Griffiths against Brome, Widow

JurisdictionEngland & Wales
Judgment Date19 November 1794
Date19 November 1794
CourtCourt of the King's Bench

English Reports Citation: 101 E.R. 438

IN THE COURT OF KING'S BENCH.

Griffiths against Brome
Widow.

[66] griffiths against brome, Widow. Wednesday, Nov. 19th, 1794. In a lease the lessor reserved a right to enter and cut timber, making reasonable satisfaction to the lessee for any damage occasioned thereby; covenant does not lie by such lessee for any wrongful act of cutting down by a third person, if without the consent or authority of the lessor, however he may countenance the, act afterwards. But where it only appeared that the lessor had promised to make compensation afterwards for such wrongful act, if the wrong doer himself did, not, it was not considered as an adoption of the act, nor as evidence of a prior consent to it, whereon to found an action on the covenant. ...... : This was an action of covenant tried before Heath J. at the last assizes for Shrewsbury. The plaintiff held an estate under the defendant, who was tenant'for life, with remainder to her son in tail. In the lease the defendant reserved the timber growing on the estate, with liberty to enter and cut down the same, making reasonable satisfaction to the plaintiff for the damage he should thereby sustain. It appeared. that the defendant's son, who was living upon bad terms with her, had entered upon the premises in question, and cut down timber at an improper season of the year, and received the money for the sale of it, whereby a damage had accrued to the plaintiff. In consequence of this the plaintiff applied to the defendant stating the nature of the damage, and requiring compensation; to which she answered that she thought he was entitled to it, and if her son would not pay it she would. And upon the plaintiff's telling her that he had left it to three neighbours to ascertain the amount of the damage, she replied, that she had no objection to them. The plaintiffs^ counsel contended that this evidence of the defendant's subsequent conduct amounted to a recognition of the son's having acted with her privity and concurrence, and was (a) Vide Simpson's case, Grodb. 265. 1 Kol. Eep. 137. Clamp v. Clamp, 4 Leon. 8. 6T. R.67. LATHAM 17. BARBER 439 an adoption of his acts: and Heath J. being of this opinion directed the jury to find a verdict for the plaintiff. Milles obtained a rule on a former day to set aside the verdict and to enter a nonsuit, on the ground that as there was no evidence of the act of the son having been originally committed by the command or consent of the...

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