Hegel and Natural Law Theory
| Date | 01 February 1995 |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9256.1995.tb00017.x |
| Published date | 01 February 1995 |
| Author | Tony Burns |
| Subject Matter | Article |
Politics
(1995)
15(1)
pp.
27-32
Hegel
and
Natural
Law
Tony
Burns
72is paper examines Hegel’s attitude towarak
natural law the0
y.
Commentators disagree
on
this. Some say that Hegel
is
hostile to nat-
ural law theoy and that he is
a
legal positi-
vist Others say that he is
in
fact, a natural
law theorist
in
the conventional sense. 72e
paper argues that both of these intevpreta-
tions are incorrect. It takes the view that
Hegel
is
a natural law theorist, but not in the
conventional sense. Like certain of the medie-
val scholastics, he subscribes to what is by
current standard, an unconventional t@e
of natural law theoy, which derives ulti-
mately
from
Aristotle.
Introduction
A
natural law theorist is usually thought
of
as
being someone who believes that there are
certain principles of justice or morality which
are discoverable by reason and which have
a
validity which is both timeless and universal.
The precepts
of
natural law forbid the perfor-
mance
of
certain actions. These actions are
not considered
to
be wrong or unjust
because they have been forbidden by positive
law. Rather, they are wrong or unjust in
themselves, and that is why positive law for-
bids them.
The principles
of
natural law, therefore,
constitute a critical standard which can be
used by individual citizens
to
evaluate the
positive law of the society in which they live.
If
positive law should command
or
permit the
performance
of
an action which
is
intrinsically
wrong, then the law in question is
itself
an
unjust law. The individual citizen is, as a
result, under no moral obligation
to
obey
it
(Chloros, 1958, p.609; d’Entreves, 1970, p.93;
Haines, 1965, p.1; Kelsen, 1973, pp.129-31;
Sigmund, 1971, p.viii; Strauss, 1974, p.2; Woll-
heim, 1967, p.450).
Hegel’s interpreters seem unable
to
agree
when assessing his attitude towards natural
law theory. Some commentators, perhaps
most, argue that he rejects altogether the
notions of natural law and the correlative
notion
of
natural rights, and hence also the
basic assumptions
of
natural law theory
(Carritt, 1935, pp.107-14; d’Entreves, 1970,
pp.72-74; Fine, 1984, pp. 56-57; Friedmann,
Lloyd, 1972, p.68; Popper, 1969, pp.41, 66;
Sabine, 1973, pp.589, 592, 603-4, 608).
Other commentators however, reject this
view. They argue that Hegel is in fact a nat-
ural law theorist in the conventional sense
(Germino, 1969, p.888; 1970, pp.293-313;
Pelczynski, 1964, pp.28, 31, 35, 37, 40,
45,
1991, pp.m-xvi).
49-52, 55, 115, 134; Wood, 1990, p.105;
Hegel’s
early essay
on
natural
law
An
important source
for
anyone seeking to
assess Hegel’s attitude towards natural law
theory is his early essay
On
the ScientiJic
Tony
Bums,
Nottingham Trent University
6
Political Studies Association
1995.
Published by Blackwell Publishers,
108
Cowley Road, Oxford
OX4
UF,
UK
and
238
Main Street, Cambridge, MA
02142,
USA.
27
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