Guest editor's introduction
| Published date | 01 March 2005 |
| Date | 01 March 2005 |
| DOI | 10.1177/002070200506000101 |
| Author | Wesley Wark |
| Subject Matter | Article |
WESLEY WARK
Guest
editor's
introduction
1:E
NEW INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT, rooted in the
terrorist attacks
of
11 September 2001, remains volatile and unpre-
dictable. While we continue to grapple with the aftershocks
of
9/11
and the Iraq War, the future
of
global security looks more perilous
than at any time since the end
of
the Cold War. For countries such
as Canada, the question
of
what the new environment portends is
both
ambiguous and controversial. Canada clearly has an important
stake in the global war on terror, yet it is a war
that
is
not
ours to
define.
Canada
cannot
be a leader in
the
fight; it lacks
both
the
power
and
the inclination to play such a role.
Nor
can it be content
to act as camp follower.
It
must shape its own strategy, yet shape it to
meet both domestic political requirements
and
the needs
of
its inter-
national policy.
For Canada, as for many other countries in the world, the dilemma
of
national security strategy is sharpened by the fact that we have
not
witnessed a direct, al Qaeda-inspired attack on
our
own country. We
may be on al Qaeda's announced hit list,
but
ambiguity remains about
how high a priority we should attach to terrorist threats.
Yet to design a national security strategy around an effort to cali-
brate the terrorist threat to Canadian interests is probably a fallacious
approach.
The
fallacy rests on two issues.
One
is that the new securi-
ty environment, like it or not, demands a "worst case" strategy. We
have to assume that global terrorism will sooner or later strike directly
at Canadian interests, and we have to take all reasonable precautions to
prevent or prepare for the day when such violence descends on
our
heads.
The
other root
of
error lies in assuming that national security
INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL
Wintet
2004-2005
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