Habeas Corpus?
| Published date | 01 April 2006 |
| DOI | 10.1177/1474885106061605 |
| Date | 01 April 2006 |
| Author | David Janssens |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Habeas Corpus?
Pierre Manent and the Politics of Europe
David Janssens Tilburg University
abstract: This article examines and assesses Pierre Manent’s critique of the
European political project and his concomitant endorsement of the nation-state. It
first presents Manent’s basic arguments against the European Union, focusing on his
Aristotelian understanding of political forms and his notion of the body politic.
Subsequently, it argues that Manent’s position, in part due to its Aristotelian
underpinnings, is deeply problematic, in that it disregards the contingency and the
element of representation that are necessarily inherent in the foundation of every
body politic. As a result, Manent’s critique tends to downplay the contingency of the
nation-state and to overplay the contingency of the European Union.
key words: Aristotle, body politic, European Union, Marcel Gauchet, incorporation,
Claude Lefort, Pierre Manent, nation-state, polis, political representation
Introduction
With the recent French and Dutch rejection of the Treaty Establishing a
Constitution for Europe, the process of European integration seems to have
entered a critical phase, the outcome of which is as yet impossible to predict.
Regardless of its success or failure, however, the process itself can be seen as an
attempt to found a polity that is in many ways unprecedented in scope and ambi-
tion. Because of this challenging novelty, the process has inevitably provoked
opposite reactions. Hailed by its proponents as the final overcoming of the violent
divisions that rent Europe in the course of the 20th century, at the same time its
opponents have lamented the decline of the nation-state and have argued that
Europe is not – and can never be – a satisfactory substitute.
One of the most thoughtful and eloquent critics of the European project is the
French political philosopher Pierre Manent. In numerous writings, Manent has
addressed what he calls ‘the construction of Europe’. Invariably, these writings are
as balanced, lucid and enlightening as their general outlook is critical. Unlike
many other critics, Manent does not take the easy option of pinpointing the prac-
tical difficulties that beset the project, invoking them as grounds for a subsequent
171
article
Contact address: David Janssens, Tilburg University, PO Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg,
The Netherlands.
Email: D.Janssens@uvt.nl
EJPT
European Journal
of Political Theory
© SAGE Publications Ltd,
London, Thousand Oaks
and New Delhi
issn 1474-8851, 5(2)171–190
[DOI: 10.1177/1474885106061605]
dismissal. Although he is keenly aware of these issues, he also offers a principled
philosophical argument, firmly rooted in historical knowledge and informed by
a profound understanding of classical, more specifically Aristotelian, political
philosophy. This article analyses Manent’s critique of the European project by
looking at its philosophical underpinnings. As I will argue, some of these are
deeply problematic. In sections 1–3, I present Manent’s position regarding
Europe and the nation-state. A critical examination of its presuppositions follows
in sections 4 and 5. From this vantage point, I return to the question of Europe
and the nation-state in sections 6 and 7.
1. Defining the Body Politic
Fundamental to Manent’s perspective is the Aristotelian view that the human
being is both a zôion logon echôn and a zôion politikon.1According to the first
definition, man is an animal endowed with the capacity for reasoned speech. This
capacity enables him to discover what is common to beings in general and, more
specifically, to his fellow men. It is the potential to discover and bring to light
what Manent calls ‘the human universality’ (l’universalité humaine), the specific
humanity of thought and action.2
However, the zôion logon echôn cannot actualize this potential in isolation.
According to Manent, human beings can only render concrete their abstract
human universality by ‘putting things in common’ (mettre des choses en commun), by
sharing certain conceptions, values and goals, and by defining a common good.3
This operation, Manent emphasizes, is essentially political rather than economic
or cultural: by ‘putting things in common’, human beings define and become part
of what he calls a ‘body politic’ (corps politique): a specific, distinct community, a
population defined by certain limits. This differentiation entails both the neces-
sity of a plurality of distinct bodies politic and the possibility of friction and even
conflict between them.4For this reason, Manent firmly rejects the idea of a
global or universal community. Since every body politic and every political form
presuppose limitation and thus differentiation, a body politic encompassing the
whole of humanity is impossible, ‘for humanity does not constitute a people’.5By
necessity, humanity is divided into different bodies politic: the universal can never
find expression directly, but only through the particular.
Moreover, the body politic necessarily takes on a determinate form, Manent
emphasizes: ‘there is no indefinite political form . . . once one lives politically,
one lives within a political form, or perhaps in the transition from one form to
another’.6By the same token, there is of necessity a plurality of possible political
forms. As examples, he cites, in historical succession, the tribe, the ancient polis,
the empire, the medieval church and the nation. At the same time, Manent
stresses that the number of possible political forms is limited: ‘The human world,
insofar as it is political, does not present us with an indefinite variability: it is
articulated, it is ordered.’7
European Journal of Political Theory 5(2)
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