Hart v Cradock

JurisdictionEngland & Wales
Judgment Date15 July 1837
Date15 July 1837
CourtHigh Court of Chancery

English Reports Citation: 59 E.R. 229



Interest. Annuity. Judgment Debt.

8BIM. B78. HYDE V. PRICE 229 [578] hyde v. price. hart v. cradock. July 14, 15, 1837. Interest. Annuity. Judgment Debt. In 1795 an annuity was granted for the grantor's life, and was secured by a bond and by a warrant of attorney, on which judgment was entered up. The grantor died intestate in 1810, at which time the annuity was greatly in arrear. The grantor's assets consisted solely of a fund in Court which had been accumulating from the grantor's death. No administration was taken out to the grantor until 1834. Held, that the grantee was entitled to be paid the arrears of the annuity, with interest at five per cent, from the death of the grantor. Many of the provisions of 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 413, though made with reference to proceedings at law, will be adopted by this Court. On the 19th of June 1779 Wm. Price and Mary, his wife, having agreed to live separate from each other, a deed of separation was executed by them and other parties. By a deed, dated the 20th of January 1794, William Price, in lieu of the provision made for his wife by the former deed, assigned 2500 stock to a trustee, in trust to apply the dividends for her maintenance and support, during the joint lives of Plaintiff rests merely in contract, where no estate passes but there ia merely an agreement as to convey land, to transfer stock, to assign a bond debt or other chose in action, this Court will not interfere. This is the principle upon which the recent decisions in different branches of the Court have proceeded. But the case is widely changed where there has been actually a conveyance of the land, a transfer of the stock or an assignment of the chose in action ; there the cestui que trust may sustain a suit against the trustee, and the trustee may file his bill to have protection and indemnity against conflicting claimants." It was also contended that the furniture, though retained by the settlor, passed by the deed, as the retainer was consistent with the [577] deed. See Ellison v. Ellison, 6 Ves. 656; L'ldmrlofl v. Pulvertofl, 18 Ves. 84; Fortescue v. Burnett, 3 Myl. & Keen, 36. The Lord Chancellor said he regretted that he could not put the parties in a situation to have their rights decided, but that he saw no way of doing it, looking at the state of the pleadings before him ; that, if the Plaintiffs were right in their facts and their law, they were in error as regarded the form ofthe, suit; that the bill was riot one by which a trustee called upon the Court, by reason of the difficulty arising from the nature of the trust and the conflicting claims of parties, to lend him its aid and protection ; that, had the bill been one of that kind, making the cestui yue trusts Defendants instead of making some of them Co-plaintiffs, and stating that the trusts could not be carried into execution without the assistance of equity, inasmuch as the executors and the persons claiming beneficially were quarrelling amongst themselves, the Court might have done something; it might have directed some inquiries before the Master, which would have eventually enabled it to give suitable relief. The bill claims the residue, and the Plaintiffs feel themselves bound to admit that whatever they are entitled to is only after the debts shall be satisfied. On that head inquiry would be requisite. It might be contended that the property assigned is not subject to debts incurred since the date of the deed. Information might be requisite as to whether there were debts when the deed was made 12 years ago and the amount. But, as this bill cannot enable the Court at any period to decide on the merits, it is useless to consider what, if it had been properly framed, assuming the facts and arguments on the Plaintiff's behalf are correct, the inquiry ought to have been. According to those arguments the trustee can recover at law. Why does he come here, then, for the recovery of mere choses in action and personal chattels, for that is the object of the bill in its present shape? What aid does he want from this Court? Why does he not bring his action at law 'I The bill is equally defective if looked at as the bill of the cextui qu-e tninln. In such a bill as that the trustee would be, of course, the principal Defendant. The Vice-Chancellor's decree dismissing the bill must be confirmed, except that it must be with/nit prejudice- to the institution of any other suit. 230 HYDE V. PRICE 8 SIM. 579. himself and his wife; and in case John Price, their son, should survive his mother, then in trust, after her decease, to transfer the stock to him; but in case he should die before, then in trust, after the decease of Mrs. Price, to transfer the stock to William Price, his executors, &c. By an indenture of the 25th of May 1793, Mary Price and John Price, in consideration of 560 (which was raised for purchasing a commission in the Army for John Price), granted to William Hyde an annuity of 70 during their joint lives and the life of the survivor, and charged it upon the 2500 stock; and for further securing the annuity they, at the same time, executed to Hyde a bond in the penalty of 1200, and also a warrant of attorney for confessing judgment against them, at his suit, for the same amount. [579] In August 1795 Mary Price and John Price, in consideration of 240, granted to Thomas Shearcroft an annuity of 30 during their lives and the life of the survivor, and charged and secured it in the same manner as the former annuity. In Trinity term 1795 judgment was entered up on both the warrants of attorney. Hyde's annuity being in arrear, he, in June 1796, filed the bill in the first cause against Mr. and Mrs. Price, John Price, Shearcroft and the trustee of the deed of January 1794, praying that the 2500 stock might be transferred to the Accountant-General, and the dividends applied in payment of the arrears and future payments of his annuity. In June 1797 the cause was heard before Lord Alvanley, M.E., who dismissed the bill so far as it sought payment of the annuity, out of the stock, during the life of Mrs. Price, inasmuch as no trust was created by the deed of 1794 for her separate use, and therefore she had no dominion over the dividends of the stock, but tho trust created by that deed was for her maintenance and support, in which her husband had an interest as well as herself. His Lordship, however, held that the grants of the annuities were good so far as they affected the contingent...

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