Gwynne against Heaton and Others

JurisdictionEngland & Wales
Judgment Date27 June 1778
Date27 June 1778
CourtHigh Court of Chancery

English Reports Citation: 28 E.R. 949

HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY

Gwynne against Heaton and Others

See Miller v. Cook, 1870, L. R. 10 Eq. 646; Nevill v. Snelling, 1880, 15 Ch. D. 703.

Reports of CASES ARGUED and DETERMINED in the HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY, during the Time of Lord Chancellor Thurlow, and of the several Lords Commissioners of the Great Seal, and Lord Chancellor Longhborough, from 1778 to 1794 By WILLIAM BROWN, Barrister-at-Law. Fifth Edition by Robert Belt, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. 1820. Vol. I. [1] tbinity teem 18 geo. 3, 1778. gwynne against heaton and Others. [23, 26, 27 June 1778.] [See Miller v. CooTc, 1870, L. E. 10 Eq. 646 ; NeviUv. Snelling, 1880,15 Ch. D. 703.] Grant of a reversionary rent-charge, after the death of plaintiffs father (who was old and infirm) upon unreasonable terms, set aside; but to remain as a security for the money really advanced, and costs to be paid as in redeeming a mortgage. (1) This was a bill filed to be relieved against a bargain as unconscionable, under the following circumstances. By the will of the plaintiff's grandfather, the family estate was left to the plaintiffs father for life, the remainder to first and other sons in.tail-male : the estate was 2000 per annum.--The father being 81 years of age, and the son 23, seised of this estate tail in reversion, having offended his father by an imprudent match, in consequence of which he and his wife were turned out of doors, advertised in the publiek papers a reversionary annuity of 300 after the death of a man of great age, -The defendant's father (who knew the age of the plaintiffs father) applied, and the annuity Was sold to him on the following terms : the reversionary annuity in fee, after the death of the father^ was valued at 17 years' purchase, amounting to 5100.-Heaton was to grant to the plaintiff an annuity [2] of 400 for the life of the father, which was valued at 7 years' purchase, 2800, and to pay to Gwynne the remaining sum of 2300.- Accordingly, by deed bearing date the 12th of June 1773, the rent-charge was granted in consideration of 5100, with a covenant to levy a fine at the expence of Gwynne, and a bond of equal date in 10,000 penalty was given to suffer a recovery when he should come into possession.-By deeds of equal date, the annuity of 400 per annum was granted to Gwynne, secured by a transfer of long annuities to Heaton -the son (the present defendant) and the defendant Baker, a friend of Heaton's, with power to Heaton, in case of the death of either of them, to appoint new trustees. It does not appear whether this transfer ever took place. It was agreed between the parties, that the fine should be levied immediately, and the expence deducted out of the first payments of .the annuity; the fine was accordingly levied at the great session (the estate being in Carmarthenshire), and.a. charge made for the expences, of 314, 15s. Id. Deducting this sum far expences, 85, 4s. the balance of one year's annuity only was paid, though the ffttlier. suryiYed eighteen monti^s. There was no confirmation of the .bargain 950 G WYNNE V. HEATON 1 BED. C. C. 3. upon the death of the father, but he offered the present defendant Heaton (his father being then dead) 1000 to cancel the deeds, which being refused, this bill was filed. Mr. Attorney General and Mr. Price, for the plaintiff (after stating the case). On the part of Heaton, the defence is, that this was the offer of Gwynne, and that it was only a good bargain: It is true, a bargain is not to be destroyed where there is any measure of equality. In those cases, it is always upon the proposal of the person who is to give the good bargain. Take the comparison; an annuity in fee, at the death of a man eighty-one years old, is estimated at seventeen years' purchase, and.'.the. life of eighty-one, at seven, years' purchase, for which two years' purchase is the utmost value upon Dr. Halley's calculations. This. is. decisive .against Heaton^ it is,..an advantage that iio.man in a common situation would accede to -..Qwynne is to give every possible security, and at his own expence^; and, on the other side, to submit that Heaton should name the trustees, and, upon the death of either, should appoint new ones. This is contrary to the common mode of dealing between man* and man, and it is iaking an unconscientious advantage of his situation. In matters of a common kind, if a purchaser has a little advantage, [3] the Court has it in its discretion whether to take it away. From the time of Lord Guilford, to the present, there is no case like this, where relief has not been granted, except upon a confirmation. (See what Lord Hardwicke says on the subject of confirmations, Cole v. Gibson, 1 Ves. 503 and seq. [See also in Lord Chesterfield v. Jansson, 2 Ves. 146, 149, 152, 158.;.per Lord fhurlow, in Crowe v. Bollard, 1 Ves. jun. 220; ei per Lord Eldon, C., in Morse v. Royal, 12 Ves. 373; and Wiseman v. Beake, 2 Vernon, 121.]) He was doubtful in Noit v. Hill, 1 Vern. 167, whether this Court could meddle with a legal security, but that cause was reheard before Lord Je/erys and reversed, as being an unconscionable bargain. (It was on a second rehearing, 2 Vern. 27, Mr. Eaithby's edition.) According to the decision in that case, have been Berney v. Pitt, 2 Ch. E. 396; 2 Vern. 14. Wiseman v. Beake, 2 Vern. 121, where the plaintiff was not a young heir. Twistleton v. Griffith, 1 Wms. 310. Curwyn v. Milner, 3 Wms. 292 (note). Cole v. Gibbons, 3 Wms. 290. Sir IFilliam Stanhope v. Cope, 2 Atk. 231. Lord Chesterfield v. Janssen, 2 Vesey, 125, and 1 Atk. 301, where Lord HardwicKe's principle was, that, wherever there was an, unconscionable bargain entered into by a young heir, this court should relieve. Mr/ Ambler (for the defendant). Mr. Heaton did 'not in'general deal in annuities. -It is not necessary in this case to consider the case of young heirs dependent on their parents.-This is the ease of a gentleman living on his own fortune, applied to by the plaintiff,' invited into the bargain, and the terms deliberately settled by the plaintiff and his friends.-The question is singly, whether this agreement is upon such an inadequate consideration, that this Court will set it aside. The plaintiff was intitled to a remainder in :an estate of 2000 a-year, with limitations- over to his brother and several other persons, and had incurred the displeasure of his father, by marrying a servant in the house; on which account his father, at his death, gave all the property he could dispose of to the second son. The plaintiff put the advertisement into the papers, offering the...

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