventional politics. However, because of eth-
nic members’ excluded status, conventional participation
in national politics is perceived as not feasible or in some
cases, impossible. Nonviolent protest, too, may not help
an excluded ethnic group overcome deprivation (Koos,
2016), especially in non-democracies where the govern-
ment is better able to repress ethnic minority nonviolent
protests, suggesting that members of politically excluded
ethnic groups will view nonviolent protest as ineffective
and will not initiate nonviolent protests. Because con-
ventional politics and nonviolent protest are not seen as
viable options (Thurber, 2018), support of an armed
group may be the only choice for educated ethnic mem-
bers to address their grievances.
2
Importantly, we argue
that education does not generate ethnic group violence
everywhere; its impact is expected to be conditional on
ethnic groups being excluded, which blocks individuals
from accessing conventional politics and nonviolent pro-
test, leaving ethnic members with limited choices on
how to better their ethnic group’s political status.
This article makes three principal contributions to
existing scholarship. First, it addresses literature that has
produced mixed findings on the role of education and
violence by examining education in the context of polit-
ically excluded ethnic groups. We build on the previous
literature’s findings on education’s positive correlation
with political participation (Hillygus, 2005; Dahlum
& Wig, 2019), but diverge from existing insights by
addressing how the political context limits the effective-
ness of conventional political behavior and nonviolent
protest for excluded ethnic groups. Limited nonviolent
options, in combination with education’s impact on
political participation, result in support of violent action.
Our article thus contributes to scholarship by continuing
its focus on education and political participation while at
the same time highlighting the conditioning role of polit-
ical context.
Second, our study’s focus on education sheds light on
the role of non-material goods as a resource for excluded
ethnic groups to mobilize violently. While scholars have
made great strides in understanding the role of material
goods in relation to violent mobilization (e.g. Collier &
Hoeffler, 2004), less is known about non-material
resources (see Weinstein, 2007; Staniland, 2012; Larson
& Lewis, 2018 for important exceptions) like education.
Ignoring non-material resources, however, hinders our
understanding of the full spectrum of resources that eth-
nic group members use to engage in violence.
Third, we test our proposition at the subnational
level, moving beyond an aggregated country-level analy-
sis and address variation in violence within an excluded
ethnic group. Previous research on education and ethnic
violence uses country-level measurements of education
or treats ethnic groups as unitary entities, both of which
obscure localized variation. Our approach seeks to
address this shortcoming by providing a theoretical argu-
ment for where ethnic violence occu rs and leveraging
fine-grained geo-referenced data to test our expectations.
Ethnic violence and education
Our argument builds on two related and sometimes
overlapping literatures: ethnic civil war and the relation-
ship between education and political violence. Regarding
the former, grievances have played a prominent role in
2
Most educated individuals are not likely to pick up arms
themselves – existing research suggests that those with less to lose
are the ones predominantly doing the fighting (Humphreys &
Weinstein, 2008).
320 journal of PEACE RESEARCH 59(3)
To continue reading
Request your trial