Hegemonic-order theory: A field-theoretic account
| Author | Iver B. Neumann,Daniel H. Nexon |
| DOI | 10.1177/1354066117716524 |
| Published date | 01 September 2018 |
| Date | 01 September 2018 |
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https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066117716524
European Journal of
International Relations
2018, Vol. 24(3) 662 –686
© The Author(s) 2017
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DOI: 10.1177/1354066117716524
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Hegemonic-order theory:
A field-theoretic account
Daniel H. Nexon
Georgetown University, USA
Iver B. Neumann
Norwegian Institute for International Affairs, Norway
Abstract
This article outlines a field-theoretic variation of hegemonic-order theory — one
inspired primarily by the work of Pierre Bourdieu. We argue that hegemony derives
from the possession of a plurality of meta-capital in world politics; hegemons exercise
“a power over other species of power, and particularly over their rate of exchange.”
Recasting conventional hegemonic-order theories along these lines carries with
it at least three advantages: it helps bridge the differences between realist and neo-
Gramscian approaches to hegemony; it provides scaffolding for exploring the workings
of hegemony and hegemonic ordering across different scales; and it better addresses the
fact that hegemonic powers are enabled and constrained by international order itself.
After reviewing some of the major variants of hegemonic-order theory, we explore
Bourdieu’s understanding of hegemony and cognate concepts. We then elaborate on
our field-theoretic approach, with examples drawn from US foreign relations and the
Roman Empire. Finally, we provide a longer illustrative sketch in the form of a discussion
of Roman ordering and its longue durée influence on social, political, and cultural fields
in world politics.
Keywords
Field theory, hegemonic stability theory, hegemony, historical sociology, international
order, practice-turn theory
Corresponding author:
Daniel H. Nexon, Georgetown University, 6th Floor ICC, Washington, DC 20057, USA.
Email: dhn2@georgetown.edu
716524EJT0010.1177/1354066117716524European Journal of International RelationsNexon and Neumann
research-article2017
Article
Nexon and Neumann 663
Introduction
Many hold that hegemons — pre-eminent powers that exercise a leadership role in
international systems — establish order in line with their own preferences. They see
hegemons as international quasi-states, able to use their preponderant economic and
military power to take on some of the functions in world politics that governments per-
form in domestic politics (see Butt, 2013: 578–590). In most approaches, the order
remains largely inert until the system faces a power transition. Either dominant powers
successfully adjust the order to accommodate rising powers or the system sees a power-
transition war.
Such hegemonic-stability and power-transition accounts generally neglect theorizing
about how, first, the power politics of hegemony operate at multiple levels of political
life and, second, international order itself structures emergent hegemony. Building on
work by Julian Go (2008, 2012), we develop a practice-turn, field-theoretic account of
hegemony. In it, hegemony derives from the possession of a plurality of meta-capital in
world politics. Hegemons exercise “a power over other species of power, and particu-
larly over their rate of exchange” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 114). This meta-capital
stems from highly asymmetric military and economic capabilities; hegemons achieve
preponderance in military and economic fields, and this enables them to shape and even
create other fields — such as, in the contemporary era, diplomacy, finance, and sports.
They influence what counts as salient capital — performances and goods — within these
fields, as well as the exchange rates of different capital across them.
However, this ordering has its limits. Hegemons cannot completely restructure inter-
national order; they emerge in pre-existing social fields, and rarely, if ever, enjoy a suf-
ficient preponderance of meta-capital to rewrite those fields entirely. For example,
aspects of international order beyond their control may facilitate or undermine imperial
modes of control (Go, 2008, 2012; MacDonald, 2009). Moreover, past hegemons may
exert influence on relevant fields long after they disappear. A trip to the National Mall or
a walk past the British Museum serve as reminders that — more than a millennium after
the fall of Rome — Roman cultural capital remains a symbolic prop for imperial and
great-power politics.
A field-theoretic account of hegemony provides more than a means to incorporate
longer-term dynamics of order and ordering. It also:
Suggests a way to bridge different conceptualizations of hegemony, such as realist
ones and Gramscian accounts of cultural preponderance.
Establishes scaffolding for relating macro-level, meso-level, and micro-level
dimensions of hegemony. These dynamics operate directly among polities — such
as the US and Canada — but also in meso-level and micro-level settings. States,
non-state actors, and individuals, for example, “struggle to accumulate and
monopolize different kinds of capital” (Swartz, 1996: 79) within and across spe-
cific institutions of international order — such as the United Nations (Pouliot,
2016) — in ways that potentially reproduce, mutate, and challenge macro-level
hegemonic-order processes (cf. Bourdieu, 1986: 47).
Extends practice-turn theorizing. English School (Clark, 2009), network-relational
(Nexon and Wright, 2007), and relational-contracting (Lake, 2009) approaches all
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