Habermas and Oakeshott on Rationalism, Morality and Democratic Politics
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2011.00917.x |
| Date | 01 June 2012 |
| Published date | 01 June 2012 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
Habermas and Oakeshott on Rationalism,
Morality and Democratic Politicspost_917381..398
Gulshan Ara Khan
University of Nottingham
In this article I compare Michael Oakeshott’s and Jürgen Habermas’ respective accounts of morality, rationality and
politics. I show that they both theorise the conditions of the modern political community as a ‘civil association’, and
I argue that this comparison enables us to challenge predominant understandings of each thinker and to address
criticisms levelled against them. I demonstrate that the contextualist and Hegelian aspects of Habermas’ earlier work
are carried over into his later work on discourse ethics and that he puts forward a more situated understanding of
rationality and morality than is usually acknowledged.I also show that Oakeshott is not a straightforward conservative
and in some respect he can be seen as a forerunner of deliberative politics.However,this compar ison takes us beyond
an exercise in interpretation, and I also draw attention to the practical possibilities residing in the work of Oakeshott
and Habermas. Indeed,it is my contention that each of their approaches has much to offer in addressing the challenges
of pluralism characteristic of contemporary multicultural societies and that their respective works can contribute to a
contemporary theory of critical republicanism.
Keywords: societas; morality; rule of law; discourse ethics; democracy
This article compares Michael Oakeshott’s and Jürgen Habermas’ conceptions of ratio-
nality, morality and politics.1On a prime facie analysis there may appear to be significant
differences between the work of these two prominent figures in twentieth-century
political thought. Habermas is heir to the legacy of the Frankfurt School of critical
theory and his theory of ‘discourse ethics’ has had a significant impact on contemporary
theories of deliberative democracy. By way of contrast, Oakeshott is generally perceived
as a conservative thinker. However, his influence is steadily growing nearly two decades
after his death, and in recent years a variety of liberal and democratic theorists have
drawn upon aspects of his work, including Richard Rorty (1979), John Rawls (1993),
Chantal Mouffe (1993) and Margaret Canovan (1999). Oakeshott’s work falls broadly
within the tradition of British Idealism and follows the Hegelian side of German Idealist
philosophy, whereas Habermas’ later work on discourse ethics is generally understood to
fall within the Kantian side of this tradition. Indeed, Oakeshott is renowned for his
critique of rationalism in politics whereas Habermas defends Enlightenment reason.
Oakeshott’s emphasis on the importance of tradition in shaping individual behaviour
appears to be at odds with Habermas’ formulation of generalised r ules, which establish
universal norms of conduct for the regulation of social interaction. Oakeshott’s emphasis
on vindication through persuasion jars with Habermas’ stress on rational justification
(Habermas, 1990, p. 209; Oakeshott, 1975, p. 69). Evidently, there are significant differ-
ences between their respective approaches. However, I show that on closer examination
Habermas’ early and later works exhibit important similarities with Oakeshott. In fact,
some of the features listed above actually reveal points of convergence between the two
thinkers, and it is often their different vocabulary that makes it appear otherwise. Indeed,
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doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2011.00917.x
POLITICAL STUDIES: 2012 VOL 60, 381–398
© 2011The Author.Political Studies © 2011 Political Studies Association
the purpose of this article is to consider important similar ities between their respective
approaches.
There are a number of advantages to demonstrating the proximity between Oakeshott
and Habermas. First,we can challenge the predominant understandings of each thinker and
address some of the criticisms levelled against them. For example, post-structuralists have
criticised Habermas’ work for being overly ‘rationalist’ and he is often presented as
advocating an abstract transcendental conception of rationality (see, for example, Lyotard,
1984; Mouffe, 1993; 2000). Clearly, the Kantian emphasis on procedural rationality is a
central component of Habermas’ theory of discourse ethics; however, it is my contention
that these criticisms overlook the Hegelian and more contextualist elements in Habermas’
earlier work, in his theory of communicative action and in his project of discourse ethics.
Indeed, I show that Habermas’ conceptions of rationality and morality share important
points of similarity with Oakeshott’s reflections on practical knowledge and civil association
and this comparison helps to bring out the r ichness in Habermas’ concepts and to rebuff
those who see his work as a narrow defence of proceduralism.In addition, this comparison
enables Oakeshott’s categories to be seen in a different light. In 1976 Oakeshott explicitly
abandoned the term ‘tradition’ and replaced it with the term ‘practice’,yet both cr itics and
sympathisers read his work as a form of political conservatism (Anderson, 1992;Oakeshott,
1976). The comparison with Habermas shows that these readings underestimate Oake-
shott’s emphasis on politics as the conscious direction of society towards generalisable
norms, and in some respects his work pre-empts contemporary deliberative understandings
of democracy.
However, this comparison takes us beyond an exercise in interpretation and I also draw
attention to the practical possibilities residing in the work of Oakeshott and Habermas.
Indeed, it is my contention that each of their approaches has much to offer in addressing
the challenges of pluralism characteristic of contemporary multicultural societies. I show
that Habermas and Oakeshott both theorise the conditions of the modern political
community as a ‘civil association’. This is not understood as an instrumental enter prise to
pursue a common goal, but rather as a form of collective identification in which diverse
citizens are in a relationship of loyalty to one another in recognising certain conditions of
acting. As I see it, Oakeshott’s and Habermas’ work can contribute to a contemporary
theory of critical republicanism, which is in close proximity to the ideas put forward by
thinkers such as Philip Pettit (1999), Quentin Skinner (1998; 2002) and Cécile Laborde
(2008). Indeed, a critical republican perspective – which draws upon Habermas and
Oakeshott2– offers a clear alternative to the predominant responses to pluralism. For
example, this is different to the liberal theories of Rawls (1971) and Ronald Dworkin
(1977), which stress the ideals of state neutrality and the importance of foundational
principles of justice, and it is also different to the proposals of multiculturalists like Will
Kymlicka (1995)and Bhikhu Parekh (2000), who advocate forms of legal pluralism and a
system of group rights. By way of contrast, a critical republican response to the challenges
of pluralism seeks to address questions of diversity and recognition with recourse to the idea
of liberty as non-domination, and seeks to address the problem of social cohesion charac-
teristic of multicultural societies through emphasising the idea of a common civic bond
between diverse groups and individuals (Skinner, 2002, p. 24). From this perspective, the
382 GULSHAN ARA KHAN
© 2011The Author.Political Studies © 2011 Political Studies Association
POLITICAL STUDIES: 2012, 60(2)
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