Heidegger’s appropriation of Aristotle: Phronesis, conscience, and seeing through the one
| Author | Matthew C. Weidenfeld |
| DOI | 10.1177/1474885110395480 |
| Published date | 01 April 2011 |
| Date | 01 April 2011 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Article
E J P T
European Journal of Political Theory
10(2) 254–276
! The Author(s) 2011
Heidegger’s appropriation
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of Aristotle:
DOI: 10.1177/1474885110395480
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Phronesis, conscience, and
seeing through the one
Matthew C. Weidenfeld
Washington State University, USA
Abstract
This article attempts to show that Heidegger’s phenomenology may shed light on polit-
ical phenomena. It pursues this project by arguing that Heidegger’s phenomenology is an
appropriation of Aristotle’s practical philosophy and his conceptualization of phronesis.
I argue that, in Being and Time, Heidegger’s ‘circumspection’, which is a capacity for
making sense of practical situations, is a translation of phronesis. Heidegger argues,
though, that the sight of circumspection is foreshortened by the rules and norms of ‘the
one’. In division 2, ‘conscience’ becomes a sharpening of the vision of phronesis, which
sees through the one. I then defend Heidegger’s appropriation of phronesis and argue
that Heidegger’s concept of conscience, which takes up a critical stance toward plural-
ity, may actually be a proper vision of practical wisdom under modern conditions.
I substantiate this claim by turning to an unlikely source to bolster Heidegger’s reading
of phronesis and the modern public, Hannah Arendt.
Keywords
Arendt, Aristotle, conscience, das Man, Heidegger, phronesis, the social
There is a familiar trope within political theory concerning Martin Heidegger’s
contributions to the field, which runs along these lines: Heidegger’s political
thinking is, at best, unhelpful and, at worst, dangerous. The former claim begins
with Hannah Arendt, who excoriates Heidegger’s turn to the ‘Self’ in division 2 of
Being and Time as a quasi-mystical negation of the public dimensions of existence
and of the political possibilities that are tied to human plurality.1 This line of
argument is picked up by Jacques Taminiaux who argues that Heidegger’s
thought represents a traditional opposition of the philosopher to the polis, where
Corresponding author:
Matthew C Weidenfeld, Department of Political Science, Washington State University, USA
Email: mweiden@wsu.edu
Weidenfeld
255
Heidegger merely continues a tradition of metaphysical thinking that is hostile to
politics.2 The latter claim, that Heidegger’s thought is dangerous for politics, is
made most forcefully by Ju¨rgen Habermas and Richard Wolin, who see Being and
Time as introducing a line of thinking in western philosophy that undermines
public standards of rationality and a philosophical justification for political
decisionism.3
My aim is not to offer an apologetic for Heidegger’s politics or to argue that
Being and Time was not connected to his political engagement. Such a defense
would come onto the scene too late and could only cloud over Heidegger’s own
responsibility and guilt, with which he never came to terms. The lines of connection
from Being and Time to Heidegger’s politics is a path so well worn and so poorly
resolved that it doesn’t warrant a revisiting here; instead, this article pursues a
broader project of showing that Heidegger’s phenomenology may shed light on
political phenomena. I argue that Heidegger’s phenomenology may help to theorize
politics by showing that Being and Time is an appropriation of Aristotle’s practical
philosophy and his conceptualization of phronesis; in fact, I hope to show that, if
the Aristotelian roots of Heidegger’s phenomenology are properly understood,
then it will be clear that Heidegger provides resources for conceptualizing practice
under modern conditions.
The claim that Being and Time is an appropriation of Aristotle’s practical phi-
losophy is not surprising; after all, there is now no doubt about the influence of
Aristotle on Heidegger, though the actual content of that influence is subject to
debate.4 Jacques Taminiaux, for instance, has argued that Heidegger’s analysis of
equipment and the workworld in division 1 of Being and Time is derived from
Aristotle’s analysis of techne, whereas division 2 and the discussion of authenticity
is driven by Heidegger’s appropriation of phronesis.5 Robert Bernasconi and
Franco Volpi, on the other hand, have argued that the appropriation of phronesis
plays a role in the entirety of Being and Time and not just in division 2.6 In this
article, I attempt to clarify the exact role that the appropriation of phronesis plays
in Heidegger’s thought by examining, mainly, Heidegger’s reading Aristotle in two
of his lecture courses: the summer semester 1924 course, ‘Basic Concepts of
Aristotelian Philosophy’, and the winter semester 1924–5 course, ‘Plato’s
Sophist’. I argue that the appropriation of phronesis undergirds the whole of
Being and Time and that this work is, in fact, a useful resource for practical
philosophy. The argument is developed in two sections. The first section argues
that in division 1 of Being and Time, Heidegger’s ‘circumspection’, which is a
capacity for making sense of practical situations, is a translation of phronesis.
