Hegel on Marriage and Politics
| Author | Peter J. Steinberger |
| Published date | 01 December 1986 |
| Date | 01 December 1986 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.1986.tb01614.x |
| Subject Matter | Article |
Political
Studies
(1986),
XXXIV,
575-591
Hegel on Marriage and Politics
PETER
J.
STEINBERGER*
Reed College, Portland, Oregon
This essay examines Hegel’s theory
of
marriage and the r61e that it plays in the
argument of the
Philosophy
of
Right.
It aims to show that the theory of marriage is
based
on
a particular conception
of
the human self as developed in the threefold
structure of the
Philosophy
of
Righr.
It
also seeks to demonstrate the cogency and
relevance of Hegel’s specific arguments pertaining to love, sensuality, the marriage
contract, and the marriage ceremony. Finally,
it
characterizes the precise place and
function
of
the theory of marriage in the overall dialectic
of
Right.
We may say without too much oversimplification that Hegel’s philosophy is
aimed at overcoming contradictions. To be a little more precise, his concern is
to show that apparent contradictions are either not real contradictions
or,
at
least, are not necessary contradictions. Each sphere of his philosophy-logic,
philosophy
of
history, aesthetics, and
so
on-manifests this concern. That is,
each formulates its particular philosophical problems in terms of apparent
contradictions and then proceeds to demonstrate how those contradictions can
be resolved in thought
or
in action. Thus, for example, Hegel’s metaphysics
begins by elucidating and then resolving the apparent contradiction between
being and not-being; his philosophy
of
history seeks to transcend the antithesis
of
ancient and modern; his ethics aims at overcoming the opposition between
duty and desire. There are, to be sure, overlaps between these spheres, and these
overlaps are in part what provides Hegel’s philosophy with its ‘systematic’
character. That is, the resolution of contradictions in one area has implications
for the philosophical work to be done in the others. Nonetheless, the various
spheres remain distinctive insofar as each is characterized by a peculiar and
identifiable set of oppositions.
Of
course, it is not at all clear what
it
means to ‘resolve’
or
‘overcome’ such
contradictions. The Hegelian Aufhebung is an extraordinarily difficult
concept; its precise rational
or
logical status remains a subject of considerable
controversy.
For
the purposes of the present essay, we will have to be satisfied
with something like the following description: a contradiction is resolved
or
overcome-it is aufgehoben-when its constituent elements, while retaining
their difference and distinctiveness, are nonetheless shown
to
be somehow
compatible
or
consistent with one another. The vehicle for achieving this
resolution is the introduction of some new element-typically a concept-
which somehow provides us with the insight that the things we thought to be
*
I
am grateful to Arthur DiQuattro, George Armstrong Kelly, Peter Nicholson, John Stanley,
Richard Wolin, and Allen Wood
for
their valuable comments and suggestions.
0032-3217/86/04/0575-17/$03.00
0
1986
Political Studies
576
Hegel on Marriage and Politics
incompatible are not simply quite compatible but are in fact mutually
dependent. In this way, the opposition between the elements is annulled while
the distinction between them is preserved.
A
sketch of this kind provides a useful context for any discussion
of
Hegel’s
political thought. This is because the ‘philosophy of right’ is just another sphere
of
Hegel’s larger system; its problems must therefore be understood as
contradictions to be resolved or overcome through an application of Hegel’s
dialectical logic. Moreover, the central problem
or
contradiction with which the
political philosophy is concerned is plain enough, although formulating it
accurately and concisely may not be that easy. We might formulate it as the
contradiction between universal and particular,
or
between polis and nation-
state,
or
between subjective inclination and objective duty. These oppositions
are far from equivalent, but they are all evocative of a single and more general
philosophical problem. Hegel himself writes of
. .
.
the reconciliation with the actual which philosophy affords to those in
whom there has arisen an inner voice bidding them to comprehend and in
which subjective freedom, and that which is substantive, are both main-
tained
so
that subjective freedom stands not in anything particular and
accidental but rather in that which exists in and for itself.’
For
the sake of simplicity, let
us
reformulate this as a contradiction between the
individual and society. It describes a situation in which the needs and legitimate
goals of the individual (for example, freedom, spontaneity, self-expression, the
opportunity to be eccentric, etc.) appear to be deeply incompatible with the
needs and legitimate goals of society (for example, order, conformity,
obedience, coordination, and
so
on). On such an account the project of the
Philosophy
of
Right
is to demonstrate how this apparent contradiction can be
overcome. The further implication is that each of the many arguments of the
Philosophy
of
Right
must be understood and evaluated in terms of its
contribution to this particular project.
The focus of the present essay is on Hegel’s theory of marriage.* This theory
should be understood as one part
of
his theory of the family which is, in turn,
just one stage in the unfolding or actualization of Right. Thus,
our
central task
is to examine the rBle that marriage plays in resolving the contradiction between
individual and society. In accomplishing this task, it will be necessary to
explicate the specific arguments of the theory of marriage which are several and
include controversial positions concerning love, the marriage ceremony,
sexuality, and
so
on.
If
we find these various arguments unconvincing, then it
will be difficult
to
accept the r61e assigned by Hegel to marriage in the overall
project
of
the
Philosophy
of
Right.
On the other hand,
if
we find them
persuasive, then this will presumably strengthen at least somewhat the prima
facie appeal of Hegel’s larger project. Hegel’s theory
of
marriage-in most of
I
G.
W.
F.
Hegel,
Grundinien
derPhi/osophiedesRechfs(Hamburg,
Felix Meiner,
1955)
(edited
by Johannes Hofmeister), p.
16.
2
1
use the word ‘theory’ here, and throughout, in the loosest sense to include Hegel’s concept of
marriage, his justification
of
that concept, and his analysis of the rBle
of
marriage in the dialectic
of
Right. Of course, the reader should also note that marriage itself occupies onlyone-third of Hegel’s
treatment
of
the family, the other sections dealing with family capital and the education
of
the
young. These other sections are not discussed in the present paper.
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