Heidegger argues, though, that the sight of circumspection is foreshortened by
the rules and norms of ‘the one’ (das Man). In division 2, ‘conscience’ (Gewissen)
is a sharpening of the vision of phronesis, which sees through the one.7 The second
section defends Heidegger’s appropriation of phronesis from familiar criticisms
and moves on to argue that Heidegger’s concept of conscience, which takes up a
critical stance toward plurality, may actually be a proper vision of practical wisdom
under modern conditions.8 I substantiate this claim by turning to an unlikely
256
European Journal of Political Theory 10(2)
source to bolster Heidegger’s reading of phronesis and the modern public: Hannah
Arendt. The turn to Arendt, though, can only make sense once we have understood
Heidegger’s appropriation of phronesis.
The dual reading of phronesis in Being and Time
Division 1 of Being and Time displaces the traditional priority of an epistemological
picture in which a subject considers the properties of objects in an explicit and
propositional manner. In opposition to this picture, Heidegger points out that
existence is usually a matter of coping with things and other people in ways that
makes sense; that is, our practices are intelligible, they have meaning, but are not
intellectual. The aim of division 1 is to point out the structure of these comport-
ments, which Heidegger refers to as Being-in-the-world, and show that they serve
as a condition for the possibility of explicit knowing.
In division 1, Heidegger argues that our activities are structured in a meaningful
way around a set of self-understandings – what Heidegger calls the for-the-sake-
of-which (worumwillen) – that are not explicit.9 For example, one does not spell out
what it means to be a good teacher (a for-the-sake-of-which) before entering a
classroom (one may do this, but these sorts of inflexible interpretation generally
dissolve in the face of practice), but shows what this means in one’s teaching
activity; that is, one does not usually follow a set of ideals of good teaching, but
teaching well actually comes to be only in the way one approaches students with
respect, by asking questions, modulating one’s tone of voice, etc. in the right way
and at the right time. Despite the fact that these understandings are not explicit,
they are stable over time because our activities make sense in the light of our
orienting for-the-sake-of-which’s. What keeps these for-the-sake-of-which’s in
view and orients our activities is a way of knowing that Heidegger refers to as
circumspection (umsicht).
Being-in-the-world is proximally absorbed in concern [in our example, teaching in a
classroom]. This concern is guided by circumspection (umsicht), which discovers the
ready-to-hand and preserves it as thus discovered. Whenever we have something to
contribute or perform, circumspection gives us the route for proceeding with it, the
means of carrying it out, the right opportunity, the appropriate moment.10
As one teaches in a classroom, one takes up a circumspective view of the teach-
ing situation that illuminates the means, the opportunities, and the moment for
question asking and these engagements are guided by a practical sense of what one
is up to and what one is about. One is able ‘to see’ how the activities of writing on
the board and moving about the classroom move toward the project of teaching
well without bringing any of this to mind.
The origin of this conceptual constellation of circumspection and its rela-
tion to the for-the-sake-of-which lies in Heidegger’s appropriation of the
Weidenfeld
257
Nicomachean Ethics, which focuses on book 6 and the concept of phronesis.11
In fact, Heidegger translates phronesis, in ‘Plato’s Sophist’, ‘Basic Concepts’,
and
the
manuscript,
‘Phenomenological
Interpretations
with
Respect
to
Aristotle’, as ‘circumspection’ (umsicht) and the hou heneka as the ‘for the sake
of which’ (worumwillen).12 In ‘Plato’s Sophist’, Heidegger reads NE 6 as an argu-
ment that phronesis discloses a situation with reference to the hou heneka, which
is Dasein itself. Being and Time also shows that what guides our practices is a for-
the-sake-of-which that is oriented by the sight of circumspection. Heidegger intends
his concept of circumspection to be a phenomenological account of phronesis.
Heidegger, then, takes on the supposed priority of disinterested, theoretical ways
of being through a reading of Aristotle’s conceptualization of phronesis. It is...
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